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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) and Rule 4A of the
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This

is

a

lawsuit

contract, and bad faith.

for declaratory

relief, breach

of

The lower court granted defendants

motion for summary judgment, ruling that plaintiffs1 loss was
excluded

by

policy.

(At the hearing, plaintiffs stipulated that their

claim

the

for bad

earth

movement

provision

of

defendant's

faith could be dismissed with prejudice

(R.

200).)

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Defendant accepts plaintiffs1 statement of the issue.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant accepts plaintiffs1 statement of the case.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Plaintiffs argue that the earth movement
limited to acts of God or natural phenomena.

1

exclusion is

However, State

Farm's policy plainly states that earth movement is excluded
regardless of its cause.

In other words, earth movement need

not be caused by an act of God in order to be excluded.

The

policy states:
The Company does not insure for loss which would not
have occurred in the absence of one or more of the
following excluded events.
The Company does not
insure for such loss regardless of: a) the cause of
the excluded event . . .
• • • •

(1)

earth movement, whether combined with
water or not . . .

See page 6 of the policy, a copy of which is attached hereto
in the addendum.

State Farm inserted this language into its

policies in 1983 in order to make certain that excluded events
such as earth movement would not result in coverage even if
the loss was attributable to human activity.

Every court that

has had occasion to consider this new policy language since
then has found it to be valid and enforceable.

Earth movement

is excluded regardless of its cause.

ARGUMENT

I.
Earth movement is excluded regardless of
its cause.

2

Plaintiffs
language

in

have

their

failed

brief.

to

quote

This

the

language

critical

policy

is known

as the

"lead-in" clause to the earth movement exclusion.

The clause

reads as follows:
The Company does not insure for loss which would not
have occurred in the absence of one or more of the
following excluded events.
The Company does not
insure for such loss regardless of: a) the cause of
the excluded event; or b) other causes of the loss;
or c) whether other causes acted concurrently or in
any sequence with the excluded event to the produce
the loss:
• • • •

(1)

earth movement

...

See page 6 of the policy, a copy of which is attached hereto
in the addendum.
As the lead-in clause plainly states, earth movement is
excluded regardless of its cause.

Earth movement need not be

caused by an act of God, as plaintiffs argue, in order to be
excluded.

The lead-in clause states:

"The Company does not

insure for such loss regardless of:

a) the cause of the

excluded

event

[earth

movement]

. . . "

Therefore,

plaintiffs1 argument that earth movement needs to be caused by
a natural phenomenon or an act of God simply does not have any
merit.
The lead-in clause was inserted in State Farmfs policies
in 1983 principally to avoid the type of construction which

3

plaintiffs urge upon this court.

As discussed more fully in

Gordon and Crowley, Earth Movement and Water Damage Exposure:
A Landslide in Coverage. 50 Ins. Counsel J. 418 (1983), a copy
of which is attached hereto in the addendum, courts have used
either the efficient cause analysis or the eiusdem

generis

analysis in order to find coverage for the insured in the face
of the "most carefully wrought [earth movement] exclusions."
Id. at 418.
enunciated

According to the efficient cause analysis, first
by

the

California

Supreme

Court

in

Sabella

v.

Wisler. 59 Cal. 2d 21, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689, 377 P.2d 889 (1963),
if a covered peril sets in motion a chain of events in which
the last step may be an excluded peril, the excluded peril
will not defeat coverage.
analysis

as

disruption."

Gordon and Crowley refer to this

"focus[ing]

on

the

source

50 Ins. Counsel J. at 421.

of

the

property

Gordon and Crowley

refer to the eiusdem generis analysis as "dissect[ing] the
language of the policy."

Id.

As a result of these two analyses, the "trend across the
country

[was] to find coverage

exclusions."

Id. at 425.

. . . regardless of policy

"[F]aced with a financial drain

neither accounted for through premium payments and reserves,
nor even anticipated,

[insurance companies

felt] the earth

slipping out from beneath their underpinnings just as surely

4

as did their insured homeowners."
by

redrafting

Id.

State Farm countered

the language of its policies.

As noted by

Michael Bragg in an article entitled Concurrent Causation and
the Art of Policy Drafting;

New Perils for Property Insurers,

a copy of which is attached hereto in the addendum,
The traditional
response
of insurers
upon
discovering that their contract language is not
being interpreted by the courts as the drafters
intended is to rewrite the language. In fact this
alternative is often judicially mandated.
Courts
have told the insurance industry countless times
that insuring agreements will be interpreted broadly
and exclusions narrowly. If the insurer desires to
exclude some event it must say so clearly and
uneguivocably.
Forum, Tort and Insurance Practice Section, ABA, Vol. 20, No.
3, 385, 391 (Spring 1985).

(The Supreme Court of California

recently cited the Bragg article with approval in a case which
has not yet been published but was filed on March 30, 1989,
Garvev v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, (S.F. 25060)
Ct. App. A017878.)
As previously indicated, State Farm introduced its new
policy language in 1983.

Although the lead-in clause has been

subject to close scrutiny, 50 Ins. Counsel J. at 426, it has
been

upheld

by

every

court

that

has

considered

it,

as

discussed infra.
The difficulty of plaintiffs1 argument is that plaintiffs
fail

to

realize

that

the

new

5

policy

language

not

only

eliminates the efficient cause analysis but also eliminates
the eiusdem generis analysis.

(Plaintiffs initially argued

that the broken water main was the efficient cause of the loss
and hence there was coverage.
counsel

to

addendum.

defendant's

See letter from plaintiffs1

counsel

hereto

in

the

However, plaintiffs later abandoned this theory in

light of the new policy language.)
in

attached

clause

eliminates

the

Subclause a) of the lead-

eiusdem

generis

analysis

and

subclauses b) and c) eliminate the efficient cause analysis.
This was clearly the intent of State Farm.

As Michael Bragg

states in his article,
The new language establishes a purging effect by
making the occurrence of any of these excluded
events an absolute prohibition to a finding of
coverage. Thus, once a loss occurs which would not
have happened in the absence of an excluded event,
there is no coverage. The policy states that this
is so "regardless of: a) the cause of the excluded
event . . . ."
20 Forum, Tort and Insurance Practice Section, at 393-94.
As indicated above, every court that has had occasion to
interpret the lead-in clause has found it to be valid and
enforceable.

In fact, the very courts which began the trend

of finding coverage for the insured in the face of the most
carefully wrought earth movement exclusions

(the California

courts) have honored the redrafted policy

language.

For

example, in Milliken v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance

6

Company, No. 86-1284-E, Memorandum Decision (S.D. Cal., March
1987), a copy of which is attached hereto in the addendum, the
court without hesitation applied the redrafted earth movement
exclusion to the "settlement of

.

"consolidation of [a] utility trench."

fill soils" and the
Id. at 16.

The court

stated, "Any loss which would not have resulted but for earth
movement is excluded, regardless of . . . the cause of the
movement."

Id. (emphasis in original).

In Bayless v. State

Farm Fire and Casualty Company, No. WEC 87135

(Los Angeles

County, Cal. Super. Ct., Dec. 1986), although summary judgment
was not granted because of the existence of a triable issue of
fact, the

court

adjudicated

the following

issues as being

without substantial controversy:
1.
The applicable insurance
coverage for earth movement;

policy

excludes

2. Coverage is excluded under the policy regardless
of the cause of the earth movement;
3. Coverage is excluded under the policy regardless
of whether other causes acted concurrently or in any
sequence with earth movement to cause the loss.
See Page 2 of the Order, a copy of which is attached hereto in
the addendum (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Turrill v. State Farm Fire and Casualty
Insurance Company, No. WEC 104 457 (Los Angeles County, Cal.
Super. Ct., May 1987), the court adjudicated the same issues
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as being without substantial controversy and therefore "deemed
established."

See Pages 1-3 of the Order, a copy of which is

attached hereto in the addendum.
The only two published decisions also hold that the leadin clause is valid and enforceable.

In State Farm Fire and

Cas. Co. v. Martin, 668 F. Supp. 1379 ( C D . Cal. 1987), a copy
of which is attached hereto in the addendum, the court held
that the policy language was "explicit as to exclusions [and]
unambiguous."

Id. at

1382.

The court

further held

that

"State Farm had an absolute right to limit the coverage."
at 1383.
on April

Id.

(The Martin case was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit
10, 1989, the court stating as

policy exclusions are unambiguous . . .

follows:

"[T]he

An insurance company

has the right to limit the coverage in a policy it issues."
copy of the case is attached hereto in the addendum.)

A
In

State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Paulson, 756 P.2d 764 (Wyo.
1988) , a copy of which is attached hereto in the addendum, the
court said that the lead-in clause was "not ambiguous.
plain and clear."

Id. at 766.

It is

The court then concluded its

opinion by stating:
[A] court
[is restrained] from liberally and
unreasonably construing an insurance contract to
permit a strained or unnatural interpretation in
order to find coverage for innocent victims who are
subjects of enormous sympathy.
Otherwise, the

8

effect would be to bind an insurer to a risk that
was not contemplated and for which it was not paid.
Id, at 772; see also the companion case to Paulson, State Farm
Fire and Cas. Co. v. Bowen, 756 P.2d 773 (Wyo. 1988), where
the court reached the same conclusion, a copy of which is also
attached hereto in the addendum.
All of the cases cited by plaintiffs are not on point
because

they

do

not

deal

with

the

contained in State Farm's policies.

new

lead-in

language

Nor do the cases deal

with earth movement exclusions containing the phrase "whether
combined

with

movement."

water

or

not"

following

the

"earth

State Farm's policy states that earth movement is

excluded "whether combined with water or not."
the policy.

words

See page 6 of

This phrase, together with the lead-in clause,

makes it clear that earth movement is excluded even if it is
caused by a broken water pipe.
Earth movement is excluded regardless of its cause,.

The

new policy language eliminates the eiusdem generis analysis.
Moreover, plaintiffs' own cases seem to cast doubt on whether
the eiusdem generis analysis is appropriate in this case.

One

provision of Jones v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 291 (Tex.
App. 1986) which plaintiffs fail to cite is as follows:
We initially address appellant's contention that the
doctrine of eiusdem generis limits the scope of the
term "earth movement." Under that doctrine, where

9

words of a specific and particular meaning are
followed by general words, the general words are
construed to mean only the class or category framed
by the specific words. In the exclusion before us,
the opposite construction is used.
The general
words, earth movement, do not follow the specific
words, but precede them.
The doctrine of eiusdem
generis does not apply in such a case.
Id. at

292.

Similarly, because

the general

words

"earth

movement" in State Farm's policies precede the specific words,
the doctrine of eiusdem generis does not apply in this case.
Eiusdem generis only applies when a general term follows (as
opposed to precedes) an enumeration of specific words.
fact,

Black's

Law

Dictionary

464

(5th

ed.

1979)

In

defines

eiusdem generis as follows:
[T]he "ejusdem generis rule" is, that where general
words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by
words of a particular and specific meaning, such
general words are not to be construed in their
widest extent, but are to be held as applying only
to persons or things of the same general kind or
class as those specifically mentioned.
(Emphasis

added.)

Plaintiffs

have misapplied

the

eiusdem

generis doctrine.

Furthermore, eiusdem generis is a rule of

construction, and

rules of construction do not need to be

resorted to if the policy is clear and unambiguous.

See 2

Couch on Insurance §§ 15:69, 15:70 (2d ed. 1984) ("When the
contract is clear, precise, and unambiguous . . . there is no
proper scope for a resort to rules of construction.")

Since

every court that has considered the new policy language has

10

found it to be clear and unambiguous, eiusdem generis does not
apply in this case.

II.
The phrase "earth movement"
ambiguous, especially in light
lead-in clause.

is
of

not
the

In Lee v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance, CCH 1988 Fire and
Casualty Cases 1806 (Tenn. App. 1988) the court considered the
definitions of "earth" and "movement" separately and concluded
that the phrase "earth movement" applied to "any change of
place, position or posture of the soil."

Id. at 1808.

In Lee

a sewer pipe broke beneath plaintiff's home, saturating the
soil,

and

causing

the

foundation

to

shift.

The

policy

provided as follows:
The Company shall not be liable for loss:
. . . .

7.
due to any and all settling, shrinking,
cracking, bulging or expansion of driveways,
sidewalks, swimming pools, pavements, foundations,
walls, floors, roofs or ceilings;

12.
caused by, resulting from, contributed to, or
aggravated by any of the following;
(a) earth movement, including but not limited
to earthquake, landslide, mudflow, earth sinking,
earth rising or shifting;

11

2.
The
section:

following

is

added

to

the

EXCLUSIONS

This policy does not insure under Section I for
loss caused directly or indirectly by any of the
following exclusions in this policy.
Such loss is
excluded regardless of any other cause or event
contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the
loss.

c.

Earth movement;

. . . .

Id. at 1806.

The court held that earth movement, as commonly

understood, had occurred in the case and that the loss was
therefore excluded:
The words, "earth movement" mean:
differential movement of the earth's
crust; elevation or subsidence of land.
Webster's Third
Unabridged.

New

Taken separately,
"earth" includes:

International
the

meaning

of

Dictionary
the

word,

fragmental material composing part of the
surface of the globe; soil, ground,
usually distinguished from bed rock.
Ibid.
The word, "movement" means:
The action or process of moving,
place or position or posture.

12

change

of

Ibid.
It thus appears that, taken together or
separately, the words, earth movement, mean any
change of place, position or posture of the soil.
Id.

at

1808.

interpretation

The court specifically
of

the

earth

movement

limited to natural phenomena.

plaintiff!s

rejected
exclusion

id. at 1807.

as

being

A copy of the

case is attached hereto in the addendum.
Moreover, an insurance policy should be construed as a
whole.

Thus,

the

phrase

"earth

movement"

cannot

be

interpreted in isolation of the lead-in clause.

The lead-in

clause specifically

is excluded

states that earth movement

regardless of its cause:
such loss regardless of:
[earth movement] . . . "

"The Company does not insure for
a) the cause of the excluded event
Therefore, it would be unreasonable

for a layperson to conclude that earth movement meant only
earth movement caused by an act of God.
movement is irrelevant.

What caused the earth

The lead-in clause could not make

this any clearer.

III.
The policy is not duplicative.
Plaintiffs argue that "earth movement" must not encompass
settling because there is a separate exclusion for settling.
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However, that exclusion

(exclusion I.e.)

does not apply in

cases where there are multiple causes as in the case at bar.
In multiple cause cases, exclusion 3. applies.

This was noted

by Mr. David Randel, fire claim superintendent for State Farm,
in his deposition.
Q
I take it there came a point at which
concluded that Exclusion . . . E did not apply?
A

Thatf s correct.

Q

At what point was that?

you

A
. . .
I would guess that probably from the
beginning I would have been referring to Exclusion 3
Subsection B.
Q

That's [the] earth movement clause?

A
Correct. . . . I'm familiar enough with the
policy language that I realized that with the broken
pipe that we would have to be relying on that
exclusion rather than the settling and shrinking.
Because we had a potential concurrent cause
situation.
Deposition of David Randel, page 28, lines 4-19.
Furthermore,

exclusion

I.e.

only

applies

to

"gradual

sinking," as noted in the Holy Angels Academy case cited by
plaintiffs.

487 N.Y.S.2d at 1007.

occur in this case.

Gradual sinking did not

The soil collapsed.

built upon sand, silt, and clay —

The apartments were

collapsible soils.

When

the underground water main broke, the soils lost their weightbearing

capacity

and

collapsed.

14

Deposition

of

Ralph

E.

Watson, page 20, line 16; page 21, line 22; page 57, line 8;
exhibit

1,

appendix

A,

page

3; see also

the

letter

from

plaintiffs' counsel to defendant's counsel, attached hereto in
the addendum, stating as follows:

"We have reason to believe

that the soil, when saturated with water, does not actually
sink or settle.

Rather, it loses its weight-bearing ability.

This allows the foundation to sink or shift.11
As
causes,

noted

by

David

exclusion

3.

Randel, anytime there are multiple
applies

and

not

exclusion

I.e.

Therefore, the policy is not duplicative.

CONCLUSION

All of the cases cited by plaintiffs are not on point
because they do not address the new lead-in language contained
in State Farm's policies; nor do plaintiffs even quote the new
policy language in their brief.

Every court that has had

occasion to consider the new policy language has found it to
be valid and enforceable and not ambiguous.
policy

is not duplicative.

Moreover, the

The order of the lower court

15

granting State Farm's motion for summary judgment should be
affirmed.

j/1

^)

DATED this / / t / day of AprilT^lQSQ.
MORGAN h HANSEN

fTfVU-^

3arwin C. Hansen
John C. Hansen
Attorneys for Defendant/
Respondeat
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ADDENDUM
Policy
Gordon and Crowley, Earth Movement and Water Damage Exposure:
A Landslide in Coverage, 50 Ins. Counsel J.418 (1983)
Bragg, Concurrent Causation and the Art of Policy Drafting:
New Perils for Property Insurers, Forum, Tort and Insurance
Practice Section, ABA, Vol. 20, No. 3, 385 (Spring 1985)
Letter
Milliken v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Company, No.
86-1284-E, Memorandum Decision (S.D. Cal., March 1987)
Bayless v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, No. WEC 87135
(Los Angeles County, Cal. Super. Ct., Dec. 198 6)
Turrill v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, No.
WEC 104 457 (Los Angeles County, Cal. Super. Ct., May 1987)
State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Martin, 668 F.Supp. 1379 ( C D .
Cal. 1987)
State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Martin, No. 87-6109 (9th Cir.
April 10, 1989)
State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Paulson, 756 P.2d 764 (Wyo.
1988)
Lee v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance, CCH 1988 Fire and Casualty
Cases 1806 (Tenn. App. 1988)

SECTION I
LOSSES INSURED AND
LOSSES NOT INSURED (cont.)
ance of property, or shortage of property
disclosed on taking inventory;

(2)

f l o o d , surface water, waves, tidal w a ter or tidal waves, overflow of streams
or other bodies of water, or spray f r o m
any of the foregoing, all whether driven
by w i n d or not;

i.

due t o any delay or loss of market;

j.

caused by repeated leakage or seepage of
water or steam whether continuous or interm i t t e n t f r o m any:

(3)

water w h i c h backs up through sewers
or drains;

(1)

(4)

water below the surface of the ground
including that which exerts pressure on
or f l o w s , seeps or leaks through sidew a l k s , driveways, foundations, walls,

heating, air conditioning or refrigerating
system;

(2)

domestic appliance; or

(3)

plumbing s y s t e m , including from

basement or other floors, or through
doors, w i n d o w s or any other opening
in such sidewalks, driveways, foundations, walls or floors;

or

around any shower stall or other s h o w er bath installation, bath tub or other
plumbing fixture.
2.

3.

The Company does not insure for loss either c o n sisting of, or directly and immediately caused by
p o w e r , heating or cooling failure, or due to change
in temperature or humidity, unless the failure or
change results f r o m physical damage t o the building or to equipment contained therein caused by a
Loss Insured. Also, the Company shall not be liable
under this exclusion for any loss resulting f r o m
riot, riot attending a strike, civil c o m m o t i o n , or
vandalism or malicious mischief.

unless fire or explosion as insured against
ensues, and then the Company shall be liable
only for loss caused by the ensuing fire or
explosion. This exclusion shall not apply to
loss arising from theft;
c.

The Company does not insure for loss which
w o u l d not have occurred in the absence of one or
more of the following excluded events. The C o m pany does not insure for such loss regardless
of: a) the cause of the excluded event; or b) other
causes of the loss; or c) whether other causes
acted concurrently or in any sequence w i t h the
excluded event t o produce the loss:
a.

occasioned directly or indirectly by enforcem e n t of any ordinance or law regulating the
c o n s t r u c t i o n , repair or demolition of buildings or structures;

b.

caused by, resulting f r o m , contributed to, or
aggravated by any of the f o l l o w i n g :
(1)

earth m o v e m e n t , whether combined
w i t h water or not, including but not
limited to earthquake, volcanic erupt i o n , landslide, subsidence, mudflow,
sinkhole, erosion, or the sinking, rising,
shifting, expanding, or contracting of
earth;

hostile or warlike action in time of peace or
war, including action in hindering, combating
or defending against an actual, impending or
expected attack:
(1)

by any government or sovereign power
(de jure or de facto), or by any authority
maintaining or using military, naval or
air forces;

(2)

by military, naval or air forces; or

(3)

by an agent of any such government,
power, authority or forces;

it being understood that any discharge, explosion or use of any weapon of war employing nuclear fission or fusion shall be conclusively presumed to be such a hostile or
warlike action by such a government, power,
authority or forces;
d.

insurrection, rebellion, revolution, civil war,
usurped power, or action taken by governmental authority in hindering, combating or
defending against such an occurrence,
seizure or destruction under quarantine or
c u s t o m ' s regulations, confiscation by order
of any government or public authority, or
risks of contraband or illegal transportation
or trade;

Fiftieth Year of Publication

INSURANCE
COUNSEL
JOURNAL

38'

July

Issued Quarterly by International Association of Insurance Counsel

INSURANCE COUNSEL J O U R N A L -

Page 418

July, 1983

EARTH MOVEMENT AND WATER
DAMAGE EXPOSURE:
A LANDSLIDE IN COVERAGE
STUART M. GORDON AND D I A N E R. CROWLEY

San Francisco,
H E DISASTROUS R A I N S of recent
winters have touched off earth movements including landslides and mudflows
across the nation; at the same time, court
decisions have set off equally unsettling
tremors among insurance companies as the
most carefully wrought exclusions are ignored or deliberately discarded. T h i s article will trace the development of exposure
for earth movements from its origins in
the smoke of the great San Francisco earthq u a k e and fire through the current trend
favoring recovery regardless of exclusion.
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I. The California
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T h e richest source of case law on landslide liability is the state of California,
where the unsettled coastal soil, the continental-edge geology, and the hilly geography found in the heavily populated areas
combine to create numerous property losses
from earth movements and where sympathetic courts have long strained to find relief for those whose homes have been lost.
Nearly all "earthquake exclusion" cases
date back to the losses sustained in the San
Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906. Perhaps because judges and juries of that day
shared so heavily in the losses described to
them by San Francisco plaintiffs seeking recovery, those plaintiffs became the first
beneficiaries of a judicial bias toward the
owners of damaged property.
For example, when merchants whose
store was destroyed in one of the major
fires sweeping the city after the e a r t h q u a k e
sought relief, the court found coverage alt h o u g h the policy excluded "loss or damage occasioned by earthquake." T h e court
insisted that the exclusion h a d to m e a n
t h a t there be a direct connection between
the earthquake and the origins of the fire,
a n d that if the fire had started in a distant
b u i l d i n g and was communicated from one
b u i l d i n g to the next until it reached the
insured property, the earthquake would
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only have been the indirect cause of the
loss. T h e court found that the context of
the exclusionary clause showed that it was
intended to include only the proximate or
immediate cause, and overruled the defendant's demurrer in favor of the property
owners. 1
In more recent times, landslides and
mudslides have provided more litigation
for the California courts than have earthquakes, as the heavy rains of 1978, 1980,
iBaker & Hamilton v. Williamsburgh City Fire
Ins. Co., 157 F 280 (ND Cal 1907); see also Williamsburgh City Fire Ins. Co. v. Willard, 164 F 404
(9th Cir), cert, denied, 212 US 521 (1908); see also
Richmond Coal Co. v. Commercial Union Assur.
Co., 169 F 746 (9th Cir), cert, denied, 215 US 609
(1909) .
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and 1982, have cost Californians hundreds
of millions of dollars in property loss,2 and
the rains of 1983 are already adding to the
devastation.
T h e presence in homeowners' policies of
stock exclusions for earth movements has
led to crushing disappointments for homeowners, angry litigation, and subsequent
publicity. A length article appearing in
the San Francisco Sunday Examiner and
Chronicle
quoted numerous aggrieved
homeowners and their indignant attorneys
u n d e r a headline which trumpeted "Angry
Homeowners Who Say Insurance Firms
Left T h e m O u t in the Rain." 3
Placing the perceptions of these unfortunate homeowners aside, it might appear
that it is the insurance companies themselves which have been left out in the rain.
T h e trend a m o n g the California courts has
been to find coverage even in the face of
specific exclusions. For example, in the
case of Hughes v. Potomac Insurance Company,4 homeowners sought recovery under
an insurance policy after the earth to the
rear of their h o m e slid into a creek bordering their lot. T h e y were denied coverage
based upon an exclusion for flood or high
water damage to the insured dwelling.
Initially, the court found that the policy
could be interpreted in such a manner as
to cover the damage to the property, even
though only the "dwelling building," and
not the earth in the back yard, was covered. T h e court stated that the "dwelling
building" suffered real and severe damage
when the soil slid away, and until the land
was stabilized, the structure could scarcely
be considered a "dwelling building" safe
for residence. 5
Secondly, the court found that the exclusion for losses covered by flood or high
water could not bar coverage for this loss.
Expert testimony as to the cause of the
landslide conflicted, b u t the lower court
found that the slide was caused solely by
the soaking of the land from heavy rains,
rather than by "flood" or "high water."
T h e appellate court stated that even if the
trial court had been wrong in that finding,
coverage would still apply under the policy.
2
Norton, Counseling Clients Whose Property Incurs
Earth Movement Damage. 2:8 CAL. LAW. 26.
3
San Francisco Sunday Examiner & Chronicle,
Aug. 22, 1982, at A7.
*199
CalApp2d 239, 18 Cal Rptr 650 (1962).
5
/d. at 249.
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Looking for guidance to a 1929 personal
injury case, the appellate court stated that
"when two causes join in causing an injury,
one of which is insured against, the insured
is covered by the policy." 6 With this theory
in mind, the court held that there was coverage under the policy as "appellant has
failed to show that respondents' loss would
not have occurred 'but for' a peril specifically excepted under the policy." 7
T h e next year, California courts expanded their willingness to find coverage in the
face of exclusions by eliminating the " b u t
for" language used in the Hughes interpretation. In Sabella v. Wisler,8 the California
Supreme Court found that when two or
more factors are a possible cause of an insured's loss, coverage will be extended regardless of the causes which are excluded
by the policy if the "efficient" cause of the
loss is not excluded.
In Sabella, a home built on fill over an
old excavation was damaged by settling.
T h e "all-risk"' policy held by the homeowners carried an exclusion for loss by settling, but the court eventually found coverage after the homeowners argued that a
sewer pipe below the house was leaking
and the escaping water infiltrated the unstable earth, causing the settlement which
damaged the house. Balancing the two
causes, the excluded settlement and the included peril of damage from faulty plumbing fixtures, the court concluded that the
absence of subsidence damages u p until the
time the pipe began leaking showed that
it was the broken pipe which was the predominating or efficient cause of the loss
and that
in determining whether a loss is within an
exception in a policy, where there is a concurrence of different causes, the efficient
cause — the one that sets others in motion — is the cause to which the loss is to
be attributed, though the other causes may
follow it, and operate more immediately in
producing the disaster.9
T h e Sabella court obviously intended that
a determination of the "efficient cause"
should be distinctly different than the
prior Hughes "but for" test, as it made a
^Zimmerman v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 99 Cal
App 723, 726, 279 P 464 (1929) .
"199 CalApp2d at 245.
859 Cal2d 21. 27 Cal Rptr 689 (1963).
*ld. at 31-32, citing 6 COUCH, INSURANCE §1466
(1930)
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p o i n t of disproving the "but for" language
in Hughes.10
T h i s sort of search for the "efficient
proximate cause" continued for a few years
in such cases as Sauer v. General
Insurance
Company,11
where, once again, faulty
p l u m b i n g causing discharge of water into
the ground under a house was found to be
the cause of the loss, rather than the excluded settling of the earth. Sauer appears
to extend the rationale of Sabella to the extent that neither contribution nor aggravation of an excluded risk will bar recovery
as a matter of law when the contribution
or aggravation results from a peril which
is covered by the policy.
T h i s line of causation analysis continued
t h r o u g h a case involving a windstorm,
rather than earth movement, in Gillis v.
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.12 Here, an insured boat dock was originally damaged by
a gust of wind, then fell into the water a n d
was further damaged by the action of the
waves. T h e policy offered coverage for
windstorm damage, b u t excluded coverage
for damage caused by water or waves,
whether driven by the wind or not. Admitting that it could not be ascertained whether the final loss was caused by the windstorm or by the excluded waves, the court
concluded that the evidence sustained the
findings of the lower court that the windstorm was the d o m i n a n t and efficient cause
of the damage, and that the water damage
was merely incidental and could n o t b a r
coverage.
T h e Gillis case carefully sidestepped several questions, including a determination
of whether in every case involving several
perils, the insured may recover if one of
those perils is insured against, a n d w h a t
the effect of an exclusion would be where
the excluded peril precedes the insured
peril, or where both operate simultaneously. 13
T h e question left open in Gillis may not
have been answered until 1973, in the case
of State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company v. Partridge,14 In this case,
the insured, w h o held both automobile and
homeowners' policies through State Farm,
was driving his car over rough terrain when
h e h i t a b u m p , causing a gun, which h e
io/d. at 33-34.
ii225 CalApp2d 275, 37 Cal Rptr 303 (1964).
12238 CalApp2d 408, 47 Cal Rptr 868 (1965).
i3/d. at 424.
1*10 Cal3d 94, 109 Cal Rptr 811 (1973).
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had specially modified to have a hair trigger, to discharge, injuring his passenger.
Although the homeowners' policy excluded
injuries arising from the use of any vehicle,
the court found coverage u n d e r both policies, and referred back to the
Hughes,
Sabella, Sauer, and Gillis cases in forming
this opinion. 1 5 T h e court stated that in the
case before it, a risk insured u n d e r the
homeowners' policy (the modification of
the gun) combined with an excluded risk
(the negligent use of the automobile) to
produce the ultimate injury.
Although there may have been some question whether either of the two causes in
the instant case can be properly characterized as the "prime," "moving" or "efficient" cause of the accident, we believe
that coverage under a liability insurance
policy is equally available to an insured
whenever an insured risk constitutes simply a concurrent proximate cause of the
injuries. That multiple causes may have
effectuated the loss does not negate any
single cause; that multiple acts concurred
in the infliction of injury does not nullify
any single contributory act.18
In a footnote, 17 the Partridge court discussed the "efficient cause" s t a n d a r d of the
earlier cases and discarded it as n o t very
helpful in situations like the one at h a n d
where, neither the careless driving nor the
firing of the gun caused the other to occur,
b u t both combined to cause the injury.
T h e Partridge answer to the Gillis questions is, then, when concurrent proximate
causes lead to an injury, a n d one cause is
covered, the entire loss is covered.
T h a t same year, this rationale was applied to a landslide case following a mild
earthquake. In Strubble v. United Services
Auto Association,1* the question was raised
as to whether the defendant insurer h a d
proved that an excluded landslide was the
efficient cause of loss to a h o m e which was
covered for earthquake damage, u n d e r an
"all-risk" policy. T h e court disregarded
the argument that the insured has a d u t y
to find a proximate cause w i t h i n the policy limits, and stated
in an action upon an all-risk policy such
as the one before us . . . the insured does
is/d. at 104-105.
i«/d.
17/d.

1835 CalApp3d 498, 110 Cal Rptr 828 (1973).
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not have to prove that the peril proximately causing the loss was covered by the policy. This is because the policy covers all
risks save for those risks specifically excluded by the policy. The insurer, though,
since it is denying liability upon the policy, must prove the policy's noncoverage
of the insured's loss — that is, that the insured's loss was proximately caused by a
peril specifically excluded from the coverage of the policy.19
Affirming the coverage determination of
the lower court, the court of appeals found
that the evidence established that the landslide had been proximately caused by the
earthquake, operating through the excluded peril of earth movement. In a footnote, the court stated that it was regarding
the earthquake endorsement as merely narrowing the earth movement exclusion,
rather than changing the "all-risk" nature
of the underlying policy. T o hold otherwise would be "a case of the tail wagging
the dog," the court concluded. 2 0
Finally, on May 17, 1982, a federal court
adopted the Partridge reasoning in a property damage case, Safeco Insurance
Company v. Guy ton.21 W h e n record rains accompanying H u r r i c a n e Kathleen broke
through flood control facilities near Palm
Desert, California, extensive flood damage
resulted. Safeco policyholders were denied
coverage because of a flood damage exclusion; they answered by asserting that their
losses were proximately caused by negligence of the local water district in maintaining flood control structures and were
therefore covered as damages caused by
third-party negligence. A diversity action
in the federal district court ended with a
ruling in favor of the insurance company
based upon an analysis of the flood as the
efficient proximate cause of the loss.
On appeal to the N i n t h Circuit Court
of Appeals, coverage was found with the
court q u o t i n g directly from Partridge: "We
believe that coverage u n d e r a liability insurance policy is equally available to an insured whenever an insured risk constitutes
simply a concurrent proximate cause of the
injuries." 22 While the insurance company
i9/d. at 504 (citations omitted; emphasis in original) .
2o/d„ at 505 n. 6.
21677 F2d 721 (9th Cir 1982) (opinion published
in advance sheets withdrawn at the request of the
court).
22/d.
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attacked the appellants reliance u p o n Partridge, arguing that it applies only where
two causes operate independently of one
another, the court found Partridge to be
dispositive in the policyholders' favor, a n d
pointed out t h a t the twin causes in Partridge were i n d e p e n d e n t only in that each
had an i n d e p e n d e n t origin, not that they
did not interact. J u s t as the flood control
structures in Palm Desert would n o t have
collapsed without the flood striking them,
the gun in Partridge would not have fired
without the lurching of the car and, in
both cases, two independently created conditions interacted to cause a loss. 23 Under
this analysis, it is n o longer necessary that
the chain of events be set in motion by an
included peril. 2 4
II. Expanding

Exposure

Elsewhere

Other jurisdictions may differ in their
analyses, yet courts from coast to coast are
increasingly finding coverage regardless of
exclusions for earthquakes, landslides,
earth movements, floods, and the like.
While some courts focus on the source of
the property disruption, others dissect the
language of the policy, a n d a third group
of courts deliberates on the chain of causation.
Courts seem more likely to find coverage
in the face of exclusion when the cause the
insurer raises as a bar is external to or not
inherent in the specified risk which is excluded. For example, in Peach State Uniform Service, Inc. v. American
Insurance
Company,25 where a portion of a foundation collapsed after heavy rain, a Georgia
jury found that relief was barred by policy
exclusions for certain earth movements or
for water damage. T h e Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed, finding that coverage
was not barred by either of these exclusions.
Criticizing the policy phrase "other earth
movements" as ambiguous, the court
stated:
Taking the phrase in its contractual context, then, and continuing to resolve ambiguity in favor of the insured, we read
other earth movement as referring only to
phenomena relating to forces operating
within the earth itself, and not to the
23/d.
24/</.

25507 F2d 996 (5th Cir 1975).
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merely superficial effects of external forces,
such as erosion by run-off rainwater.26
A few years earlier, another Georgia
court had come out with a sharply contrasting verdict. In Underwood v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Company,27 no coverage was found for damages sustained when
a bridge sank d u r i n g a heavy rainfall immediately after city officials had widened
the banks on either side of the privatelyowned bridge. T h e policy had an exclusion for "any earth movement." T h e jury
found that "although the loss might have
been incipiently caused by a h u m a n
agency, it was at least 'contributed to'
within the exclusionary language, by an
excepted natural agency." 28
More in line with Peach State and with
decisions of other jurisdictions, the case of
Souza v. Corvick29 found coverage in the
face of exclusions for settling a n d earth
sinking when the plaintiff alleged that the
damages were caused by the negligent or
willful blasting in the construction of adjacent storm sewers. T h e District of Columbia court held that the exclusion should
not be interpreted as barring recovery for
damage caused by the subsidence of the
property if that subsidence resulted from
something other than the conditions of the
soil. 30 In contrast is the holding of Olmstead v. Lumbermens
Mutual Life Insurance Company,31 an Ohio case which found
n o coverage for a building so badly damaged by adjacent excavation that it h a d to
be condemned and torn down. T h e court
found that the exclusions for collapse and
landslide, including "other earth movem e n t , " barred recovery, although the court
found neither collapse or landslide, and
failed to discuss "other earth movements."
Quite a few cases turn on the language
of the policy exclusions, as sometimes exactly the same policy terms provide the
bases for totally opposite interpretations.
For example, in Stewart v. Preferred Fire
Insurance Company,32 a building collapsed
when the soil underlying its foundation
gave way and the building sank into a preexisting cavern or mineshaft. Even though
the policy covered "collapse," the Supreme
2*Id. at 1000.
27H8 Ga App 847, 165 SE2d 874 (1968).
28/d. at 875.
2*441 F2d 1013 (DC Cir 1970) .
3o/d. at 1022.
3122 Ohio St2d 212, 259 NE2d 123 (1970) .
32206 Kan 247, 477 P2d 966 (1970).
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Court of Kansas found no coverage on the
basis of an earth movement exclusion
which it found to be "really q u i t e specific." 33 T h e exclusion in question read as
follows: "[L]oss caused by, resulting from,
contributed to, or aggravated by any earth
movement, including but not limited to
earthquake, landslide, m u d flow, earth
sinking, rising, or shifting. . . Z'34
Precisely the same exclusion was found
in the policy in Wyatt v. Northwestern
Mutual Insurance Company,35
where it was
held to be no bar to coverage for a loss
sustained by a building following excavation on contiguous property. T h e federal
district court, applying Minnesota law,
found the exclusion so broad as to require
some interpretation, and held t h a t the excluded but undefined earth movements, if
not limited to natural p h e n o m e n a , a t least
would not exclude coverage u n d e r the facts
at bar.
Looking at the special exclusionary clause
in the policy here in question, it seems to
cover situations where one single event
could adversely affect a large number of
policyholders. . . . This gives some force to
the view that the various exclusions were
not intended to cover the situations as here
where "earth movement" occurred under a
single dwelling, allegedly due to human
action. . . .36
In reaching this decision, the federal district court relied on Sabella a n d Sauer, and
also cited recent Minnesota cases which it
found to be consistent in theory. 3 7
Unlimited and undefined exclusions for
"earth movements" provide the focal point
for many subsidence cases. Generally found
to be too broad to operate as a bar, "earth
movement" is often limited t h r o u g h the
doctrine of ejusdem generis, which holds
that when general words follow a n enumeration of specific items, the general
words are to be construed as a p p l y i n g only
to items of the same general k i n d as those
specifically mentioned. 3 8 Accordingly, when
"other earth movements" is tacked onto a
string of disasters, including e a r t h q u a k e s
or landslides, the term is to b e limited to
33477 P2d at 969.
3*W.

35304 FSupp 781 (D Minn 1969).
36/d. at 783.
37See, e.g., Fawcett House, Inc. v. Great Central
Ins. Co., 280 Minn 325, 159 NW2d 268 (1968).
38BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 608

(4th

ed.

1951).
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natural phenomena of the same general description.
With this in mind, the frequently cited
case of Anderson v. Indiana
Lumbermens
Mutual Insurance Company™ found coverage for a homeowner whose property was
damaged by expansion and contraction of
the clay soil underlying the foundation.
T h e Louisiana appellate court decided that
the cracking of the home's foundation
could be considered as a "collapse," a
covered risk, by defining that term as "a
material impairment of structural integrity." T h e court also held that the
earth movement exclusion was too broad,
and, if limited by ejusdem generis, would
be inapplicable. T h e Anderson court stated
that it was adopting the view of the Supreme Court of Kansas in an earlier case,
Jenkins v. United States Fire Insurance
Company.40
Adopting the same view of the policy
term "collapse," and rejecting the majority
view which would define the term as a
complete change in structure involving a
loss of distinctive character or usefulness
as a building, Government Employees Insurance Company
v. Dejames41
found
coverage in another collapse-or-earth-movement case. Construing the policy term "any
earth movement" as above, the Maryland
court found that, of necessity, such an exclusion did not refer to settlement or damage from normal soil pressures. " T o hold
otherwise would make virtually meaningless the coverage . . . for it would be difficult to envision many other reasons why a
house would collapse." 42
Building upon the court-imposed limitations of the term "earth movement" seen
in Stewart, Wyatt, and Anderson, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed a judgment in favor of the defendant insurance
company in a case in which a building constructed along the very edge of a bluff
collapsed, following slippage of the unstable soils in the bluff. In
Wisconsin
Builders, Inc. v. General Insurance Company of America,43 the court pointed out
that although the standard exclusion is
ambiguous and must be construed against
its author, no contract of insurance should
be rewritten to bind the insurer to a risk
which had not been contemplated and for
39127
40185
41256
^2261
43221

So2d 304 (La App Ct 1961).
Kan 665, 347 P2d 417 (1959).
Md 717, 261 A2d 747 (1970).
A2d at 752.
NW2d 832 (Wis 1974).
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which n o premium h a d been paid. For this
reason, the court found error below a n d
instructed that the trial court should have
limited the definition of "earth m o v e m e n t "
for the jury p u r s u a n t to the doctrine of
ejusdem generis.44
T h e courts of many jurisdictions focus
on a chain of causation analysis, either in
addition to or in place of the analyses of
damage source and of policy language
mentioned above. A restrictive reading of
causation was advanced by the Michigan
appellate decision in Vormelker v. Oleksinski45 T h e property involved in this case
became uninhabitable when unstable soil
deposits 120 feet below the surface led to
the motion of large masses of land, destroying the building. T h e policy covered "collapse," but excluded "earth movement."
Deciding that " b u t for" inadequate construction of the building, it would never
have collapsed, the court held:
It is our opinion that the exclusions contained in the policy apply only when it
can be shown that earth movement et
cetera was the sole cause of the damage.
If it can be shown that the building was
improperly constructed (taking into account the type of soil, the geography of the
area, et cetera) and "but for" the inadequate construction the building would not
have collapsed even with earth movement,
then the damage should come under the
protection of the policy. One of the primary purposes of a policy such as this is
to protect against faulty workmanship or
planning. 46
Honoring an exclusion only when the
excluded risk was the sole cause of the injury is, after all, just one more way of
allowing coverage in the face of an exclusion when concurrent causes combine
to cause an injury, as in Sabella,
Sauer,
Safeco, and many other cases discussed.
Along these same lines, when a home in
Pennsylvania collapsed into a coal mine
shaft burrowing under it, coverage was
found even though the policy excluded
damage to walls caused by earth movements and damage to the building caused
by settling. 47 T h e court found that earth
movement of a sort had taken place, b u t
not the underground lateral movement to
"Id. at 838.
4540 Mich App 618, 199 NW2d 287 (1972) .
46199 NW2d at 294.
47Shaffer v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 21 Pa.D&C.2d 79,
49 Luzerne Leg.Reg.R. 279 (1959) .
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which it felt the exclusion referred.
Similarly, it found the damage was not
caused by settling, which it defined as a
gradual sinking as the ground yields to the
building's foundation. In other words, the
presence of excluded factors in the damage
scenario did not block coverage.
The frequently-cited case of Gullett v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company48 presented a situation in which rocks
from a retaining wall came loose and
struck the insured building, damaging it.
The policy at issue covered damage from
falling objects, but excluded landslides and
damage caused by underground or surface
waters. Although the court found that
water flow definitely played a part in the
damage, the plaintiffs victory in the lower
court was affirmed on appeal. The court
decided that the jury could have found
that the rocks came loose from the wall
through deterioration, rather than through
earth movement, and that, since the evidence could support either the covered or
the excluded theory of damage, the jury's
verdict would stand undisturbed, and their
judgment for the plaintiffs would be affirmed.
Another case in which the presence of an
excluded cause did not bar coverage when
an included cause was also present is
that of Phoenix Insurance Company v.
Branch.49 A Florida court found coverage
for a homeowner suffering a loss following blasting and dredging operations in the
construction of a nearby sewer system.
While damage caused by dredging was excluded from coverage, damage from blasting was included, and the plantiffs established at trial that blasting was a cause of
the building damage. The defendant insurer then failed its burden of proof to
show that the loss arose instead from the
cause which was excepted.50
Other courts, not content with merely
finding an included cause in the chain of
causation, insist instead that, before coverage will be found, the included cause must
be shown to be the one which set the
whole chain of causation into motion. For
example, the 1973 Massachusetts case of
Standard Electric Supply Company, Inc. v.
Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Insurance
Company51 found coverage in an all-risk
policy which excluded subsurface water
48446 F2d 1100 (7th Cir 1971).
4S234 So2d 396 (Fla 1970).
5o/d. at 399.
51307 NE2d 11 (Mass Ct App 1973).

damage when a water pipe in an adjacent
basement broke, allowing water to seep into the insured's basement and damage it.
Citing Appleman's Insurance Law and
Practice, the court referred to the "well
established principle" that "recovery is
allowed 'where the insured risk itself sets
into operation a chain of causation in
which the last step may have been an excepted risk.' "52
The succinctly-worded opinion in the
1980 New York case of Molycorp, Inc. v.
Aetna Casualty and Surety Company53 indicates that a proximate causation analysis
is still required in New York. Plaintiff had
sought coverage for the loss of a power
plant following a mudslide, which was an
included risk. Defendants countered that
the loss was "caused by, resulted from,
contributed to,, or aggravated by" surface
water, an excluded risk. When plaintiff
argued that the burden was on the insurer
to establish that the damage was caused
solely by surface water, the court rejected
this proposition outright: "Plaintiff's construction would eliminate from the exclusion the words 'contributed to or aggravated by' and would limit the exclusionary
clause to a case where damage was caused
solely by surface water, contrary to the
terms contained in the exclusion."54
Further, the court found no merit in
plaintiff's claim that the applicable law in
New York would look to the cause nearest
the loss. Rather, the court stated that "the
operative test where damage results from
two causes, one within and one without the
scope of coverage, is to establish which was
the proximate cause of the loss — what
would the ordinary and reasonable businessman conclude was the cause of the
loss?"55 Criticizing both parties for overlooking the leading New York authorities
on point,56 the court pointed out that the
relevant inquiry is which of the causes was
the dominant and efficient cause of the
loss, usually a factual issue. The court concluded that the approximate construction
of the exclusion requires that the excluded
risk be the direct, proximate, and efficient
cause of the loss, and that the suggested
proximate cause standard should apply
52/d. (citing 3 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE §3083, at

311).
5378 AD2d 510,, 431 NYS2d 824 (1980) .
54431 NYS2d at 825.
55/rf.
seTonkin v. California Ins. Co., 294 NY 326, 62
NE2d 215 (1945); Harris v. Allstate Ins. Co., 309
NY 72, 127 NE2d 816 (1955) .
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with respect to the terms "contributed to or
aggravated by" so as to require that the
excluded risk be properly related to the
occurrence of the loss.
At the opposite end of the continent, the
Supreme Court of Washington echoed this
New York decision and insisted on a proximate cause analysis in evaluating coverage
for a multi-cause loss. In one of the more
colorful factual situations in recent landslide litigation, the case of Graham v.
Pennsylvania General Insurance Company57 arose from a dispute between two
insurance companies and their insureds
following the volcanic eruption of Mount
St. Helens, in 1980. Hot materials flowing
from the eruption began melting the snow
and ice flanking the mountain and the
glacial ice blocks within the Toutle River
Valley. This water, combined with torrential rains from the eruption cloud,
existing ground water, water displaced
from Spirit Lake, and ash and debris,
created mudflows which moved through
the valley, eventually destroying the homes
of the appellants. The relevant policies excluded earth movement and water damage
including flood, but did offer coverage for
direct loss by explosion. The homeowners'
claims were rejected under either or both
of the exclusions.
The trial court stated that even if a jury
were to determine the volcanic eruption
was an explosion, it would still be necessary
to determine whether the loss was the
direct result of that explosion. The trial
court followed a causation analysis which
precluded the plaintiffs claims by stating
that the responsible cause of a loss is that
which is the "direct, violent and efficient
cause of the damage."58
In reviewing the earlier case law supporting the trial court's decision, the Supreme
Court of Washington concluded that the
"immediate physical cause analysis" is no
longer appropriate, is inconsistent with the
rule in the majority of other jurisdictions,
and should be discarded. The court defined
the majority rule as "when loss is sustained by the insured, it is necessary that
the loss be proximately, rather than remotely, caused by the peril insured
against."59 While this theory allows for
57Nos. 47706-0, 47955-1, slip op. (Wash. Tan. 6,
1983).
Mid. (citing Bruener v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co.,
37 Wash2d 181, 222 P2d 833 (1950)).
™Id. (citing 18 COUCH, INSURANCE §74:693 (2d ed

1968)).

multiple causes acting in combination, a
finding of coverage would seem to require
that it be the insured peril which set off
the chain of causation and that chain remain as an unbroken sequence. "Where a
peril specifically insured against sets other
causes in motion which, in an unbroken
sequence and connection between the act
and final loss, produced the loss for which
recovery is sought, the insured peril is regarded as the 'proximate cause' of the
entire loss."80
As proximate causation is a question of
fact for the jury, the Washington court remanded the matter for determination of
whether the movement of Mount St.
Helens was an explosion within the terms
of the policy, whether that explosion was
preceded by earth movement, and whether
the damages were proximately caused by
the eruption of the volcano.
The volcanic eruption of Mount St.
Helens created monumental devastation
and anguish. Nevertheless, the Washington
Supreme Court clearly refused to stretch
the law in any way to find coverage for the
homeless of its state, even when those
victims were specifically covered for losses
arising from "explosion." Spurning not
only the extreme liberality of the California courts, but also the views of many
other jurisdictions which find coverage
whenever one of the concurrent causes is
covered, the Washington Supreme Court
demands that a jury perform a labored
analysis of proximate causation.
III.

Conclusion

With the recent decision of the Supreme
Court of Washington as an exception of
almost startling character, the trend across
the country is to find coverage for owners
of property damaged by earthquakes, landslides, mudflows, subsidence, and similar
disasters, regardless of policy exclusions.
Insurance companies, faced with a financial
drain neither accounted for through premium payments and reserves, nor even
anticipated, may feel the earth slipping out
from beneath their underpinnings just as
surely as did their insured homeowners.
What is necessary to counteract this trend
is a case-by-case retrenchment with regard
to the standard policy defenses and a search
60/d. (citing Franklin Packaging Co. v. California
Union Ins. Co., 171 NJ Supr 188, 408 A2d 448, 449
(1979) (quoting 5 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE §3083, at
309-11)).
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for concurrently responsible parties. Was
there non-disclosure or misrepresentation
as to the condition of the building or the
soil stability at the time the policy was
entered? Has there been mitigation of
damages? Can liability be passed on or at
least shared with neighboring landowners,
contractors, soil engineers, governmental
entities, or any other party? Is there strict
liability for defects in a manufactured lot?
Did the builder and the seller disclose all
material facts to the new homeowner before the policy was entered? Has there been
nuisance or trespass?
More extensive consultation with experts in the relevant engineering fields and
more aggressive discovery into the possibility of cross-claims and counter-claims to
assert subrogation rights may be the insurer's best strategy for coping with the
current judicial trend for ignoring policy
exclusions. After paying off the first-party
claims of its insureds, the insurer may have
to proceed either on its own or in the name
of its insured, u n d e r its subrogation rights,
to recoup as m u c h as possible from all parties who contributed in some way to the
insured's loss. In this regard, there may be
statute of limitation problems that may
bar an effective recovery for the insurer.
Insurance carriers who provide homeowners' coverage in areas where earth
movement or flood damages are likely to
occur would u n d o u b t e d l y profit by an indepth study and evaluation of the possibilities and advantages of rewriting the type
of homeowners' coverage they provide. T h e
overly broad, multi-peril policy (rather
than more limited coverage for specified
perils) may leave the insurer in a far more
vulnerable situation t h a n it can handle,
financially. In areas of major vulnerability, writing homeowners' policies on a
specified-peril basis only, r a t h e r than on a
multi-peril basis, may be indicated, as the
exposure to the substantial damages involved may be more t h a n many carriers
can h a n d l e no m a t t e r how high the rates
are for premiums.
One major carrier has already revised its
homeowners' policy to provide in p a r t as
follows:
We do not insure for loss which would not
have incurred in the absence of one or
more of the following excluded events. We
do not insure for such loss regardless of:
(a) the cause of the excluded events; or

July, 1983

(b) other causes of the loss; or (c) whether other causes acted concurrently or in any
sequence with the excluded event to produce the loss. . . . We do not insure for
loss consisting of one or more of the items
below. Further, we do not insure for loss
contribute to or aggravate the loss; or
described . . . immediately above regardless
of whether one or more of the following:
(a) directly or indirectly cause, contribute
to or aggravate the loss; or (b) occur before, at the same time, or after the loss or
any other cause of the loss. . . .
A challenge to this language on the basis of ambiguity or confusion is expected,
as the exclusionary language would remove
coverage for a concurrent cause which
would otherwise be covered u n d e r the policy. T h e exclusionary language would
therefore have to be drawn artfully to exclude coverage effectively for any damages
caused by earth movement or water damage or both.
A totally different approach was used recently by the authors of this article when
asked to revise a standard homeowners'
policy. Rather than deny any coverage for
a loss where one of several causes of that
loss is excluded, this newly proposed language would exclude only that portion of
the loss caused by the excluded risk:
This policy do^es not insure against loss . . .
caused by, resulting from, contributing to,
or aggravated by any of the events set forth
[in those paragraphs containing the standard exclusions for earth movement, water
damage, and the like] even if said event or
events may not be the only cause of the
loss. There is no coverage hereunder for
that portion of any loss that is specifically
excluded pursuant to the exclusionary
paragraphs set forth hereinabove.
While this approach will require the use
of expert testimony to allocate what portion of the loss was caused by covered risks,
rather than by excluded risks, the cost of
such expert testimony is expected to be
minimal in comparison to the savings
achieved by paying for only a portion of
the loss, rather than for the entire loss.
Other proposed changes in the standard
policy were adding "rainfall" to the standard exclusion for flood, surface water,
waves, and the like a n d by a d d i n g "from
any source whatsoever" to the usual exclusions for water below the surface of the
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ground. Finally, it was recommended that
an additional exclusion be added for losses
arising from faulty, inadequate or defective
planning, construction, maintenance, engineering, workmanship, excavation, materials used in construction, and the like.
This exclusion would only apply if a peril
otherwise excluded by the policy substantially contributed to the loss.
Some insurance carriers have suggested
that they may be admitting that there was
coverage for the major concurrent causes
which heretofore had been specifically excluded, as a result of revising their policies
to state specifically that they would not insure a loss which would not have occurred
in the absence of one or more excluded
causes. The exposure the insurance carriers will face in the future may be so substantial that changes in their policies are
required no matter what effect such
changes may have on prior claims. The
further the courts go with finding coverage
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for concurrent causes, even though the
major causes were specifically excluded,
the more disastrous the results for insurers
if carriers do not take some positive action
to stem the tide.
As California courts become more and
more likely to find coverage where none
was thought to exist for earth movement
and water damage claims, other progressive
jurisdictions in the country are following
closely. This could be extremely costly to
the insurance carriers who provide homeowners' coverage in areas where such damages are likely to occur. As a result, the
current landslide of first-party claims under homeowners' policies may be as disastrous for today's insurers as the San Francisco earthquake was to those insurers who
thought they were protected by their earthquake exclusions, but who were faced with
an earthquake of their own when the
claims were successfully made under the
coverage for fire damages.
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CONCURRENT CAUSATION AND THE
ART OF POLICY DRAFTING:
NEW PERILS FOR PROPERTY INSURERS
Michael E. Bragg

Causation is a cornerstone of the propeny insurance contract. From the infancy of
the profession, insurers have used causal relationships both to describe the insured
event and to define under what circumstances coverage does not apply. The choice
has not always been a happy one.
Philosophers and linguists insist that language is merely man's meager attempt to
describe the reality of the physical world. We talk of "causes" of an event as if there
were such things physically "out there" waiting to be discovered. Thus, we send
adjusters, engineers, and geologists to determine the "causes" of a mudslide. While
this approach was adopted from the much-heralded scientific method and appeals to
common sense, philosophers would laugh at the futility. For them causes are not
physical forces waiting to be discovered; they are nebulous relational constructs
waiting to be described.
This philosophic premise has two very important corollaries: first, every event has
an infinite number of causes; and second, each cause can be described in an infinite
variety of ways. Although these statements are beyond serious philosophic challenge, they seem far removed from the practical considerations faced daily by policy
drafters, underwriters, and claims persons. The demanding careers of such professionals leave litde time to ponder Aristode's or Bacon's notion of causation. Yet it is
only when we come to grips with its philosophic underpinnings that we begin to
fully appreciate the legal complexity of concurrent causation and the havoc it creates
in the "real world" of claims handling.
At its most elementary level, concurrent causation implies simply that more than
one cause of loss or damage can have legal significance. This is hardly a startling
revelation to tort scholars. The public policy underlying tort law has long endorsed
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expanded notions of liability to compensate injured victims. Nor is the theory of
concurrent causation novel to liability insurance carriers whose fortunes follow the
legal liability of their insureds.
A 1983 Missouri appellate court decision colorfully illustrates this point." The
action arose when Terry Braxton was shot and injured by a drunken gas station
attendant following a fight over the making of change. Braxton brought suit against
the owner of the gas station alleging negligent supervision of the attendant. A judgement of $ 100,000 was obtained but the station's liability insurance carrier denied
coverage. In so doing it relied on a "firearm" exclusion in the policy which stated,
"This insurance does not apply . . . to bodily injury and property damage arising out
of the ownership or use of any firearm."2
The court cited similar cases from a number of jurisdictions and concluded that
the insured's own negligence in failing to properly supervise the attendant was a
legally significant cause of the owner's liability. Therefore, under the doctrine of
concurrent causation, coverage applied.
Insurance lawyers may well disagree with the court's finding that the negligent
supervision of the attendant was a "separate, concurrent and nonexciuded cause" of
liability. Nevertheless, nearly all would agree that every basis of liability must be
examined. If any nonexciuded basis rises to the dignity of an independent, concurrent proximate cause,* coverage under a liability policy will exist.
Liability and corresponding coverage under a third-party insurance policy must be
carefully distinguished from the coverage analysis applied in a first-party property
contract. Property insurance, unlike liability insurance, is unconcerned with establishing negligence or otherwise assessing tort liability. Thus, we discover that:
. . . proximate cause has a different meaning in insurance cases than it has in tort cases.
In tort cases the rules of proximate cause are applied for the single purpose of fixing
culpability, and for that reason the rules reach back of both the injury and the physical
cause to fix the blame on those who created the situation in which the physical laws of
nature operated; in insurance cases the concern is not with the question of culpability or
why the injury occurred, but only with the nature of the injury and how it happened.
Propeny insurance then is an agreement, a contract, in which the insurer agrees to
indemnify the insured in the event that the insured property suffers a covered loss.
Coverage, in turn, is commonly provided by reference to causation, e.g., "loss
caused by . . ." certain enumerated perils.
The term "perils" in traditional property insurance parlance refers to fortuitous,
active, physical forces such as lightning, wind, and explosion, which bring about the
1. Braxton v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 651 S.W.2d 616 (Mo. App. 198 3).
2. Wat 617.
3. Accord Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Purdic, 145Cal.App. 3d57,193 Cal. Rptr. 248 (198 3); compart
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 3d 406, 191 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1983).
4. See Unigard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 732 F.2d 1414 (9th Cir. 1984) applying Montana law; State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P.2d 123, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1973).
5. 43 AM. JUR. 2d Insurance § 463 (2d ed. 1982).
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loss. Thus the "cause" of loss in the context of a property insurance contraa is totally different from that in a liability policy. This distinction is critical to the resolution of losses involving multiple causes.
Frequendy property losses occur which involve more than one peril that might be
considered legally significant. If one of the causes (perils) arguably falls within the
coverage grant—commonly either because it is specifically insured (as in a named
peril policy) or not specifically excepted or excluded (as in an "all risks" policy)—
disputes over coverage can arise. The task becomes one of identifying the most important cause of the loss and attributing the loss to that cause. As stated in Couch on
Insurance:
In determining whether a loss is within an exception in a policy, where there is a concurrence of different causes, the efficient cause—the one that sets others in motion—is the
cause to which the loss is to be attributed, though the other causes may follow it, and
operate more immediately in producing the disaster.6
In discussingthe most important cause of a property insurance loss, "efficient" cause
is perhaps preferable to "proximate" cause because of the baggage that the latter
term brings with it from the law of torts. But whether the courts and commentators
refer to the most important cause as "proximate," "efficient," "dominant," "predominant," "operative," or "active," they have reached a consensus that one cause
is to be so designated and the loss attributed to it.7 The selection of this single cause is
not simply a random choice among an infinite number of competing events, but
rather focuses upon the contraa and the parties. For it is the language of the contraa
and the bargain of the parties that determine whether an event is significant.8
To discuss whether a particular cause is significant without understanding the context of the inquiry is jabberwocky. This was perhaps best illustrated by Professor Nicholas St. John Green in an article written for the American Law Review over a century
ago:
6. 6 COUCH ON INSURANCE, Sec. 1466 (1st ed. 1930) as cited inSabellav Wisler, 59CaJ. 2d 21, 377
P.2d 889, 895, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689, 695 (1963).
7. Brewer, Concurrent Causation in Insurance Contracts, 59 MICH. L. REV 1141, 1143 (1961). Levit,
Proximate Cause—First Party Coverage, 1965 ABA SECTION INS., NEG. & COMP L PROCEEDINGS 157,
reprinted 1966 INS. LJ. 340, 342.
8. See Bird v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 224 N.Y. 47, 120 N.E. 86, 13 A.L.R. 875 (1918).
The problem before us is not one of philosophy. . . . General definitions of a proximate cause give
titde aid. Our guide is the reasonable expectation and purpose of the ordinary business man when
making an ordinary business contraa. It is his intention, expressed or fairly to be inferred, that
counts. There are times when the law permits us to go far back in tracing events to causes The
inquiry for us is how far the parties to this contraa intended us to go The causes within their
contemplation are the only causes that concern us (Emphasis in original.)
The question is not what men ought to think of as a cause. The question is what they do think of
as a cause. We must put ourselves in the place of the average owner whose boat or building is
damaged by the concussion of a distant explosion, l a us say a mile away Some glassware in his
pantry is thrown down and broken. It would probably never occur to him that, within the meaning of his policy of insurance, he had suffered loss by fire. A philosopher or a lawyer might persuade him that he had, but he would not believe it until they told him
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For each different purpose with which we investigate we shall find a different circumstance, which we shall then intelligibly and properly call the cause. The man may have
committed suicide; we say he himself was the cause of his death. He may have been
pushed into the water by another; we say that other person was the cause. The
drowned man may have been blind, and have fallen in while his attendant was wrongfully absent; we say the negligence of his attendant was the cause. Suppose him to have
been drowned at a ford which was unexpectedly swollen by rain: we may properly say
that the height of the water was the cause of his death. A medical man may say that the
cause of his death was suffocation by water entering his lungs. A comparative anatomist
may say that the cause of his death was the fact that he had lungs instead of gills like a
fish. The illustration might be carried to an indefinite extent. From every point of view
from which we look at the facts, a new cause appears.9
Unfortunately Professor Green's lesson has not always been recalled by the courts.
Perhaps due to the judicial fascination with proximate cause in the tort field or the
infrequency with which judges encounter property insurance cases, tort causation
language has found its way—bag and baggage—into the insurance cases. This unfortunate blurring of distinctions between the law of torts and contracts is typified by
the recent flurry of decisions applying the doctrine of concurrent causation to property insurance contracts.
Although a review of case law on a national basis would reveal that several jurisdictions have struggled with issues of concurrent causation in the context of property
insurance, California decisions have had particular impaa in this developing area of
the law. n At the core of that state's causation analysis may be its demonstrated passion to find ways to compensate injured panies even at the expense of breaking
down common law distinctions between ton and contract. Granting ton remedies
Id, 120 N.E. at 87, 13 A.L.R. at 877.
In last analysis, therefore, it is something in the minds of men, in the will of the contracting parties, and not merely in the physical bond of union between events, which solves, at least for the
jurist, this problem of causation.
Id, 120 N.E. at 88, 13 A.L.R. at 879.
9. Green, Proximate and Remote Came, 4 AM. L. REV. 201, 212 (1870) as quoted in Brewer, Concurrent Causation in Insurance Contracts, 59 MICH. L. REV. 1141, 1166 (1961).
10. See General Am. Transp. Corp. v. Sun Ins. Off., Ltd., 369 F.2d 906, 908 (6th Cir. \966)affg 239
F. Supp. 844 (E.D. Tenn. 1965); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Hanley, 252 F.2d 780, 785 (6th Cir. 1958)
affg 140 F. Supp. 206 ( W D . Mich. 1956); Pearl Assur. Co. v. Stacey Bros. Gas Const. Co., 114 F.2d
702, 706 (6th Cir. 1940) applying Michigan law; Essex House v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 404
F. Supp. 978, 991-92 (S.D. Ohio 1975); Milan v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 227 F. Supp. 251, 253
(E.D. La. 1964); Fogarty v. Fidelity and Cas. Co., 188 A. 481, 483-84 (Conn. 1936), Mattis v. State
Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 118 IU. App. 3d 612, 454 N.E.2d 1156, 1164(5th Dist., 1983); Vormelkerv.
Oleksinski,40Mich. App. 618, 199 N.W.2d 287, 294(1972); Avis v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 283 N . C
142, 195 S.E.2d 545, 549 (1973); Benke v. Mukwonago-Vernon Mut. Ins. Co. 110 Wis. 2d 356, 329
N.W.2d 243 (1982); Kraemer Bros., Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 89 Wis. 2d 555, 278 N.W.2d
857 (1979); Lawver v. Boling, 71 Wis. 2d 408, 238 N.W.2d 514, 521 (1976). For additional references
see Gordon and Crowley, Earth Movement and Water Damage Exposure: A Landslide in Coverage, 50 INS.
COUNSEL J. 418,421-25 (1983).
11. Sabeila v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 2 1 , 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963); Strubble v. United
States Auto. Assoc., 35 Cal. App. 3d 498, 110 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1973); Giliis v. Sun Ins. Off., Ltd., 238
Cal. App, 2d 408, 47 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1965); Sauer v. General Ins. Co., 225 Cal. App. 2d 275, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 303 (1964); Hughes v. Potomac Ins. Co., 199 Cal. App. 2d 239, 18 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1962).
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for the unlawful withholding of contractual benefits is one example of this judicial
passion.12 The expansion of causation rules may well be another.
The California Supreme Court has never held in a property insurance case that
there can be more than one legally significant cause of loss.1 J In fact, the leading case
oiSabella v. Wisler4 seems to hold just the opposite. Nevertheless, the recent opinions of lower courts cannot be ignored. Moreover, the insurance industry has
learned well its lesson that it must not rely on the California Supreme Court to calm
troubled waters.
The difficulty of the industry's task in combatting concurrent causation embraces
two distina but related issues intertwined in the court decisions. First, the courts are
creating new "causes" of loss never contemplated by propeny insurance policy
drafters. Most important of these new causes are negligence and other human conduct. Such conduct may be active, passive, willful, negligent, imprudent, untimely,
or any other word which describes how people act or fail to act. Second, the courts
are telling us that the proper causation standard is no longer to attribute the loss to a
single proximate cause, but rather to grant coverage if any of the causes of the loss has
not been specifically excluded.
This second prong of the judicial assault is pointedly illustrated by the instructions
given to the jury in a well-publicized recent case:
Under an allriskpolicy, no matter what the cause of damage, there will be coverage
unless every cause of loss is excluded by the terms of the policy.
That is to say, if two or more causes combined to produce a loss, that also will be covered if any cause is not specifically excluded."
Through a judicial blending of these two distina notions, we now find that if a
new cause (e.g., third-party negligence) joins with an excluded cause (e.g., earthquake), the resulting loss may be covered. This precise issue was litigated and lost by
Safeco Insurance Company following the May 198 3 earthquake in Coalinga, Cali-

12. Gruenbregv. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 5lOP.2d 1032. 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (197 3).
13. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d 94, H 4 P . 2 d 12 3, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811
(197 3), which is often cited as applying concurrent causation principles to insurance contracts, does so
only in the context of the liability portion of the policy.
This distinction was clearly made by the California Supreme Court as noted.
Although there may be some question whether either of the two causes in the instant case can be
properly characterized as the "prime," "moving" or "efficient" cause of the accident we believe
that coverage under a liability insurance policy is equally available to an insured whenever an
insured risk constitutes simply a concurrent proximate cause of the injuries (Emphasis supplied
for the term "liability" only.)
Id at 105-06, 5 l 4 P . 2 d a t 130, 109 Cal. Rptr at 818.
14. Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21. 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689(1963).
15. Excerpt from jury instructions, Garvey v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., No 760 224 (San Francisco County, Cal. Super. Ct. 1982).
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fornia. * Safeco subsequently made a corporate decision not to appeal the case and
paid earthquake-related losses resulting from the Coalinga incident.
The language of the opinions is sweeping. Viewed collectively, the cases teach that
no policy exclusion or exception is inviolable. While the decisions have thus far primarily addressed the "earth movement" and "water damage" exclusions, concurrent causation finds perhaps even more fertile application in the context of the catastrophic exclusions of "war" and "nuclear hazard." Indeed it is difficult to imagine
how a war or nuclear incident could occur in the absence of negligence or some
other human "cause."
For example, if the driver of a truck carrying nuclear waste negligendy collides
with another vehicle resulting in the escape of nuclear radiation, would not resulting
property damage be concurrently and proximately caused by the driver's negligence?
Does it make a difference whether the loss was one caused by or resulting from "nuclear hazard"—a specifically excluded peril? Does it matter whether policy drafters did
not intend to cover such losses? or; whether the insured paid no premium for this
coverage? Perhaps not!
If the insured has an "all risks" policy and the driver's negligence was not specifically excluded, it would seem to present an issue of concurrent causation as applied
in the recent decisions. Moreover, the result may be the same had the loss occurred
due to the negligent design of the truck, the improper maintenance of the road or the
nuclear company's failure to transport the materials by rail. To repeat the words of
Professor Green: "The illustration might be carried to an indefinite extent. From
every point of view from which we look at the facts, a new cause appears."
From the perspective of the insurance industry, these are not idle issues of intellectual speculation. They jeopardize the very solvency of individual carriers and the
ability to conduct the business of insurance. No principles are more deeply ingrained
in the minds of underwriters than the selection of risk and the determination of pre16. Safeco Ins. Co. v. Motte, No. 0298082-9 (Fresno County, Cal. Super. Ct., July 1984).
The "ail risks" policy at issure in Safeco included recendy added concurrent causation language. Safeco
had mailed new policies to its insureds approximately fifty days before the Coalinga loss with an effective
date three days prior to the May 2, 1983 earthquake. Safeco accompanied the new policy with a letter
informing its insureds that there were changes in the new policy, but it did not describe them in detail. The
judge ruled that Safeco had not provided sufficient notice to its policyholders and therefore the concurrent causation language was ineffective.
Judge Dennis Caeton then turned to the traditional exclusionary language of the earlier policy. He held
that the earth movement exclusion was clear and unambiguous. However, although the peril of earthquake was specifically excluded, he found that the causa of the earthquake were not. Expert testimony
established that earthquakes are commonly caused by the slippage of tectonic plates underlying the earth's
crust. Since the policy did not specifically exclude tectonic plate slippage, the judge held that coverage
existed.
Judge Caeton went on to find that even if the slippage of tectonic plates was encompassed within the
exclusion for earth movement, the loss would still be covered. Judge Caeton cited the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Safeco v. Guyton—infra note 18—as controlling law in California. Since expert testimony had
established that the design of the structure was inappropriate to withstand earthquakes, the judge concluded that the negligent design was a concurrent proximate cause of the loss and therefore created coverage.
17. As cited in Brewer, Concurrent Causation in Insurance Contracts, 59 MICH. L. REV. 1141, 1143
(1961).
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mium. Insurers must know with certainty that contract language will be judicially
respected. Absent such certainty, only the most cavalier insurer would attempt to
write business.
Faced with several adverse California appellate rulings" as well as a rapidly developing number of trial court opinions,19 most companies took immediate and decisive
measures. A few, apparendy believing that the handwriting on the wall may be a
forgery, have taken a "wait and see" posture.
It is to the credit of the insurance industry that the leading trade organizations,
rating bureaus and independent writers acted swiftly and reponsibly. Despite the
gravity of the developing California case law, there was no industry movement to
halt property writings in that state. Rather the industry's effort focused on the policy
and the legislature.
REDRAFTING PROPERTY INSURANCE POLICIES

The traditional response of insurers upon discovering that their contraa language is
not being interpreted by the courts as the drafters intended is to rewrite the language.
In fact this alternative is often judicially mandated. Courts have told the insurance
industry coundess times that insuring agreements will be interpreted broadly and
exclusions narrowly. If the insurer desires to exclude some event it must say so
clearly and unequivocably.20
The difficulty, of course, is usually not one of intention, but one of language. We
humbly acknowledge the inherent artificiality, inadequacy, and imprecision of our
language. Yet we ask the policy drafter to forge the magic words that are at once easy
for the lay reader to comprehend and at the same time legally sufficient for the court
18. Safeco Ins. Co. v. Guyton, 692 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1982) rev'g 471 F. Supp. 1126 ( C D . Cal.
1979); Premier Ins. Co. v.Wdch, 140 Cal. App. 3d 720, 189 Cal. Rptr. 657 (198 3); Ashling v. Unigard
Mut. Ins. Co. (not released for publication), Cal. App., 4th Dist., Div 1 (1982); Moorehead v. Travelers
Ins. Co. (not released for publication), Cal. App., 2nd Dist., Div. 3 (circa 1974).
19. Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Adams, No. A021020, Cal. App., 1st Dist., Div. 3 (1984) on appeal
from an order granting defendant's demurrer (Marin County, Cal. Super. Ct., Nov 2 3, 1982), State
Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Sheldon, No A0213 26. Cal. App., 1st Dist., Div. 4 (1984) on appeal from an
order granting defendant's motion to dismiss (Marin County, Cal. Super. Ct., Aug. 2, 1982); Garvey v.
State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., No. A017879, Cal. App., 1st Dist., Div. 4(1984) on appeal from a judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff. No. 760 224 (San Francisco County, Cal. Super Ct., Feb 18,
1982). For a discussion of this case, see Jordan, Proximate vs. Concurrent Cause: the California Syndrome, 1
TEXAS INS. L.J. No. 6 (April 1984); McKibbin v Security Ins. Co., No. C 178 697 (Los Angeles County,
Cal. Super. Ct., Oct. 30, 1981).
20. See Kane v. Royal Ins. Co., No. 83 CV 603, ruling on motion for summary judgment (Larimer
County, Colo. Dist. Ct., Feb. 28, 1984).
The Kane decision holds that the property losses resulting from the July 15,1982 failure of the "Lawn
Lake dam" were not excluded by the water damage/flood exclusion. Rather the court decided that
the "efficient cause of Plaintiffs' damages" was the failure of the dam and not a flood as
contemplated within the insurance exclusion
Lastly, the Defendant companies control the language of the policy and their exclusions, and if
they wished to exclude damage from escaping "impounded waters," they could have easily specified and defined such an exclusion
Id. at 4
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to sanction. It is this challenge of writing for a dual audience (laymen and judge), and
the often contrary demands of each, that leaves fertile ground for litigation.
When policy drafters from individual companies began to examine concurrent
causation, they quickly learned that the issue was overwhelmingly complex. The
"solution," in the words of McGeorge Bundy, was as elusive as "picking up a jellyfish by the comers."" No consensus was reached by the industry on the precise
language to be employed. Therefore, several approaches now exist, none of which
has yet been judicially tested.
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company introduced its revised homeowners policies in California on January 1, 198 3. As the first company to issue new policies, the
language has been subject to close scrutiny and some criticism/'
Nevertheless, the changes made by State Farm are typical of those made by other
carriers and will be used here as illustrative of the industry response.
State Farm made four basic changes in its homeowners policies.
1. It removed the term "all risks" from the policy itself as well as all advertising
and promotional materials. The insurance industry well understood that "all risks"
referred merely to the format of the policy and not to the fact that it protected the
insured from every conceivable loss. Unfortunately, the term carried a connotation
for some laypersons that the policy contained no exceptions or exclusions. To avoid
the injection of the doctrine of reasonable expectations into the controversy, it
seemed prudent to stop referring to and selling the policy as "all risks"2' and to
change the language of the coverage grant from "all risks of physical loss" to "accidental direa physical loss." 4 The change merely attempts to reinstate the intent of
the earlier coverage grant.
2. It expanded the exclusionary definition of "earth movement" to enumerate a
detailed listing of events including earthquake, volcanic eruption, subsidence, and
mud flow. Ironically, the new listing closely resembles more historic versions of the
industry homeowners policy.
Public and regulatory pressures to develop "easy to read" policies had earlier resulted in eliminating the litany of specific events in favor of the single term "earth
Compare Bartlett v. Continental Divide Ins. Co., No. 83 CV 994, granting defendant's proposed order
(Larimer County, Colo. Dist. C t , Jan. 5, 1984). In Bartlett, decided more than a month prior to Kane, a
different judge of the same court held that losses from the same occurrence were unambiguously excluded
by an identical flood exclusion.
To hold the term "flood" ambiguous when applied to the great overflowing of water due to the
failure of a dam would be a denial of common sense and reason.
Id at 1.
21. McGeorge Bundy quoted in NEWSWEEK, Dec. 26, 1967.
22. Gordon and Crowley, Earth Movement and Water Damage Exposure: A Landslide in Coverage, 50
INS. COUNSELJ. 418, 426 (1983).
23. Insurers have traditionally referred to expansive homeowners policies as "all risks" policies to differentiate them from "named peril" policies. The removal of the term "all risks" has left insurers without
a universally accepted industry substitute. The Insurance Services Office coined the term "open peril"
policy which is perhaps the most descriptive.
24. For a discussion of direa versus indirect loss, see Gorman, A Reply to "Proximate Cause—First Party
Coverage,'' 34 INS. COUNSELJ. 98, 101-03 (1967).
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movement." Gains in brevity, however, are almost always accomplished through a
loss in precision. In light of judicial demands on insurers to say precisely what they
mean, most carriers have returned to describing a dozen or more kinds of excluded
activity. This well illustrates the dilemma of writing for the dual audience discussed
above.
3. It specifically provided that negligence or other conduct as well as defective or
improper design, materials, etc. are not in themselves covered losses. Moreover, the
presence or absence of these enumerated items has no effect on coverage. That is, the
items neither affirmatively create coverage nor bar recovery if the claim is otherwise
payable.
To illustrate how this provision operates in the typical homeowners policy, consider the following two hypothetical:
a. A home is improperly designed and constructed to withstand heavy winds
common to its geographic location. If the home is subsequently destroyed by a
windstorm, the loss is paid because the peril of wind is not excluded in the policy. The fact that the improper design or construction of the home or that
defective materials may also have been ''causes" of the loss is immaterial to the
determination of coverage; and
b. A home is negligendy constructed on a site extremely susceptible to mudslides
without adequate structural precautions. If the home is subsequendy destroyed
by mudslide, the loss is denied because the peril of mudslide (as well as other
forms of earth movement) is specifically excluded. As in the above example,
that improper design of the home or defective materials may also have been
"causes" of the loss is unimportant to the issue of property insurance coverage.
Note, however, that these "causes" are very important factors if the homeowner attempts to recover for his loss directly from the contractor based on
theories of negligence or warranty. Again, whether "causes" of a loss are significant depends gready on the context of and reason for the inquiry.
The adopted language attempts to restore traditional property insurance principles.
Coverage is determined by an examination of the fortuitous, active, physical perils
involved. Negligence and other liability-related concepts are irrelevant."' The intention of the drafters is to eliminate the new "causes" of loss held to have legal significance in such decisions as Safeco v. Guyton6 and Premier v. Welch.'
4. And finally, it revised the lead-in language to the exclusions (i.e., ordinance or
law, earth movement, water damage, neglect, war, and nuclear hazard). The new
language establishes a purging effect by making the occurrence of any oi these excluded events an absolute prohibition to a finding of coverage. Thus, once a loss
occurs which would not have happened in the absence of an excluded event, there is
no coverage. The policy states that this is so "regardless of (a) the cause of the ex25. Set Brodskv v. Pnnccmont Construction Co., 30 Md. App 569, 3 54 A.2d 440, 44 3 (1976)
26 Safeco Ins.'Co. v Guyton, 692 F.2d 551 (9th Cir 1982) w g 4 7 1 F Supp 1126 ( C D Cal.
1979)
27 Premier Ins Co. v. Welch, 140 Cal. App Id 720, 189 Cal. Rptr. 657(1983)
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eluded event; or (b) other causes of the loss; or (c) whether other causes acted concurrently or in any sequence with the excluded event to produce the loss."
Consideration was given to discussing the interaction of covered and excluded
perils in terms of proximate or remote causation. While such terminology would
parallel existing statutory and case law, attempts to crystalize such concepts in language meaningful to the lay reader proved futile. Furthermore, the potential catastrophic potential of such excluded perils as war, nuclear incident, flood and earthquake demanded that such losses be outside the contract regardless of the interaction
of other nonexcluded factors. Therefore, it was decided to structure the exclusions
to apply in every situation where the loss would not have occurred "but for" the
excluded peril.
The Insurance Services Office (ISO), whose forms are widely used in the property
insurance industry, introduced its revised homeowners forms and endorsements effective October 1983. Two substantive changes not incorporated in the State Farm
policy are worthy of note. First, ISO added a new exclusion labeled "weather conditions." Accordingto ISO's August 9, 1983 circular, this new exclusion is designed to
operate similarly to its negligence language. That is, it only applies if a specifically
excluded peril contributes in any way with weather conditions to produce the loss.
"Therefore," according to the circular, "if the dwelling is damaged due to (the
weather condition of) windstorm, coverage is provided; however, if (the weather
condition of) heavy rainfall causes flood damage (an excluded peril), the loss is not
covered."
Another significant ISO revision is its treatment of "collapse." Previously, collapse has been insured as a specifically named peril under both the personal property
and dwelling coverage grants. ISO removed collapse from the list of covered perils
and "excepted" it.2
Two reasons precipitated ISO's change in treatment of collapse. First, the peril of
collapse has always been somewhat anomalistic. Unlike traditional perils such as fire,
wind, and theft, "collapse" more often describes the result of an occurrence, not the
cause of one. Thus, it does not fit comfortably with other named perils and is more
logically treated separately. Secondly, the adoption of concurrent causation made
companies reexamine the drafting approach. They feared that if a massive earthquake occurred, courts might consider the resulting mass of nibble as "caused by"
the named peril of collapse. While it is difficult to think of collapse as an independent, concurrent proximate cause of an earthquake loss, there is concern that the
doctrine of reasonable expectations has not yet been stretched to its ultimate boundaries.
Therefore, ISO steered toward a safe harbor. It created a new paragraph under the
heading, "Additional Coverages," to reincorporate coverage for "collapse" caused

28. For a well-developed treatment of the difference between "exceptions" and "exdusions," see E.
PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW (2d ed. 1957).
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by certain specified perils such as hidden decay, weight of people or personal property, fire, and explosion. This change does result in a reduaion of coverage and has
generated both industry and regulatory debate.
Whether any version of the recent policy revisions will successfully ward off concurrent causation, only time will tell. Of panicular concern is whether the California
courts will accept the admittedly complex language. Although the language represents the industry's best efforts to state its intent and has its genesis in the soundest of
business principles, the California courts have been singularly unsympathetic with
insurance industry attempts to limit coverage.
Illustrative of this judicial mind set is the 198 3 California appellate decision of
Ponder v. Blue Cross.29 The dispute in Ponder arose out of a health insurance policy
which read in pan: "Blue Cross shall not furnish benefits for . . . treatment for or
prevention of temporo-mandibular joint syndrome."
Both parties agreed that Mrs. Ponder suffered from temporo-mandibular joint
syndrome (a "clicking" of the lower jaw). The central issue was whether the language in the Blue Cross policy effectively excluded coverage.0 The court held that
the exclusionary language was too obscurely written and inconspicuously placed in
the contract to be given effect. In so holding, the Ponder court summarized the applicable contractual rules:
1. Every contract is to be construed against the party who drafted it;
2. An insurance contract imposes an even more stringent duty on the court to
interpret in favor of the insured;
3. An exclusion in an insurance contract is subject to the closest possible scrutiny;
4. A health policy, like traditional property policies, is not just an insurance policy but a contract of adhesion offered to the insured on a "take it or leave it"
basis; and
5. An exclusion in an adhesion contract must be more than merely precise" and
unambiguous, it must be (a) conspicuous and (b) stated in plain and clear language.
The court explained these last requirements as follows:
First, the exclusion must be positioned in a place and printed in a form which would
attract a reader's attention. Secondly, the substance of the exclusion must be stated in
words that convey the proper meaning to persons expected to read the contract.
The court concluded that the Blue Cross language failed both the conspicuous and
29. Ponder v. Blue Cross of So. CaJ., 145 Cai. App. 3d 709, 193 Cai Rptr 632(1983)
30. The court, not surprisingly, characterized the inquiry somewhat differently
The central issue on appeal is whether a form insurance contract effectively excludes coverage
through a clause couched in undefined technical language not highlighted by location, typesize or
otherwise
Id. at 714. 19? CaJ Rptr at 63 3
31 The court went so far as to say that
Because ot the nature of the contract and the contracting panics, the most precise language imaginable may prove insufficient to eliminate coverage
Id at 718, 193 CaJ. Rptr at 635-36
32. Id. at 719, 193 Cai Rptr at 637
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the plain-and-clear requirements. Therefore, in the court's words, it "disappointed
the reasonable expectations of the policyholder." Policy drafters can only approach
such requirements with a deep sense of humility.
As a final reflection on the an of policy drafting, a review of the policy language at
issue in Guyton—the Palm Desert flood case—is instructive. The policy provided, all
in capitals:
ADDITIONAL EXCLUSIONS
THIS POLICY DOES NOT INSURE AGAINST LOSS
1) CAUSED BY, RESULTING FROM, CONTRIBUTED TO OR AGGRAVATED BY ANY OF THE FOLLOWING:
A. FLOOD, SURFACE WATER, WAVES. . ."
Note that the very nature of the "caused by, resulting from, contributed to or
aggravated by" language presupposes that other causes may intermix with the excluded events to produce the loss. The clear intent of the exclusionary language is to
bar recovery regardless of the sequence or concurrency of other loss-producing factors.
Most insurance experts believe that the insurance industry cannot draft language
which more precisely, unambiguously, conspicuously, plainly and clearly tells insureds that they have no coverage for flood losses. Judge Solomon, who authored
the federal district court opinion in Guyton, agreed:
There is no merit in the insureds' contention that policyholders and insurance companies generally believe that floods are covered. I do not believe that they do. But even if
they did, the express language of the policies, written in clear, concise and simple language, excludes floods from covered risks.5*
Despite this language-—carefully drafted as it was—the Ninth Circuit, in reversing
Judge Solomon's ruling, found the exclusion would not preclude the payment of
flood losses if third-party negligence were also a proximate cause of the loss. Flady
stated, an insurer's ability to contract—at least in California—is in serious jeopardy.
THE LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVE

Having witnessed judicial rebuff of previous policy-drafting efforts in such cases as Ponder and Guyton, the insurance industry can ill afford to place total confidence in the
most recent policy revisions. Most industry representatives firmly believe that their
assets are not protected, at least in California, until salutary legislation has been passed.
Numerous industry meetings were called to discuss the California judicial developments and to attempt to forge a legislative solution. Although every major trade
organization and independent property insurance writer participated in the dia33. Safeco Ins. Co. v. Guyton, supra note 26, at 552-53.
34. Safeco Ins. Co. v. Guyton, 471 F.Supp. 1126, !130<C.D.Cal. 1979), rev'd, 692 F.2d 551 (9th
Cir. 1982).
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logue, a consensus position was difficult to develop. Each company brought to the
discussions its o w n interests, policy forms and interpretation of the California judicial mandate.
Most felt that the policy drafters had successfully removed negligence and other judicially created "causes" of loss from the contract. There was considerably less comfort,
however, with the interplay between the contractual causation language and two existing sections of the California Insurance Code. Sections 530 and 532 provide:
§ 530. Proximate cause
An insurer is liable for a loss of which a peril insured against was the proximate cause,
although a peril not contemplated by the contract may have been a remote cause of the
loss; but he is not liable for a loss of which the peril insured against was only a remote
cause.
§ 532. Specially excepted peril
If a peril is specially excepted in a contract of insurance and there is a loss which would
not have occurred but for such peril, such loss is thereby excepted even though the
immediate cause of the loss was a peril which was not excepted.
These sections codify the long-standing English principles of marine insurance relating to causation.' 6 Despite their derivation from marine insurance, they have been
frequendy cited by California courts in resolving both liability and property insurance cases.'7 An open question remains whether sections 5 3 0 and 532 can be suc-

35. CAL INS. CODE §§ 530 and 532 (Deering 1972).
These two statutes were originally enacted in 1872 as sections 2626 and 2628 of California's first Civil
Code. They were derived from sections 1431 and 143 3 of David Dudley Field's draft of the New York
Civil Code of 1865. Sections 1431 and 143 3 were subsequendy deleted from the New York draft and
hence never enacted. This leaves California unique in its codification of insurance causation principles.
Section 530 codifies the traditional marine insurance causation principle applicable to named peril policies. That being, when two perils join to produce a loss—one of which is specifically '' insured against'' and
another of which is "not contemplated," i.e., unmentioned, neither specifically insured against nor specially excepted—coverage depends upon which of the two perils is "proximate." If the peril specifically
insured against is found to be proximate, there is coverage; if the unmentioned peril is proximate, there is
no coverage. For property subject to all risks protection, of course, all perils are "contemplated" by the
coverage grant. Therefore in the absence of a relevant policy exception, coverage would apply regardless
of the manner in which the perils combine to produce the loss.
Seaion 532 provides the traditional marine rule for determining coverage under both named peril and
all risks policies in instances quite distinct from section 530. Now one o( the perils is "specially
excepted"—not simply unmentioned or "not contemplated." Seaion 532 unambiguously states that, if
the loss would not have occurred "but for" the specially excepted peril, there is no coverage. W h a h e r the
specially excepted peril is proximate or remote is unimportant. Similarly unimportant is whether the
other operative peril is specifically insured against. As long as the specially excepted peril meets the "but
for" (cause in faa) standard, the loss is not covered.
Either the California courts have filed to recognize the above distinction or they have considered the
results of literally applying section 5 3 2 too harsh. Regardless of the reasoning, chey have found the provisions of the two seaions to be "directly contrary" to each other and have essentially emasculated section
532[S«SabeUav. Wislcr, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P 2 d 889,896, 27 Cal. Rptr 689, 696(1963).]
36. Brewer, Concurrent Causation in Insurance Contrasts, 59 MICH. L REV 1141, 1145(1961)
37. S« State Farm Mutual Auto Ins Co. v. Partridge, lOCai. 3d 94. 514 P 2d 123. 109 Cal. Rptr
811 (1973);Sabellav Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr 689 (196 3); Sauer v. General
Ins. Co., 225 Cal. App. 2d 275,37 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1964). Hughes v Potomac Ins Co., 199 Cal. App. 2d
2 39, 18 Cal. Rptr. 650(1962).
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cessfully altered by contract language. However, section 3268 of the California Civil
Code 8 and the case law " interpreting that section persuasively support such contractual freedom.
Nevertheless, the possibility cannot be ignored that the courts will declare sections
5 30 and 5 3 2 so entrenched in the law of property insurance that they now represent
the public policy of the state and cannot be contractually circumscribed. Fearing
such a judicial construction, the insurance industry introduced several bills during
the 1982 and 1983 legislative sessions which would have either repealed or amended
both sections. These efforts were strongly opposed by the California Trial Lawyers
Association and each of the bills died early in the legislative process.
Realizing that broad legislation to resolve concurrent causation had little chance of
passage, the insurance industry focused its attention on the one peril whose catastrophic potential endangered its very solvency—the peril of earthquake. Unsuccessful efforts were made during the 1983 session to legislatively exclude earthquake
losses from property insurance policies which did not specifically cover earthquakes.40 Finally, some relief was achieved in 1984 with the passage of Assembly Bill
2865, which became effective on January 1, 1985.41 This bill was sponsored by a
substantial segment of the insurance industry and received the support, at least informally, of the California Insurance Department.
A.B. 2865 has two significant portions. First, it intends to provide absolute protection for property insurers against the peril of earthquake and to resolve the application of concurrent causation to this peril. The bill states that such protection applies
regardless of sections 530 and 5 32 or any other existing laws. At least within this
limited context, it should legislatively overrule the rationale employed in such cases
as Guyton.
As a trade-off for such protection, A.B. 2865 requires that each insurer affirmatively offer earthquake coverage to all existing and new residential property policyholders. This offer, which must be made in a prescribed written format, calls to the
attention of the policyholder that the policy does not cover loss resulting from earthquake. If the insured desires such coverage, the insurer will either offer it directly or
arrange for another insurance entity to offer it.
Similar to earlier efforts, A.B. 2865 was introduced as a clarification measure to
38. [Panics may waive provisions of code] Except where it is otherwise declared, the provisions of the
foregoing titles of this part, in respect to the rights and obligations of panics to contracts, are subordinate
to the intention of the panies, when ascenained in the manner prescribed by this chapter on the interpretation of contracts; and the benefit thereof may be waived by any party entided thereto, unless such
waiver would be against public policy. CAL. Crv. CODE § 3268 (Deering 1972).
39. See WiUiamsburgh City Fire Ins. Co. v. Willard, 164F. 404,21 L.R.A..N.S., 103(9thCir. 1908).
40. Set, e.g., Cal. S.B. 958, 1983 Reg. Sess. (as amended on Sept. 7, 1983).
Existing California law prohibits fire and related insurance policies (induding homeowners policies)
from affording coverage for nuclear loss or damage unless a specific nudear endorsement is attached.
Absent such an endorsement there is no coverage for nudear loss "whether directly or indirectly resulting
from an insured peril." [Cal. Ins. Code § 2079 (Deering 1972).] Unenacted S.B. 958 would have provided identical treatment for the peril of earthquake.
41. Enactedasch. 916, LAWS 1984,Reg. Sess. (to be codified as ch. 8.5—commencingwith§ 10081—
of the CAL. INS. CODE).
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reinstate traditional insurer-intended coverage and to legislatively underscore the significance of the earthquake exposure. If people desire earthquake protection, it is
readily available for an additional premium. If people choose not to purchase such
coverage, their property insurance policy furnishes; no coverage for earthquakeregardless of other "causes."
The enactment of A.B. 2865 hopefully will provide the insurance industry with
much needed relief from the peril of earthquake. However, the bill may be cold
comfort indeed should the California courts decide that the special legislative treatment of eaahquake implies that all other "causes" of loss are covered regardless of
policy language to the contrary.
Moreover, the mandatory offer of earthquake insurance provisions of the bill are
very troublesome. They have created a great deal of concern throughout the insurance industry that the legislation may result in earthquake writings and corresponding liabilities which exceed the prudent capacity levels established by individual insurers as well as the California Department of Insurance. Although it is not presendy
known what the level of policyholder acceptance will be for this mandatory offer, a
survey conducted by State Farm's research department suggests that earthquake insurance writings may well double.
The added earthquake exposure resulting from the mandatory offer will force insurance companies to seriously reevaluate their underwriting and pricing guidelines.
Since a homeowners policy cannot be written in an earthquake-prone area of California without offering coverage against earthquake, insurers may be forced to decline theriskentirely. Such action may result in areas of insurance unavailability or
unaffordability, which in turn may spur further legislative action.
CONCLUSION

Final resolution of the concurrent causation issue remains elusive. As industry efforts concentrate on California, the rationale of the California decisions has recendy
surfaced in other jurisdictions.42 The jellyfish is entering new waters, leaving industry
policy drafters, lobbyists and lawyers with the task of searching for the "corner" to
extricate the property insurance industry from the most: significant and perplexing
problems it has faced in decades.

42. Sx Mams v State Farm Fire and Cas Co., 118 Hi. App. 3d 612, 454 N.E.2d 1156 (5th Dist ,
1983); memorandum brief in support of plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, filed Jan. 17, 1983 in
Kane v. Royal Ins. Co., No. 83 CV 693 (Larimer County, Colo. Dist. Ct.) at 13-18.
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October 16, 1987

TELECOPIER
(SOI) 5 2 4 - 1 0 9 9

Darwin C. Hansen, Esq.
110 West Center Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Re:

Village Inn Partners v, State Farm Insurance Co
Civil No. C-87-01180

Dear Darwin:
Since we are about to embark on discovery, there is
one matter I would like to bring to your attention.
Your client denied this claim on the basis of two
exclusions: repeated leakage and earth movementi With respect
to the second exclusion, I have various arguments as to why
that "earth movement" exclusion does not apply. You and I have
discussed some of those theories. For example, I will argue
that while earth movement itself is excluded, the efficient
predominant cause was a covered cause, and therefore the loss
is covered. Additionally, we discussed my position that earth
movement only applies to natural phenomeiife.
There is one additional position we will be taking
when attacking the earth movement clause. I wanted you to be
aware of this before the depositions started. We may argue
that the earth movement exclusion does not apply because,
technically, there was no earth movement which preceded the?
loss} We have reason to believe that the soil, when saturated
with water, does not actually sink or settle. Rather, it loses
its weight-bearing ability. This allows the foundation to sink
or shift. The soil would, of course, be displaced at that
point, but the actual movement of earth is not what caused the
foundation to shift.

KRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

Darwin C. Hansen, Esq,
October 16, 1987
Page 2
At this time, I are not sure to what extent the facts
will bear out this theory. However, in the interest of candor,
I wanted you to be aware of this approach. My Amended
Complaint may be technically incorrect because it references
"soil settlement" in one allegation (1f 5). While there was
indeed soil settlement or displacement, we intend to argue that
such settlement or displacement was the result of (rather than
the cause of) foundation shifting. I suppose I could amend the
allegation accordingly, but I would hope that is not necessary
in view of this letter.
S"\

Sincerely,
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141

Defendants.

15

STATEMENT OF FACTS

161

This case arises out of the alleged bad faith denial of

17

18!
19

insurance

21

22|
90

24

and

concomitant

unreasonable

defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company
n

20 j

coverage

conduct of
(hereinafter

State Farm11) in its investigation of a property damage claim

submitted by plaintiffs Jeannie and James Milliken.
On June 3, 1985, the Millikens applied for an insurance
package with State Farm (intending, according to their account,
to secure "all-risk" or "all peril11 coverage for their home) .

25 A "Homeowners Policy -- Extra Form 5" (No. 77-89-3958-1, here-

261

inafter "Policy") was then issued, effective June 23, 1985.

2"

Apparently the Millikens were not provided with a copy of the

281 Policy at the time of their application, nor was their attention

n\ ft

called to any provisions which would defeat their purported
desire to secure all-risk protection.
Shortly after applying for the Policy, the Millikens depart
ed on a two-month vacation.

They had not received a copy of th

executed Policy until they returned home on August 1, 1985. It
was also at this time that they noticed cracking in the concrete
slabs underlying their residence, garage and patio.
On December 5, 1985, the Millikens submitted a claim for
indemnification to State Farm, which received the claim on
December 11 and on December 17 agreed to investigate the loss
(under a full reservation of rights).

State Farm claims examine

Charles Garvin made a visual inspection of the Milliken residenc
on January 17, 1986.

He took fourteen photos of the damaged

areas, which he forwarded to State Farm for its review.

At no

time did State Farm or Garvin arrange for a licensed geotechnica
firm to conduct an independent investigation of the site.
State Farm denied the Millikens1 claim on February 6, 1986.
Garvin's letter of denial cited language in the Policy purportin
to exclude coverage for damage caused by "earth movement'1 (and
related phenomena that could have caused the cracking) . Speci.fi
cally, the following exclusionary language was noted:
Section I -- Losses Not Insured

We do not insure under any coverage for loss (including
collapse of an insured building or part of' a building)
which would not have occurred in the absence of one or
more of the following excluded events. We do not
insure for such loss regardless of: a) the cause of
the excluded event; or b) other cause of the loss; or
c) whether other causes acted concurrently or in any
sequence with the excluded event to produce the loss:
b.

Earth Movement, meaning any loss caused by,'
resulting from, contributed to or aggravated
by earthquakes; landslides; mud flow; sinkhole; erosion; the sinking, rising, shifting,
expanding or contraction of the earth. Earth
movement also means volcanic eruption, explosion or effusion, except as provided in Additional Coverages for Volcanic Action.
We do insure for direct loss by fire, explosion other than explosion of a volcano,
theft, or breakage of glass or safety glazing
materials resulting from earth movement.

c.

Water Damage, meaning:
(3) natural water below the surface of the
ground.
This includes water which exerts
pressure on or seeps or leaks through a
building, sidewalk, driveway, foundation,
swimming pool or other structure.
However, we do insure for direct loss by
fire, explosion, or theft resulting from
water damage.

We do not insure under any coverage for loss consisting
of one or more of the items below:
a.

conduct, act, failure to act, or decision of
any person, group, organization or governmental body whether intentional, wrongful,
negligent, or without fault;

b.

defect, weakness, inadequacy,
fault or
unsoundness in:
(1) planning, zoning, development surveying,
siting;
(2) design, specifications, workmanship,
construction, grading, compaction;
(3) materials used in construction or repair;
(4) maintenance;
of any property (including land, structures,
or improvements of any kind) whether on or
off the residence premises.

]|
2 |

However, we do insure for any ensuing loss from items a
and b unless the ensuing loss is itself a Loss Not
Insured by this Section.

3
4.
i

We do not insure for loss described in paragraphs 1 and
2 immediately above regardless of whether one or more
of the items listed in paragraph 3 above:

5II
a.
g
b.

gjl
10
II
|9;
~j
in
2411

directly or indirectly cause, contribute to
or aggravate the loss; or
occur before, at the same time, or after the
loss or any other cause of the loss.

However, we do insure for ensuing loss from items 3a
and 3b unless the ensuing loss is itself a Loss Not
Insured by this Section.
The letter then stated:
Our observations of the cracking in the slab of the
sort we observed at your home can only be a result of
some type of earth movement, of a sinking, rising,
shifting, expanding or contracting of the earth. As
you can see from the terms of your policy quoted above
this sort of earth movement is excluded.

2&11 The disappointment of the Millikens in having their claim denied
2Q|| was compounded by their suspicion that Garvin, not a licensed
27|| geotechnical engineer, did not give them a fair evaluation.
2g! Through their attorney they wrote to Garvin on February 12, 19S6
19

and "beseeched11 him to undertake a more complete inquiry into the

20

causes of the damage.

Garvin's response was a reaffirmation of

nil) coverage denial.
22

The Millikens filed the instant suit in San Diego Superior

23

Court on April 10, 1986.

24

of action:

25

1)
2)

26
27
28

3)
4)
5)

Their.complaint sets out eight causes

breach of contract;
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and breach of State Farm's fiduciary
duties;
fraud;
negligent misrepresentation;
violation of the California Insurance Code
(sections 790.02 and 790.03);
- 4 -

State Farm petitioned for removal of the action on June 5, 19S6
and the Millikens then moved for remand. Pursuant to a Memorandum
Decision dated November 5, 1986, this court denied the motion
for remand.

State Farm then moved for summary judgment on

February 13, 1987.

Summary judgment on the first through fifth

causes of action is sought on grounds that the Policy excludes
the Millikens' loss from coverage, and summary judgment on the
seventh and eighth causes is sought on grounds of failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

State Farm

inadvertently failed to request summary judgment on the sixth
(,fnegligencelf) • cause of action, but at hearing the court agreed
to entertain an oral motion on that cause.

For the reasons set

forth below, the court now finds the arguments of State Farm to
be well-taken and therefore grants summary judgment in its favor
as to all eight causes of action.
DISCUSSION
I.
Summary Judgment Standards
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) allows for the entry
of summary judgment where:
23

!

jj
241

the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show
25
that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is
25
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
271 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. In a recent discussion of this standard
281 the Supreme Court stated that Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of
- 5 -

1
2
3
4
5
61
1\

summary judgment against a party who "fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential tc
that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden
of proof at trial."

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S. Ct. 2548,

2553 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of
proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact and

8

that judgment may be entered as a matter of law.

9

Union of Bricklavers & Allied Craftsmen Lcccl Union No. 20,

International

10j AFL-CIO v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir.
11 1985). Once that burden has been met, however, the opponent
12i must answer with factual allegations revealing a genuine dispute
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
221
23
24
251
261
27
28

of fact.

^Id.

. .

A dispute over a material fact is "genuine," according to
a recent Supreme Court pronouncement, if "the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party."

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510

(1986).

If a nonmoving party's evidence is "merely colorable"

or "not significantly probative," summary judgment may be
granted.

Jd. at 2511.

Furthermore, the "substantive evidentiary standards that
apply to the case" must guide a judge in determining whether a
factual dispute requires submission to a jury.

Ld. at 2514.

The Court in Anderson, supra, went on to point out that "at
the summary judgment stage the judgefs function is not himself
to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but
to determine whether .there is a genuine issue for trial."
at 2511.
- 6 -

Id.

that certain facts or issues do not present a genuine dispute.
In such a case a court may enter an order specifying the facts
that are not subject to substantial controversy.
56(d).

Fed. R. Civ. P.

Here, State Farm has requested that such an order be

entered if summary judgment is denied.
Although Rule 56 presents only one standard for summary
judgment, application of the standard over the years has produced certain rules of thumb.

For instance, summary judgment

is usually denied where a case turns on issues of intent or
motive.

In this spirit, the Millikens argue that "summary

judgment is generally denied in cases involving insurance
contracts because issues of -fact are present concerning whether
the damages involved are within the scope of the insurance
policy.11

Citing Wright and Miller, 10A Federal Practice and

Procedure § 2730.1, p. 293 (1983).

The Millikens further argue

that resolution of these factual issues requires that a policy
be construed in light of the parties' reasonable expectations
of coverage.

Finally, the Millikens

suggest that summary

judgment is usually inappropriate in insurance coverage cases
because such cases typically present thie factual issues of
whether the insurer breached its obligations under the policy
and whether the insurer made certain representations regarding
coverage.

These propositions notwithstanding, however, summary

judgment is just as appropriate in insurance cases as it is in
other cases where there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore,
- 7-

1

as mentioned above and discussed below, summary judgment may be

21 entered in favor of State Farm in the instant case.
3|
II.

4

Coverage Issues Relating to the
First Five Causes of Action

5
6

^*

7 I

Both parties spend a considerable amount of their discussion

g

Ambiguity of the Policy

on the issue of the Policy's ambiguity before they address wheth*

oil the damage claimed by the Millikens is covered.

State Farm's

2Q( firm assertion that the Policy is not ambiguous is central to its
argument for summary judgment.

This is because construction of

I2i an unambiguous policy may be undertaken by the court as a legal
jo I matter suitable for resolution on a motion for summary judgment.

14 See Sanrota v. Barbagelata, 220 Cal. App. 2d 463, 472 (1963).
15

In developing its argument here, State Farm restates some

jgjl familiar maxims.

The language of a policy prevails over any

j-

inconsistent or general description of that policy.

C & H Foods

lg

v. Hartford Ins. Co., 163 Cal. App. 3d 1055, 1064 (1984).

Words

ion must be given their plain meaning, and if a policy is unambiguous
2Q

a court must give effect to that plain meaning and must not

21

create an artificial ambiguity.

See Matsuo Yoshida v. Liberty '

22 Mutual Ins. Co,, 240 F.2d 824, 826-27 (9th Cir. 1957).
23 exclusionary

241
25
26!
27
28

clause must

be

conspicuous, plain

and

An

clear.

Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lesher, 187 Cal. App. 3d 169, 184 (1986).
State Farm avers that the Policy exclusions are abundantly
clear.

Clauses affording coverage are located under the boldface

heading "Losses Insured,11 while exclusions comprise the separately titled section of'"Losses Not Insured.11
- 8 -

Furthermore, the

1

numbered exclusionary subsections all begin with the simple

2! declaration, "We do not insure...." What is more, there is a
3 separate, boldfaced "Earth Movement" exclusion which, according
4 to State Farm, applies neatly in the instant case.
51
The Millikens argue, contrariwise, that the policy _is_ ambig6 uous and that summary judgment therefore cannot be entered.

A

7

policy provision is ambiguous when it is susceptible to two or

81

more constructions, both of which are reasonable.

9

according to the Millikens, ambiguity must be "viewed from the

101 perspective of a reasonable lay person."
11

Furthermore,

Delgado v. Heritage

Life Ins. Co., 157 Cal. App. 3d 262, 272 (1984).

A policy should

121 not be subjected to the fine-toothed inspection of an attorney or
13

insurance specialist, but instead should be read in its plain,

14! everyday sense.
15

The Millikens charge that the Policy is ambiguous in several

16! fundamental respects. An initial ambiguity arises out of the
17 provision, "We insure for accidental direct physical loss to the
181 property described in Coverage A except as provided in SECTION 119 LOSSES NOT INSURED." According to the Millikens, the operative
201 phrase "accidental direct physical loss" is never defined in the
21 Policy. Nor is the term "loss" itself defined. This is important
22! because the Millikens allegedly assumed that they had taken out
23 an "all-risk" policy. This assumption, they contend, is borne
24 out by the presence in the Policy of some 60 individual exclu25

sions.

The Millikens reason that only an "all-risk" policy would

261 have such a comprehensive list of exclusions. Thus the structure
27 of the Policy is ambiguous; the Policy is internally inconsist281 ent.

In addition, the Millikens posit that the "Losses Not
- 9-

1 Insured11 terminology is unclear.
21
3

sions is followed with the declaration that "we do insure for
any ensuing loss...."

4

in the Policy.

5

Each of the numbered exclu-

The term "ensuing loss1' is not defined

And, more importantly, the Millikens assert that

the diminution in value of their residence is just the sort of

6

"ensuing loss" that a reasonable person would expect to be

7|
8|
9

covered under this exception to the exclusion.

Finally, the

Millikens allege that State Farm apparently admitted the ambiguity of some of its own terms in responding to several pro-

10| pounded requests to admit.
11
Having considered the arguments set out above, the court
12j
now finds that the Policy is sufficiently unambiguous to warrant
131
reading it on its own terms. The Millikens1 objections are not
14!
persuasive; the Policyfs coverages and exclusions are clearly

15J
16!
17

categorized, labeled and (to a reasonable degree) defined.

It

is an easy task to quibble over definitions and undefined terms,
and it seems to the court that an approach like that taken by

IS!
i

the Millikens could render any policy or provision arguably

191 unintelligible.

The fact that the coverage term "accidental

201 direct physical loss" is undefined does not reveal a fatal
21

ambiguity in the Policy, because in this case the operative term

221

is the "earth movement" exclusion (which' is clearly set out).

231 Thus, even assuming that the coverage term is unclear, the
24

exclusion term is not.

25

inconsistent.

Moreover, the Policy is not internally

The Millikens' argument here relies upon a good

26| deal of bootstrapping in its effort to establish that just
27 because an all-risk policy was sought, the presence of exclusions
281 renders the Policy ambiguous.

As admitted by Mr. Milliken

- 10 -

li

2
3
4

at his deposition, the Policy says what it says.
p. 71)

(Milliken Dep.,

If what the Policy says differs from that which it was

expected to say, that discrepancy goes more to reasonableness
of expectations or bad faith than to ambiguity (see below,

5 pp. 11-13). Furthermore, although the Policy does not define
6 "ensuing loss," it does indicate at the outset that only
7 "physical" losses are covered. Diminution in value would there8 fore not be within a reasonable reading of "ensuing loss."
9 Finally, having examined State Farm's responses to the Millikens1
10 requests to admit, the court is satisfied that State Farm was not
11 admitting in any way the ambiguity of the Policy. Moreover, as
12 shown herein, the court is further satisfied that the Policy is
13 not ambiguous.
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28|

B.

Reasonable Expectations

Although in some senses it is true, as State Farm contends,
that reasonableness of expectations is only an issue if the
Policy is found to be ambiguous, the unusual facts of this case
recommend that the issue be considered apart from the Policy's
ambiguity.

The gist of the Millikens1 argument here is that they

applied for an "all-risk" or "all peril" policy but that they
received a policy riddled with exclusions.

When the Millikens

submitted their application, they checked a box reading "all
peril."

They now maintain that by doing so they expected a more

comprehensive policy than that which was issued.

And because the

actual Policy was mailed to their home while they were away on
vacation, they could not inspect and object to the Policy until
they returned.
occurred.

But by the time of their return the damage had

Therefore, according to the Millikens, the scope of
- 11 -

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

coverage should be determined by their expectations at the tine
of application, and not by the limited terms of the Policy.
With respect to the first contention, the court is not convinced that the Millikensf application did evince an intent to
secure all-risk coverage.

The box on the application which was

marked for "all peril11 is included in the deductibles section,
not the coverage section.

Thus, it appears to the court that the

8 Millikens were not indicating that they wanted all-risk coverage,
9 but instead were simply agreeing to a certain deductible on all
10 "perils" -- on all risks and occurrences which would otherwise
11 give rise to claims.
12
Moreover, State Farm points out that Mr. Milliken is an
13 insurance lawyer who has prosecuted bad faith actions and is
14 somewhat acquainted with soil mechanics, and then argues that he
15 did get exactly what he bargained for in the Policy. In other
16 words, he had no expectation of receiving all-risk coverage. In
17 an excerpt from his recent deposition, Mr. Milliken indicates
18 that he knew that some insurers were attempting to exclude con19 current causation coverage from their policies (in the aftermath
20 of the Coalinga earthquake). (Milliken Dep., p. 70) From this
21 knowledge, State Farm deduces that Mr. Milliken "is a very, very
22 sophisticated individual who knew more than the insurance agent
23 selling the policy." In another deposition excerpt, Milliken
24 states:
25
I mean, the policy speaks for itself. Whatever it says,
it says. There was no collateral conversation about
26
the meaning of the policy. I expected the policy to
cover
whatever it says it covered and we didn't discuss
27
what their intent, was in doing it or what my intent was
in buying it. I'bought the policy as it was sold. The
28
product is the policy form and that's what I bought.
- 12 -

1
2

(Milliken Dep., p. 70)

In light of this and other evidence,

State Farm concludes that Mr. Milliken did not have a reasonable

3 expectation of coverage for loss due to earth movement. The fact
4 that he did not actually read the Policy until after the loss is
5 therefore beside the point. To find otherwise, and to protect
6 the Millikens on expectation grounds, would be to conjure up an
i

untenable principle that exclusions will not be enforced until

8

they are actually received and read by the insured.

9
10

In light of the revealing deposition testimony quoted above,
!

11

12!
13
14 i
15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22;
23
24;
25
26
27
28

the court finds that the Millikens did not have a reasonable
expectation of coverage for losses due to earth movement.

The

Millikens have not shown both that they intended to secure allrisk coverage and that they communicated that intent to State
Farm.

And State Farm has shown that Mr. Milliken" (at least)

expected only to be covered by the terms of the Policy as
written.

The court declines the Millikens' invitation to fashion

a rule that premises the effectiveness of policy terms upon the
condition that they are read.

Such a novel rule would burden

insurers with uncertain expectations and ultimately reward ignorance and sloth on the part of policyholders.
C.

Reasonableness of Investigation

A related reasonableness issue concerns whether State Farm's
investigation of the Milliken claim was reasonable -- complete,
accurate and undertaken in good faith.

The Millikens assert

strongly that State Farm's investigation was inadequate.

That

investigation, which consisted of a visual inspection by Garvin,
an interview of the Millikens, and State Farm's later analysis of
Garvin's site map and photos, was allegedly too cursory to have
- 13 -

1 been made in good faith.
2!

The Millikens challenge the competency

of Garvin and fellow State Farm examiner Thomas O'Mahoney and

3| allege that the Policy's implied covenant of good faith and fair
4
dealing required at least a thorough study by a qualified civil
5
1/
11
engineer before coverage was denied.—
According to the
6
Millikens, a finding that earth movement has caused the subject
mm

i

8
9
10
11

property damage must be based upon a complete investigation by a
civil engineer.

Such an investigation, moreover, must be under-

taken in order to comport with an insurer's express and implied
contractual duties (including its fiduciary duty).

Here, say the

Millikens, the failure of State Farm to consult with earth

12

movement specialists constitutes an unreasonable investigation
13
2/
and a breach of contractual duties.—
14
15
16

State Farm argues that its investigation of the Milliken
claim was reasonable, and it is with this argument that the court
is in accord.

Surely further studies by expert geologists would

;

17

p

18

25

The Millikens cite the fact that neither Garvin nor O'Mahoney
is an engineer in support of a collateral accusation that the two
examiners are practicing civil engineering without a license, in
violation of California Business and Professions Code § 6730.
This charge, in the court's estimation and in agreement with
State Farm's reply, "borders on the ludicrous." Neither Garvin*
nor O'Mahoney purports to be a civil engineer, and neither has
held himself out so as to raise such a suspicion. By contrast,
both do have experience in evaluating earth movement loss claims.
And the opinion of an insurance examiner ought not to be discredited merely because the subject about which he makes a determination lies within the special expertise of another professional
such as an engineer. To hold otherwise would be to disqualify
most examiners from rendering opinions on any subject except
insurance -- an absurd result.

26

2/

19
20
21
22
23
24

The Millikens here rely on the declaration of Jack Eagan,^
27 a certified engineering geologist who has reviewed this case and
has concluded: "I do not believe a sufficiently thorough investi28 gation was performed to cause anyone to render an opinion that
the damage described was as a consequence of earth movement."
- 14 -

1 have lent credence to whatever conclusion was ultimately drawn by
2 State Farm. But there is insufficient proof that State Farm's ov
3 investigation was either too cursory or conducted in an incompe4 tent manner. Garvin was an experienced claims examiner who had
5 "years of experience in investigating property losses resulting
6 from earth movement." His on-site review of the damaged property
7 together with his discussion with the Millikens and other State
8 Farm examiners, led him to the reasonable conclusion that the
9 damage would not have occurred absent some movement of the earth.
10

D.

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Coverage

The backbone of State Farm's summary judgment argument is
its assertion that "NO COVERAGE FOR THE LOSS TO THE MILLIKENS
[sic] PROPERTY EXISTS SINCE THE LOSS RESULTED FROM A PERIL
SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED UNDER THE POLICY."

After noting that an

insurer has a right to limit coverage (see Continental Casualty
Co. v. Phoenix Construction Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 432 (1956)),
State Farm argues that its investigation was not only reasonably
carried out, it was also accurate.

That is, the property damage

at the Millikens' residence was caused by earth movement.
37

'
In reaching this conclusion the court need not rely on the
reports of the Milliken property prepared by the Santa Fe Soils
Company and submitted by State Farm with its reply memo. These
reports, which establish
the probability that earth movement did
cause the Millikens1 damage, would not be admissible for the purpose of showing that State Farm's investigation was reasonable.
Both parties have properly noted that the reasonableness of an
insurer's denial of coverage must be determined on the basis of
the facts known to the insurer at the time of the denial. Austero
v. National Casualty Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 1, 32 (1978). An
insurer cannot use hindsight to justify its denial, and cannot
justify its denial on grounds which differ from those originally
invoked. As discussed above, however, the court finds the State
Farm investigation to have been reasonable, even without having
considered the Santa Fe reports. (See the discussion below on
use of the reports to show coverage,)
- 15 -

II

State Farm's finding is corroborated by reports of soil

2 tests conducted by Santa Fe Soils, Inc. in August and December
3 of 1986. Those reports, released by Magistrate McKee only last
4 Wednesday, were submitted with State Farm's reply memo.The
5 August report states: "Based upon our preliminary observations,
6 it is our judgment that the indicated site distress is in response
7 to differential settlement of the underlying fill soils." The
8 December report includes, among its conclusions, the statement
9 that "the noted site distress is a result of adverse local condi10 tions. The crack in the garage footings may reflect local consol11 idation of the utility trench backfills in that vicinity." It is
12 the court's opinion that the observed "settlement" and "consoli13 dation" constitute "earth movement."
14
Because Policy exclusion 2(b) of "Losses Not Insured" explic15 itly denies coverage for damages which would not have resulted but
1G for earth movement, State Farm proposes that the question of cover
17 age is easily resolved: no coverage. State Farm points out that'
18 the earth movement exclusion is couched in broad terms. Any loss
19 which would not have resulted but for earth movement is excluded,
20 regardless of either the cause of the movement or whether some
21 other force combined with the movement to cause the damage.—
22 47
Although, as mentioned in note 3 above, the reports may not
23
be used to establish the reasonableness of State Farm's investi24 gation, they may be used to establish the cause of the damage to
the Milliken property. There is no requirement that a court
25 confine its inquiry to the evidence which is known to an insurer
at the time that a claims decision is made.
26 5/
Compare Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21 (1963) (coverage
27 exists where included peril is efficient cause which sets in
motion other excluded' perils, where the combination of perils
28 causes loss) .
- 16 -

1

State Farm goes on to argue that the Millikens have not

2

presented any facts which indicate a possibility of coverage.

3

a letter to Garvin shortly after State Farm's denial of coverage

4

counsel for the Millikens speculated about some possible alter-

5

native explanations for the damage, which might have been covere*

6

by the Policy.

7

pacting of fill material prior to construction of the Millikens1

8

residence; 2) the introduction of water into weak or unstable

9

formational material; and 3) the use of inadequate grading

I

Examples included: 1) negligent placing and com-

10

equipment.

11

scenarios would result in a similar denial of coverage.

State Farm insists, however, that each of these
The

12 first is excluded by sections 3(b) and 4 of "Losses Not Insured,f
13 the second by sections 2(b), 2(c), 3 and 4, and the third by
14 section 3(b)(1) and 3(b)(3). State Farm concludes:
15
1C
|-}|
I
-jo I

In short, there are no facts before this Court indicating any possibility that the applicable insurance policy
issued to plaintiffs by State Farm provided coverage for
any "direct accidental physical loss" not excluded by
Section I -- Losses Not Insured. Indeed, every cause
posited by plaintiffs reflects an absence of coverage.

19

On the strength of this conclusion State Farm requests the

20

entry of summary judgment on the Millikens1 first five causes of

21

action.

The Millikens have not directly confronted State Farm's

22 assertion that the damage was caused by earth movement. That
23 is, the Millikens have not come forward with facts sufficient to
€%A\\ overcome the proof that State Farm has offered (especially in the
95

form of the Santa Fe soils reports).

Rather, the Millikens have

26 Proposed various alternative forces that could have caused the
97 damage.
23

None of these has been supported by the facts, however,

and several have been shown to fall within Policy exclusions any- 17 -

1

way.

2j

remains a genuine dispute over the facts of causation and that t

The court is therefore satisfied both that there no longe

3 explicit Policy exclusion for earth movement losses operates tc
4 deny coverage.
51

E.

61

As if to anticipate one of the Millikens1 objections, Stat

Validity of the Exclusions

mm

/

8]

Farm included in its moving papers an argument that the Policy*,
exclusions are not contrary to public policy.

According to Stat

9 Farm, an insurer need not cover all risks, and certain risks ma:
101 be excluded at the insurer's behest.
11
12!
13
14!
151
161
17

If the court were to find

the subject exclusions to violate public policy, then a parade
of horribles would follow:

State Farm "will become insolvent:"

and premiums "will have to be increased to a point that they wil
be out of reach to virtually all homeowners.11

The private con-*

tractual agreement will have been tampered with, and financial
interests of State Farm's prior insureds' will be jeopardized.
So as not to disappoint, the Millikens do argue that the

18! subject exclusions are void as against public policy. But even
19 if the presence of their argument was expected, its substance is

201

somewhat inventive. Rather than positing policy grounds for

21 invalidating the exclusions, the Millikens here revive their
22 j "reasonable expectations" analysis (presented above). Because,
23 j they argue, standard-form insurance policies are adhesion con24

tracts, an insurer must bring to the insured's attention any

25

provisions that would frustrate the coverage that is sought.

26

Exclusions must be conspicuous, plain and clear.

27

65 Cal. 2d 263, 271 (1966).

28

clear exclusions are not effective until the policy is delivered.

Gray v. Zurich,<

Moreover, say the Millikens, even

- 18 -

1 unless they were adequately explained at the time of applicatior
2ii Logan v, John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 41 Cal. App. 3d 988
3 995 (1974)• In this case, the earth movement exclusion (which i
4 apparently a recent addition to such policies) was not explainei
5 to the Millikens at the time of their application. Therefore,
6 because the Millikens presumed they were securing all-risk cover
i

age and because State Farm had only recently rewritten its

8 policies to exclude earth movement losses, the Millikens assert
9 that their reasonable expectation was that the Policy to be issue
10 would cover the sort of loss incurred. At the very least, State
11 Farm had a duty to inform the Millikens that earth movement woulc
12 not be covered.
,13

These arguments merely restate the "expectations1' claims dis

14 cussed above, and for the reasons previously explained the court
15 finds them to be unmeritorious. The record does not reflect any
16 evidence of overreaching on the part of State Farm. Instead, it
17 reveals that Mr. Milliken was a sophisticated buyer who was aware
18 of certain restrictive trends in insurance policy writing and who
19 therefore probably expected less than complete coverage for such
20 occurrences as earth movements. Furthermore, because the precise
21 date of the damage is unknown, the facts could support an infer22 ence that the Policy was delivered by the time of the damage.
23 Then the exclusion would have been effective even though it had
24 not been explained at the time of application and even though the
25 Millikens had not yet read the Policy. State Farm would then have
26 done all possible to put the Millikens on notice of the exclusions
27 In any case, no authority has been brought to the court's atten28 tion for striking down the earth movement exclusion on its face.
- 19 -

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
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F.

The Milliken Claims

On the basis of the above discussion, the court finds the
first five Milliken causes of action to be unmeritorious and
vulnerable to State Farm's motion for summary judgment.

Becaus

the discussion proceeded along general lines and did not addres
the counts individually, the causes of action are again set out
and briefly commented upon below.
1.

Breach of Contract

The claim for breach of contract must fail because, as
developed at length, the court finds that earth movement did cau:
the damage to the Millikens' property, that claims for earth
movement were excluded from the Policy, and that State Farm's
investigation of the claim was reasonable and sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of the contract.
2.

Breach of the Implied Covenant
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

' The Millikens argue that State Farm's denial of coverage

18 after only a cursory inspection of the damaged property, where
19 such inspection was conducted by a claims agent who "hasn't
20

even taken a basic geology course,11 constituted a breach of

21

the Policy's implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

22 An implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is read
23 into every contract of insurance. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha
24 Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 818 (1979), cert, denied and appeal
25 dismissed, Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Egan, 445 U.S. 912
26 (1980). The covenant requires the insurer to act fairly and
9711 reasonably with respect to claims of its insureds. According
2g|i to the Millikens, an insurer must not seek to deny claims, but
- 20 -

1 muse act so as to find a basis for paying a portion of a claim,
2

even if the insurer believes there to be no coverage.

Further-

3

more, good faith requires an insurer to make a thorough investi-

4

gation of the grounds for a denial of coverage.

5

at 819.

6!

Egan, supra,

State Farm argues, and this court has found, that the inves

7

tigation of the Milliken claim was reasonable and undertaken in

8

good faith.

Garvin was an experienced claims agent who had oftei

9!

investigated

cases involving property damage caused by earth

10

movement.

11

good faith and fair dealing.

12
13
14
15

2A.

There has been no breach of the implied covenant of

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

The Millikens rely again on Egan, supra, for the propositior
that insurers hold themselves out as fiduciaries and therefore
owe their insureds a special duty of care. 24 Cal. App. 3d at

ie;

820; Delos v. Farmers Ins. Group, 93 Cal. App. 3d 642, 656

IV

(1979).

In the instant case, the Millikens have alleged three

18; breaches of this special duty:
19

1) the failure to conduct a

thorough investigation of the possible causes of the damage;

201 2) the failure to point out the "earth movement" exclusion in
21 the Policy (a recent addition to such policies); and 3) the
221
failure to point out that an "accidental direct physical loss"

231
24
25]

policy is not the same as an all-risk policy.
The court finds that State Farm has not breached its fiduciary duties because:

1) its investigation was sufficient, 2) the

26! "earth movement" exception was communicated to the Millikens via
27

the clear Policy language; and 3) the Millikens did not have a

28

reasonable expectation of all-risk coverage. .
- 21 -

3f 4^

Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation

The Millikens' third and fourth causes of action are for
fraud anci negligent misrepresentation.

These claims purported!:

encompass the triable fact issues of whether or not oral misrej?II resentati-ons were made to the Millikens and whether the Millikefl
justifiably relied on those representations.
7

Furthermore, the$*

I] claims (which are identical, except that the latter does not

8

require proof of intent to defraud) will be cognizable regard-" 1

9

less of how the coverage issue is resolved.

If coverage is

10 denied, Che Millikens will assert that they were led to believe
11 that the Policy would cover all risks. And if coverage is foun<ii
12 the Millikens will retain their action on the basis of the
13

implied Representation that State Farm would conduct a thorough

14 investigation of all possible bases for coverage and pay any
15 relief due.

According to the Millikens, there is a triable

16 issue he^e in any event.
*'||

Consistent with the findings made above, however, the

18 court is convinced that State Farm did not misrepresent either
19 the Policy's coverage or the extent of the investigation whicfr
20 would be provided upon the bringing of a claim for indemni21

fication/

Neither does the court find evidence that the

22 Millikens reasonably relied to tYieir detriment on represen23 tations made by State Farm.
24

5.

25

The Millikens further allege that State Farm's unreasonable

Violation of Insurance Code Sections 790.02 and 790.03

26 procedures for investigating claims of its policyholders violate
27 California Insurance Code sections 790.02 and 790.03 (especially
28 sections 790.03(h)(3) and 790.03(h)(5)). Section 790.02" prohibits
- 22 -

1
the c o m m i s s i o n
2|!
3)
4'
5)
6
/!
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instant

and
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clear."
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West's Ann.

in
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faith

in
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summary

judgment
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Millikens'

f i f t h c a u s e of a c t i o n is w a r r a n t e d .
III.
T h e S i x t h C a u s e of A c t i o n
The Millikens'
Inasmuch

as

determines
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that
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cause
State
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be
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discussion which establishes
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oral motion
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the

is for

court
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unless

some

the

duty,

and

court
given

that State F a r m h a s
now

finds

that

on this c a u s e of

not

State
action

taken.
IV.
The Emotional Distress

25

28!

of

standards

c a s e , and in the a b s e n c e o f any s h o w i n g of an u n f a i r

24

2"/

790.03(h)(5)

reasonable

processing

have been implemented

231

261

and

the c o u r t h a s found

are r e a s o n a b l e

I61

19

implement

liability has become reasonably

15

IS i

7 9 0 . 0 3 ( h ) ( 3 ) and

f a i r , and e q u i t a b l e

14

17

Sections

in th<

u n d e r i n s u r a n c e p o l i c i e s " and "[njot a t t e m p t i n g in g o o d f a i t h tc

9
10|

of "an u n f a i r or d e c e p t i v e act or p r a c t i c e

As

t h e i r s e v e n t h cause of a c t i o n , the M i l l i k e n s a l l e g e

"State Farm pursued
ally

Claim

and/or

an o u t r a g e o u s

recklessly,

c o u r s e of c o n d u c t ,

proximately

causing

- 23 -

intention-

plaintiffs'

e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s , s h o c k and o t h e r h i g h l y u n p l e a s a n t

that

severe

emotions."

1 As their eighth cause of action, the Millikens allege that it was
21 foreseeable that they would suffer severe emotional distress and
3 shock if State Farm improperly handled their claim. What is
more, such "severe emotional distress, shock and other highly
5 unpleasant emotions" were suffered by the Millikens.
6
State Farm has separately argued for summary judgment on
7 these causes of action. Regarding the claim for intentional
8 infliction, State Farm argues that its conduct (i.e. the conduct
9 of everyone at State Farm who was associated with the Millikens'
10 Policy and claim) was not "so outrageous that no person in a
11

civilized society should be required to bear it."

Soto v. Roval

12 Globe Ins. Corp., 184 Cal. App. 3d 420, 430 (1986). The viola13 tion of statutory duties alone (if such violation were found)
14 would not constitute the sort of conduct which is actionable
15 as an intentional infliction of emotional distress. I_d. at
16 431. Because, according to State Farm, this court may find as
17 a matter of law that the conduct was not outrageous, summary
18 judgment is appropriate.
19
The Millikens oppose summary judgment on the intentional
20 infliction count on two grounds. First, they note that abuse of
21 a protected relationship by one in a relative position of power
22 may amount to outrageous conduct. Second, they urge that the
23 outrageousness of State Farm's conduct is a question for the
24 jury in any case.
25

As State Farm has pointed out in its reply, however, the

26 issue goes to the jury only if the situation presented is one
27 "[w]here reasonable men may differ." See Alcorn v. Anbro
28 Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 499 (1970). And in the
- 24 -

1

instant case the court is not satisfied that reasonable people

21 could differ. State Farm's conduct, although perhaps falling
3 short of an ideal of informativeness or thoroughness, was not
4 sufficiently outrageous that a jury could find for the Milliken
5| on this issue. Summary judgment may therefore be entered on th
6| seventh cause of action.
7
In moving for summary judgment on the eighth cause of
81 action, State Farm summarizes the standard recently discussed
9 by the California Supreme Court in Ochoa v. Superior Court,
101 39 Cal. 3d 159 (1985): a cause of action for negligent inflic11 tion of emotional distress lies where it is foreseeable that
12! emotional shock would result from an abnormal event. See also
13 Soto, supra, at 433. The court in Soto found that a failure
14 timely to pay workers'' compensation benefits was not an "abnormal
15 event." Similarly in the instant case the failure to indemnify
161 the Millikens would not support .a claim for negligent infliction
1/ of emotional distress.
181
19
20|
21

221
23
24
25
26|
27
28|

The Millikens attempt to rehabilitate their claim by arguing that State Farm's mishandling of the instant claim was a
breach of the parties' special relationship of trust and confidence.

Although there may have been such a trust relationship

between State Farm and the Millikens in this case, the court
finds that the facts simply do not support a finding of a breach
of that relationship.

Nor do the facts show either that the

Millikens' purported emotional shock was foreseeable or that
the shock resulted from an abnormal event.

Summary judgment

must therefore be entered in favor of State Farm on the
Millikens' eighth cause of action.
- 25 -

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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CONCLUSION
Upon due consideration of the parries' memoranda and
exhibits, the arguments advanced at hearing and for the reasons
set forth above, this court hereby grants the motion of defendant
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company for summary judgment on all
eight of the causes of action stated in the complaint of plaintiffs Jeannie and James Milliken.
DATED:

March 26, 1987.

9
10
11

'WILLIAM «. ENRIGHT, JuSge
United States District Court

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26 Copies to:
27 Plaintiffs
28 Defendants
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Civil No. 86-1284-E

JAMES S. MILLIKEN and
JEANNIE S. MILLIKEN,
Plaintiffs,

A M E N D E D
ORDER

v.
STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants.

For the reasons set forth in the court's Memorandum Decision
dated March 26, 1987, the motion of defendant State Farm Fire and
Casualty Company for summary judgment is hereby granted as to all
eight of the causes of action brought by plaintiffs Jeannie and
James Milliken.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

April 1, 1987.

WI^IAM B. ENRIGHT, Judge
United States District Court

Copies to:
Plaintiffs
Defendants
< $

U N I T E D S T A T E S DISTRICT C O U R T
S O U T H E R N D I S T R I C T OF CALIFORNIA
O F F I C E O F T H E CLERK
WILLIAM W. LUDDY
CLXRK

April 1,

1N20 U.S. COURT HOUSE
• 4 0 FRONT S T R U T
S A N D I E O O . CALIFORNIA 0 2 1 8 9

PHONE:
(714) 193-5600
PT8: S0S-56OO

1987

Anthony E. Shafton
11620 Wilshire Blvd 6th Fl
Los Angeles, CA 90025

Berger Kahn Shafton & Moss
4215 Glenco Ave
Marina Del Rey CA 90292

William D. Hughes
450 B st Ste 1450
San Diego, CA 92101
Milliken VS State Farm Fire & Casualty Co 86-1284E(CM)

RE:

You are hereby notified that ^mpnHp^ ord^r

in each of the above entitled cases was
Date Filed 4-1-87
X

Copy enclosed

x

Filed and j>L_

Date Entered

Copy not enclosed

I hereby certify that this notice was mailed on

C. GUARDADO

«-~.

AAA

4-1-8 7

1 APR 1987

Deputy

Entered.
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KNAPP. PETERSEN * CLARKE

L

ORIGINAL FILEO

A P M F t M I O N A I . COUFQMATION

LAW Y CAS
7 0 UNIVCJUAI. CITY PlAXA. »UIT* 4 0 0
UNIVCRSAL CITY, CALIFORNIA 91608

2

DEC 3 1 1933

(318)608-5000

3

COUNTY CLERK

4

Attorneys forPlaintiff and Defendant STATE FARM FIRE AND
5 CASUALTY
COMPANY, an Illinois corporation
6

7
8

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

9

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

10
11 JOHN R. BAYLESS, et al.,
Plaintiff,

12
13

CASE NO. WEC 8 713 5
(Consolidated with
WEC 090135)

vs.
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY

PftQPQQCP ORDER

14 COMPANY,- etc. ,
15
Defendants.

£i

16
17 AND ALL CONSOLIDATED ACTIONS.
18
19
20 Casualty

On

December

Company1s

5,

1986,

(State

defendant

Farm)

motion

State
for

Farm

summary

Fire

and

judgment,

21 or in the alternative, for summary adjudication of issues, came
22 on regularly for hearing in Department R of the above-entitled
23 court, before the Honorable David M. Rothman, Judge presiding.
24
25
26 defendant

Barry

Bartholomew

State

Farm.

appeared

Neil

on

Rockwood

behalf

of plaintiff

appeared

on

and

behalf

27 plaintiffs and defendants John R. Bayless and Monica R. Bayless.
28 ///

of

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1
2

State Farm Fire and Casualty Company's motion for summary

3
4

judgment is denied.

5
6

State Farm Fire and Casualty Company's motion for summary

7

adjudication of issues is granted as to issues 1, 2, 3 and 4,

8

as follows:

9
10

1.

The

applicable

11

for earth movement;

insurance

policy

excludes

coverage

o

oo
o «
t

12

* -

2.

13
JI <o c
:2 S5 3 S 14
J

is

excluded

under

the policy

regardless

under

the

regardless

of the cause of the earth movement;

u a. < uo

- < > *

J

Coverage

ao

2 3 <J j: S 1 5

• S

- < 03
00
u» —

3.

X Q

Coverage

is

excluded

policy

z a

>

17 of whether

other

causes

18 with

movement

acted

concurrently

or in any

sequence

3

19 but

earth
not

being

20 settling,
21

limited

shrinking,

foundation

22 decision

to

thereof,
of

any

cause
to,

the

loss,

surface

water,

bulging

or

or

conduct,

the

person,

said

expansion

group,

including

sub-surface

of

act,

causes

the

failure

organization

or

water,

residence
to

act

or
or

governmental

23 body whether such be intentional, wrongful, negligent or without
24

fault;

25
26

4.

There

is

no

coverage

under

the applicable

policy

27

of insurance for property damage ensuing from the Big Rock Mesa

28

///
•2-

1

landslide, save for any ensuing loss caused by fire as provided

2

for in the policy.

3
4

The

above

four

issues

are deemed

established

and

the

5 action shall proceed as to the issues remaining.
6
7

The

court

denied

State

Farm's

issue

number

five

on

8 the grounds that a triable issue of fact exists as to whether
9 there was any misrepresentation made to the Baylesses concerning
10 whether the policy issued on the Seaboard residence was similar
11

to those issued to the Baylesses on other properties

owned

by

12 them, and whether there was a misrepresentation as to the coverage
13

afforded by the policy issued on the Seaboard residence.

O

S 14
00

o
°

15 DATED.

DEC 3 1 1986
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JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
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(SPACE BELOW FOR FILING STAMP ONLY)
KNAPP. PETERSEN 4

1

CLARKE

A FftOrXaSIONAL CORPORATION

LAWYERS
70 U N I V I M A L CITY PLAXA. S U I T *

2

400

UNIVERSAL CITY, CALIFORNIA »t«OS
(818)

508--5000

3

ORIGINAL FILED

4
Attorneys for

5

D e f e n d a n t STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUAIifl^qpgDAfiUf

COUNTY CLEBIS

6
7
8

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

9

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

10
11

ROBERT SCOTT TURRILL, etc.,
Plaintiffs,

12

Case No. WEC 104 457

)
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
ADJUDICATION OF ISSUES
E^MRQPODDD ]

13

vs.

14

STATE FARM FIRE AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
et al.,
Defendants.

15

)

)
)
)
)

16
17
18
19 i

TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
On April 17, 1987, in Department 7*K" of the above-entitled

20

court V\ defendant STATE FARM F^RE P&V //CASUALTY COMPANY'S

21

Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative for Summary

22

Adjudication of Issues came on regularly for hearing.

23

on the moving, opposing and reply papers, and oral arguments

24

by both parties, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

Based

25

The motion for summary judgment is denied.

26

Summary Adjudication is granted as to the following

27

ten issues.

28

issues shall be deemed established and the action 'shall proceed

At any trial of this action, the below specified

- 1-

as to the issues remaining.
1.

The insurance policy applicable from 7/25/85 to

7/25/86 excludes coverage for earth movement;
2.

Coverage is excluded under the policy applicable

from 7/25/85 to 7/25/86 regardless of the cause of the earth
movement;
3.

Coverage is excluded under the policy applicable

from 7/25/85 to 7/25/86 regardless of whether other causes
acted concurrently or in any sequence with earth movement

o o
o *

* Z

<

< 0

10

to cause the loss, said causes including but not being limited

11

to, surface water, subsurface water, settling, shrinking,

12

bulging or expansion of the residence or foundation thereof,

13

or the conduct, act, failure to act or decision of any person,

c

. N U. O

3 2 3 o 14
UJ

a. <

< u >
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15

00

Z
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>

group, organization or governmental body whether such be

ir>

intentional, wrongful, negligent or without fault,
4.

CO
—

There is no coverage under the policy applicable

17

form 7/25/85 to 7/25/86 of insurance for property damage

18

ensuing from landslides in Potrero Canyon, if any, save

19

for any ensuing loss caused by fire as provided for in the

20

policy.

21

5.

D

22
23

The insurance policy applicable from 7/25/83 to

7/25/85 excludes coverage for earth movement;
6.

Coverage is excluded under the policy applicable

24

from 7/25/83 to 7/25/85

25

earth movement;

26

7.

regardless of the cause of the

Coverage is excluded under the policy applicable

27

from 7/25/83 to 7/25/85 regardless of whether other causes

28

acted concurrently or in any sequence with earth movement

- ? -

to cause the loss, said causes including but not being limited
to, surface water, subsurface water, settling, shrinking,
bulging or expansion of the residence or foundation thereof,
or the conduct, act, failure to act or decision of any person,
group, organization or governmental body whether such be
6

intentional, wrongful, negligent or without fault;
8.

7

There is no coverage under the policy

applicable

8

from 7/25/83 to 7/25/85 of insurance for property

9

ensuing from landslides in Potrero C a n y o n , if a n y , save

1 0 i for any ensuing loss caused by fire as provided
11

damage

for in the

policy;

00

O O

°t

9.

12

w

II 13

July

The policies in effect from July 2 5 , 1983

2 5 , 1986, do no insure against

through

loss caused by the

< oc
!]ol4

of third p a r t i e s .

5 > S 15

third party acts or i n a c t i o n , such acts are not an

W h e r e a proximate cause of damage

actions

is

a. < to

insured

risk within these p o l i c i e s .
Z X
D UJ
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10.

17

There is no coverage under the policies in effect

D

from July 2 5 , 1983 through July

2 5 , 1986 for losses, if

18 |
any, proximately

caused by the actions of third p a r t i e s .

19
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the above ruling is made

20
w i t h o u t prejudice to defendant bringing another motion

for

21
summary

judgment on the ground that the only policy

sued

22
on w a s for the policy periods July

2 5 , 1983 through

July

23 1
24 j
25
26
27
28

2 5 , 1 9 8 6 , and summary

judgment should be granted by

///
///
///
///
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reason

of the above adjudication of issues.

Plaintiff is directed

2

in any opposition to address whether the July 25, 1978 through

3

July 24, 1983 policies are a part of this lawsuit.

4

RICHARD G. KAR319

5 DATED: W W * 1987
JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
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STATE FARM FIRE AND CAS. CO. v. MARTIN

1379

Cite a» 668 F^upp. 1379 (CD.CaL 1987)

Adjudication of Plaintiff Crawford
With respect to plaintiff Crawford's
claim. This Court grants summary judgment in favor of plaintiff Crawford with
respect to his claim regarding DISCO's refusal to grant his clearance because of his
"homosexual activity and susceptibility to
coercion." Use of these factors alone violates Crawford's rights under the equal
protection clause. With respect to Crawford's other claims, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of defendants.

6. plaintiffs' attorney shall be awarded
a reasonable attorney's fee under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
(O i«YNUMBt*SYSTEM>

STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY
COMPANY, a corporation, Plaintiff,

Defense Central Index of Investigations
Claim

v.
Steven M. MARTIN and Peggy D.
Martin, individuals, Defendants.

Because this claim is not included in
plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint, the
Court may not consider it.

Steven M. MARTIN and Peggy D.
Martin, individuals,
Counter-claimants,

Accordingly, good cause appearing, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:

v.
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY
COMPANY, a corporation,
Counter-defendants.

1. plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part
and defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part
2. defendants' policy of subjecting
plaintiffs to expanded investigations and
mandatory adjudications is declared to violate plaintiffs' rights under the first and
fifth amendments to the United States Constitution;
3. defendants' reasons for denying
plaintiff Dooling a Secret clearance and
subjecting him to further investigation and
adjudication is declared to violate plaintiff
Dooling's rights under the first and fifth
amendments to the United States Constitution;
4. defendants' reasons concerning homosexuality for denying plaintiff Crawford
a Secret clearance are declared to violate
plaintiff Crawford's rights under the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution;
5. defendants are enjoined from subjecting plaintiffs to expanded investigations, mandatory adjudications, or any other procedures based on plaintiffs' sexual
orientation, homosexual activity, or membership in a gay organization;

No. CV 86-6672 (CBM).
United States District Court,
CD. California.
July 9, 1987.
Memorandum Order Granting Summary
Judgment Oct 20,1987.
Homeowners' insurer sued for declaratory judgment that damage to insureds'
home was not covered by policy. Insureds
counterclaimed for insurer's alleged refusal to pay under terms of policy, breach of
implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, and violations of California Insurance Code. The District Court, Consuelo
Bland Marshall, J., held that: (1) language
in homeowners' policy, providing that policy provided no coverage for any loss that
would not have occurred "but for" an excluded event regardless of whether covered
events may have contributed thereto, did
not violate any provision of California Insurance Code, so as to be enforceable as
written, and (2) insurer did not breach duty
of good faith and fair dealing.
Insurer's motion for summary judgment granted.
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1. Insurance <3=>146.7(8)
Absent some ambiguity, court could
not "construe" exclusions in homeowners'
policy so as to provide coverage, but had to
enforce exclusions as written.

counsel, hereby issues the following memorandum order.

MEMORANDUM ORDER GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF PLAINTIFF

I. FACTS
This action is based on denial by plaintiff
State Farm of a claim by defendants under
their homeowners insurance policy.
Defendants Steven and Peggy Martin
purchased the residential property that is
the subject of the insurance claim in early
January, 1984. On January 4, 1984, defendants purchased a homeowners insurance policy from State Farm insurance.
The policy issued was contained in Form
Policy 7175.
Sometime between May 5, 1984 and August 6, 1985, defendants noticed cracking
and other related problems on their property, including bulging, corrosion and tilting.
On January 4, 1985, the policy was renewed as contained in Form Policy 7185.
On August 6,1985, defendants submitted
a claim to State Farm for cracking and
related problems on their property, and on
September 4, 1985 they met with Chiquita
Ector, State Farm claims representative, in
their home, and Ector inspected the premises.
On October 16, 1985, Jim Damm, State
Farm claims superintendent sent defendants a "reservation of rights" letter setting
forth possible exclusions under the policy.
Sometime in October of 1985, Tim Welch,
a senior engineering geologist at the time
employed by American Earth Technologies,
investigated the cause of damage to defendants' property at the request of State
Farm.

CONSUELO BLAND MARSHALL, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on plaintiff State Farm Fire and Casualty Company's motion for summary judgment A
hearing was held on June 1, 1987 before
Honorable Consuelo B. Marshall, United
States District Judge, presiding. The
Court having reviewed the pleadings, moving papers, oppositions, replies, all exhibits
presented by the parties, all pertinent authority and having heard the arguments of

In his report to State Farm, dated October 21, 1985, Welch stated the potential
causes of distress to be one or more of the
following:
1. Settlement of subgrade soil;
2. Expansion of subgrade soil;
3. Sulfate crystaKzation within the subgrade soil;
4. Sulfate attack to the cement foundations;
5. Poor foundation construction.

2. Insurance <£=»427
Language in homeowners' policy, providing that policy provided no coverage for
loss that would not have occurred "but
for" excluded event, regardless of whether
covered events may have contributed thereto, did not violate any provision of California Insurance Code, so as to be enforceable
as written.
West's Ann.Cal.Ins.Code
§ 530.
3. Insurance «=>602.2(1)
Homeowners' insurer which denied
coverage when covered home began to
crack and bulge, on ground that damage
would not have occurred but for excluded
events such as earth movement, did not
breach its duty of good faith and fair dealing, where there was no indication that
insurer's investigation was inadequate or
substandard or that insurer unduly delayed
by waiting three months in order to investigate claim.
Jeffrey H. Leo, Daniel L. Gardner, Douglas R. Irvine, Parkinson, Wolf, Lazar & Leo,
Los Angeles, CaL, for plaintiff.
Paul B. Witmer, Jr., P.C., Santa Ana,
CaL, for defendants.

STATE FARM FIRfi AND CAS. CO. v. MARTIN
Cite a* MS F.Supp. 1379 (CDX.L 1987)
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absolute right to limit coverage under an
insurance policy and that because defendants had a copy of the policy at all times
herein, they are charged with knowledge of
the terms of that policy. Moreover, plaintiff explains that defendants did not pay
for an "all-risk" policy; to require plaintiff
State Farm to pay for excluded perils
would, in turn, require the company to
raise the premimums on all such restrictive
policies in order to stay financially sound;
this would harm the group of all insureds.
Plaintiff contends that because it did not
unreasonably delay in investigating defendants' insurance claim, and because there
was a reasonable basis for denial of plaintiffs claim, it is not in violation of California Insurance Code § 790.03.
Plaintiff asserts that in drafting the insurance policy in question, the company did
not disregard or violate California Insurance Code § 530. Finally, plaintiff contends that all counterclaims are time
barred by the one-year limitations period
imposed by the policy.
Defendants, in opposition, contend that
based on California law, the policy must be
construed narrowly against the insurer and
II. PARTIES' CONTENTIONS
so as, if semantically possible, to provide
Plaintiff contends that all potential indemnity to the insured.
causes of the trauma to the defendants'
Moreover, defendants contend that this
property were expressly excluded under is a situation where coverage should exist
their insurance policy. Plaintiff specifical- pursuant to California Insurance Code
ly cites in its moving papers to Form Policy § 530 because the earth movement and oth7175, section I, at 1(f), 2(b), (c)(3), and 3; er excluded causes were concurrent with a
and Form Policy 7185 Section I, at 1(f), (h), non-excluded cause of damage—sulfate
(i), 2(b), (cX3), 3(aXb), and 4(a), (b). These crystalization.
restrictions are essentially the same in both
Defendants claim that summary judgyears.
ment against their counter-claims based on
Plaintiff argues that the language con- the one-year contractual limitations period
tained in these sections of the policy is is improper because theere is a triable issue
explicit and lists earth movement, under- of fact as to what losses are affected by
ground water, contamination and deteriora- the limitation, when the limitations period
tion as causative events which are express- commenced, and whether State Farm is
ly excluded. Plaintiff further argues that estopped to assert or has waived the limitathe contract is unambiguous in its explanations defense.
tion that resulting damage which would not
have occurred in the absence of one of III. DISCUSSION
these excluded events is also excluded from
A. Ambiguity
coverage, no matter whether or not other
concurrent causes exist Plaintiff contends
[1] Defendants cite Safeco Insurance
that under California caselaw it has an Co. v. Guy ton, 471 F.Supp. 1126 (C.D.Cal

State Farm sent a copy of this report to
the defendants' attorney on September 15,
1986.
Subsequently, Welch states in his declaration, further tests were conducted and
further investigative work done, which led
him to conclude that sulfate crystalization
was not, in fact, a potential cause of the
damage to the Martin's property.
State Farm filed the complaint in this
action on October 15,1986, seeking declaratory relief, including a ruling that the insurance contract does not provide coverage
for the losses contained in defendants claim
against the insurance policy.
Defendants filed an answer and counterclaim on November 4, 1986. The counterclaims included the following:
1. Refusal to pay under terms of the
policy;
2. Breach of implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing;
3. Violation of California Insurance
Code Section 530;
4. Bad faith conduct in violation of California Insurance Code Section 790.03(h).
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1979) for the rule of strict construction
against insurers, i.e., the proposition that
"[ijf any ambiguity or uncertainty exists an
insurnce policy is construed strictly against
the insurer and most liberally in favor of the
insured." Safeco, 471 F.Supp. at 1129.
However, what plaintiff fails to note is that
the case goes on to explain that the rule
. . . is subject to an important limitation,
. . . it is applicable only when the policy
actually presents such uncertainty, ambiguity, inconsistence or doubt. In the absence thereof, the courts have no alternative but to give effect to the contract of
insurance as executed by the parties.
Accordingly, when the terms of the policy are plain and explicit the courts
will not indulge in a forced construction so as to fasten a liability on the
insurance company which it has not
assumed. Safeco, 1471 F.Supp. at 1130.
In Safeco, the Court, in fact, found that
there was no coverage. Moreover, the policy involved in Safeco was what is termed
an "all-risk" policy; its coverage was more
broad, in general, than that under the policy currently at issue.
The language of the policy herein is explicit as to exduwons. The Court must
give full effect to the policy as written.
Defendants tore presented no evidence
to dispute plaintiffs allegations and supporting declarations that defendants had
timely received copies of the reservation of
rights letter, detailing exclusions, following
submission of their claim. Nor have defendants made allegations or provided any
evidence that representations were ever
made by plaintiff that the policy purchased
would be an all-risk policy.
B. Coverage
[2] The language of this policy form is
unambiguous as to the sections limiting
coverage. In Form 7175, effective from
January 1984 to January 1985, the policy
specifically states in "Section I," "Loss not
insured" at 1(f) that there is no coverage
for loss "consisting of, or directly and immediately caused by, one or more of the
following:

f. wear and tear, marring; ... deterioration; . . . contamination; ... settling,
cracking, shrinking, bulging, or expansion of pavements, patios, foundations,
walls, floors, roof, or ceiling; ..." (Ector
Decl., Exh. 12 at 0023).
Moreover, the policy specifically states
that it does not insure for any loss that
would not have occurred in the absence of
certain events, including earth movement
and water damage (Section I, 2(b)f, (c),
"regardless of ... any other causes, or
whether other causes acted concurrently or
in any sequence with the excluded event to
produce the loss." (Id.)
Defendants, in opposition, cite Sabella z>.
Wisler, 59 Cal.2d 21, 27 Cal.Rptr. 689, 377
P.2d 889 (1963), for the proposition that
this language is violative of California Insurance Code § 530. However, in Sabella
the insurer attempted to rely on California
Insurance Code § 532, alone, to argue that
because one cause or "peril" was excluded,
the loss would not have occurred in the
absence of that peril, the loss is automatically exempted, even if another covered
cause directly led to the loss. The Court in
Sabella was focusing on interpretation of
Cal.Ins.Code § 530, and held that the insurer could not rely on section 532 alone, but
must read that section in conjunction with
section 530, which provides:
An insurer is liable for a loss of which a
peril insured against was the proximate
cause, although a peril not contemplated
by the contract may have been a remote
cause of the loss; but he is not liable for
a loss of which the peril insured against
was only a remote cause.
The court in Sabella was addressing the
construction and applicability of section 532
of the statute. Here, the insurance policy
itself expressly and explicitly includes in its
language a provision which states that for
certain causes, the "but for" argument
raised by the insurer in Sabella wiH apply^
to limit coverage. While the court inr'B&*!'
bella would not extend the statute so as tfr
imply such restrictions on coverage of coif1
current causes, there is nothing m th'elft^"
denying the insurer the right to indu8&J
such language as a term of the contract
itself. The insurer, here State Farm, haff1

STATE FARM FIRE AND CAS. CO. v. MARTIN
Ote M 668 RSupp. 1379 (CJJ.CaL 1987)

an absolute right to limit the coverage contained in the language of the policy itself.
"An insurance company has the right to
limit the coverage of a policy issued by it
and when it has done so, the plain language
of the limitation must be respected." Continental Casualty Co. v. Phoenix Construction Co., 46 Cal.2d 423, 432, 296 P.2d
801 (1956).
The only evidence provided by defendants in opposition to the motion for summary judgemnt are portions of the transcript
of the deposition of Tim Welch, the geotechnical expert who investigated the premises for State Farm and who supplied a
declaration in support of State Farm's motion. These portions of the deposition only
show that sulfates were considered at the
time of the intital investigation to have
been a potential contributing factor. This
does not impeach or contradict the declaration of Welch, who stated that sulfate crystalization was, at first, listed as a potential
cause. Moreover, this evidence in no way
negates the fact that even if sulfate crystalization was a potential cause, the broad
exclusionary language of the contract
would disallow coverage. Defendants have
provided no independent evidence of their
own which in any way negates the evidence
presented by plaintiff that excluded perils,
including earth movement, settling and deterioration, were the primary causes of the
damage.
In Celotex v. Myrtle Nell Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265
(1986), the Supreme Court clarified the
standard to be used in analyzing motions
for summary judgment brought pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The
Supreme Court held that the language of
Rule 56(c) requires entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case, and on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial", assuming that
party has had adequate time for discovery.
106 S.Ct at 2552-53. The Supreme Court
explained its reasoning by stating that "a
complete failure of proof concerning an
essential element of the non-moving party's
case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 2552.
668 F.Supp.—31
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Here, defendants' complete failure to
provide any evidence in support of its dispute as to the causes of damage to their
home, coupled with the Court's duty to give
effect to the unambiguous contractual language, necessitates that the Court grant
summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on
these issues.
C. Counterclaims
Based on the foregoing analysis, including inter alia,, the fact that the language
of the insurance policy is unambiguous as
to exclusions and the fact that defendants
have failed in their burden of proof to
provide any evidence to negate the alleged
fact that earth movement was proximate
cause of the damage to defendants' dwelling, the Court finds that under the Celotex
standard defendants have failed to provide
any evidence that State Farm's failure to
pay on defendants' claim was a breach of
the policy or that in drafting the language
of the policy in question State Farm
breached California Insurance Code § 530.
1. Bad Faith; California Insurance
Code § 790.03(h)
California Insurance Code § 790.03 provides a list of descriptions of prohibited
actions by insurance companies; commission of these acts is statutorily defined as
unfair and deceptive act or practice. Section (h) provides a list of fifteen activities
considered to be unfair claims settlement
practices.
Defendants have provided the Court with
no evidence that State Farm has violated
any of these provisions or has otherwise
acted in bad faith.
2. Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
[3] In Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance
Co., 9 Cal.3d 566, 108 Cal Rptr. 480, 510
P.2d 1032 (1973), the California Supreme
Court explained when a cause of action for
breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing would lie.
That responsibility [the duty of good
faith and fair dealing] is not the requirement mandated by the terms of the poli-
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cy itself—to defend, settle, or pay. It is
the obligation, deemed to be imposed by
the law, under which the insurer must
act fairly and in good faith discharging
its contractual responsibilities. Where in
doing so, it fails to deal fairly and in
good faith with its insured by refusing,
without proper cause, to compensate its
insured for a loss covered by the policy,
such conduct may give rise to a cause of
action in tort for breach of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Id. at 574, 108 Cal.Rptr. 480, 510 P.2d
1032.
Defendants have provided no evidence
that State Fair breached its duty in the
process of investigating and ultimately denying defendants' claim. Based on the evidence and the allegations before the Court,
there is no indication that the investigation
by State Farm was inadequate or substandard or that State Farm unduly delayed in
the investigation process.
3. Contractual Limitations Period
In support of its motion for summary
judgment, plaintiff State Farm has argued
that defendants' counterclaims are untimely under the one-year limitations period imposed by the language of the insurance
policy. Defendants essentially raise an equiiatte-argument that plaintiff is estopped
from raising this defense because it did not
inform defendants that their claim was denied until after the one-year period had,
based on plaintiffs argument, already
passed. Defendants argue, moreover, that
this creates a question of fact as to whether, under the policy, the limitations period
should be tolled, based on equitable considerations. The Court does not address this
issue because summary judgment is hereby
granted against the counterclaims based on
the unambiguous language of the contract,
irrespective of whether the counterclaims
were timely.
For the foregoing reasons, summary
judgment is GRANTED in favor of plaintiff and against defendants.

Terry Dean ROGAN, Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a municipal
corporation; Richard Crotsley and Lester Slack, individually and in their official capacities as detectives of the L.A.
P.D., Defendants.
No. CV 85-0989 RJK (Mcx).
United States District Court,
CD. California.
July 20, 1987.

Arrestee brought action against city
and two police officers, after being arrest*
ed five separate times on basis of information contained in record entered in national
computer arrest warrant notification system by officers, concerning robbery-murder arrest warrant issued in arrestee's
name. Suspect in robbery-murders had
been using arrestee's name after obtaining
arrestee's birth certificate. On cross motions for summary judgment on issue of
liability, the District Court, Kelleher, Senior District Judge, held that (1) arrestee
was unconstitutionally deprived of his liberty during four arrests and detentions due
to lack of particular description in record
and maintenance and multiple reentry of
record without amendment after arrestee's
initial misidentification as suspect; (2)
city's failure to adopt policy or train and
supervise its officers concerning particular
description requirement and necessity of
amendment of record involved pattern of
gross negligence;, and (3) officers were entitled to qualified immunity.
Ordered accordingly.

1. Civil Rights <*»13.7
Plaintiff must show* in order to states
civil rights deprivation claim against munic->
ipality, that he suffered deprivation of con^
8titutionally protected interest arid that1
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SUMMARY
Insurance

Affirming a summary judgment for an insurer, the court
held that the Insurance Code does not prohibit inclusion of a
concurrent causation provision that excludes coverage.
3611
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STATE FARM V. MARTIN

A provision of a policy issued by appellee State Farm Fire
and Casualty excluded from coverage losses occurring as a
result of earth movement, whether or not other causes acted
concurrently to produce the loss. Appellants Steven and
Peggy Martin argued that such a provision in their policy violated Insurance Code § 530, which provides that an insurer is
liable for losses caused concurrently by proximate and remote
causes.
[1] An insurance company has the right to limit the coverage in a policy it issues. Insurance Code section 530 provides
guidance when a policy is silent on concurrent causation; it
does not prohibit inclusion of a provision similar to the concurrent causation provision in the State Farm policy.

COUNSEL
Paul B. Witmer, Santa Ana, California, for the defendantsappellants.
Peter Abrahams, Horvitz, Levy & Amerian, Encino, California, for the plaintiff-appellee.

OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Steven and Peggy Martin (the Martins) appeal the entry of
summary judgment in favor of State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co. (State Farm) in its action for declaratory relief. State
Farm sought and obtained a declaration that certain damage
to the Martins' home was excluded from coverage under a
State Farm homeowner's insurance policy issued to the Martins. On appeal, the Martins argue that (1) the exclusions in
their policy are ambiguous and a genuine issue of material
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fact existed over whether the damage to their home was covered; (2) the district court erred in crediting a concurrent causation provision in the policy since that provision was
contrary to California law; and (3) the district court improperly granted summary judgment to State Farm on various
counterclaims of the Martins. The district court had jurisdiction of this diversity action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have
jurisdiction of this timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.
The district court set forth the undisputed facts. State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Martin, 668 F. Supp. 1379, 1380-81
(CD. Cal. 1987). We review a summary judgment independently. Barring v. Kincheloe, 783 F.2d 874, 876 (9th Cir.
1986). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, we must determine whether there are any
genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court
correctly applied the relevant substantive law. Ashton v. Cory,
780 F.2d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 1986). The district court's interpretation and application of state-law is entitled to no special
deference but is reviewed independently. Matter ofMcLinn,
739 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
The Martins first argue that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because the policy's exclusions are
ambiguous and there existed a genuine issue of fact whether
the policy covered the damage to their home. We agree with
the district court that the policy exclusions are unambiguous
and the Martins failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact
regarding coverage. 668 F. Supp. at 1381-83. However, one
part of the district court opinion requires clarification.
Because the insurer bears the burden of proving an
excepted risk or the applicability of an exclusion, see Searle v.
Allstate Life Insurance Co., 38 Cal. 3d 425,437-38 (1985), the
district court erroneously relied on Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
411 U.S. 317 (1986), in holding that the Martins failed to
make a sufficient showing on this element. 668 F. Supp. at
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1383. In fact, State Farm and not the Martins bore the burden
on this element. Nonetheless, this does not require reversal.
Viewing the evidence in the record in the light most favorable
to the Martins, we do not believe that "a fair-minded jury
could return a verdict for [the Martins] on the evidence
presented." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242,
252(1986).
The Martins next argue that the district court erred in
enforcing a concurrent causation provision in State Farm's
homeowner's policies. Paragraph Two of the State Farm policy excluded from coverage
loss which would not have occurred in the absence of
one or more of the following excluded events. We do
not insure for such loss regardless of: a) the cause of
the excluded event; or b) other causes of the loss; or
c) whether other causes acted concurrently or in any
sequence with the excluded event to produce the loss.

b. Earth Movement, whether combined with water
or not, including but not limited to earthquake,
volcanic eruption, landslide, subsidence, mudflow, sinkhole, erosion, or the sinking, rising,
shifting, expanding, or contracting of earth.
(Emphasis added.) The Martins argue that State Farm may
not exclude concurrent causation from policy coverage
because such exclusion violates California Insurance Code
§ 530. Section 530 provides:
An insurer is liable for a loss of which § peril insured
against was the proximate cause, although a peril not
contemplated by the contract may have been a
remote cause of the loss; but he is not liable for a loss
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of which the peril insured against was only a remote
cause.
Cal. Ins. Code § 530 (West 1972 & Supp. 1989).
[1] We agree with the district court that "[a]n insurance
company has the right to limit the coverage of a policy issued
by it and when it has done so, the plain language of the limitation must be respected." Continental Casualty Co. v. Phoenix
Construction Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 432, 296 P.2d 801, 806
(1956): State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. MacKenzie,
85 Cal. App. 3d 727, 732, 149 Cal. Rptr. 747, 750 (1978). California Insurance Code § 530 provides guidance when a policy is silent on concurrent causation; it does not prohibit
inclusion of a provision similar to the concurrent causation
provision in the State Farm policy. See National Insurance
Underwriters v. Carter, 17 Cal. 3d 380, 388, 551 P.2d 362,
367, 131 Cal. Rptr. 42, 47 (1976) ("[I]n the absence of any
general declaration of public policy mandating coverage . . .
[the court will not] interfere with the parties' full freedom to
contract for coverage on any terms not specifically prohibited
by statute.").
The Martins lastly challenge the summary judgment based
on their counterclaims for (1) breach of an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, and (2) bad faith investigation
of their claim in violation of California Insurance Code
§ 790.03(h). 668 F. Supp. at 1381. We agree with the district
court that the Martins presented "no evidence" to support
these counterclaims. Id. at 1379; see also Kopczynski v. Prudential Insurance Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d 846, 849, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 12,14-15 (1985) (since insurance company's interpretation of policy was correct, there clearly was no bad faith).
AFFIRMED.
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STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY
COMPANY, Appellant (Defendant),
v.
Herb J. PAULSON, Appellee (Plaintiff).
Herb J. PAULSON, Appellant
(Plaintiff),
v.
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY
COMPANY, Appellee (Defendant).
Nos. 87-259, 87-260.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
June 3, 1988.

Insured sought to recover for damage
to his home which resulted from entrance
of water and hail into basement of house
after severe storm. The District Court,
Laramie County, Edward L. Grant, J., entered judgment for insured, and insured
appealed. The Supreme Court, Rooney, J.,
Retired, held that loss sustained was excluded from coverage under exclusion for
water damage resulting from surface water.
Reversed.
Cardine, J., filed dissenting opinion.

1. Insurance «=>146.7(1)
Only exception to construing insurance
contracts as other contracts are construed
is requirement that ambiguous language in
insurance contract be liberally construed in
favor of insured.
2. Insurance «3=>417.5(1)
Damage resulting from entrance of
water and hail into basement of insured's
house after severe storm was excluded
from coverage under exclusion for loss
from water damage resulting from surface
water.

John A. Sundahl of Godfrey, Sundahl &
Jorgenson, Cheyenne, for State Farm Fire
and Cas. Co.

Stanley K. Hathaway and Blair J. Trautwein of Hathaway, Speight & Kunz, Cheyenne, for Herb J. Paulson.
Before BROWN, C.J., THOMAS,
CARDINE and MACY, JJ.t and
ROONEY, Retired Justice.
ROONEY, Retired Justice.
This appeal in Case No. 87-259, by State
Farm Fire and Casualty company (hereafter referred to as "appellant") is from a
judgment entered against appellant after a
non-jury trial declaring that an insurance
policy issued to Herb J. Paulson (hereafter
referred to as "appellee") covered damage
resulting from the entrance of water and
hail into the basement of appellee's house
after a severe storm. The basic issue
presented on appeal is whether or not the
trial court erred in declaring the existence
of such coverage.
We reverse.
Uncontroverted are the facts that hail,
followed by hail and rain, fell in Cheyenne
on August 1, 1985; that the storm was
severe; that hail broke sections of three
basement windows on the east side of appellee's residence in Cheyenne; that water
and hail, which were generated within a
few blocks of the residence (a 62-acre
drainage area), entered the basement
through the windows; that the high water
line was several inches above the basement
and water completely filled the basement;
that less water would have entered had the
windows not been broken; and that the
policy in question was in force at the time
and provided in pertinent part:
"SECTION 1—LOSSES INSURED
"COVERAGE A—DWELLING
"We insure for accidental direct physical
# loss to the property described in Coverage A except as provided in SECTION
I-LOSSES NOT INSURED.
"COVERAGE B—PERSONAL
PROPERTY
"We insure for accidental direct physical
loss to property described in Coverage B
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caused by the following perils except as
provided in SECTION I-LOSSES NOT
INSURED:
*
*
*
*
*
*
"2. Windstorm or hail. This peril does
not include loss to property contained in
a building caused by rain, snow, sleet,
sand or dust. This limitation does riot
apply when the direct force of wind or
hail damages the building causing an
opening in a roof or wall and the rain,
snow, sleet, sand or dust enters through
this opening.
*
*
*
*
*
*
"11. Weight of ice, snow or sleet which
causes damage to property contained in a
building.
*
*
*
*
*
*
"SECTION I—LOSSES NOT INSURED
*
*
*
*
*
*
"2. We do not insure under any coverage for loss (including collapse of an
insured building or part of a building)
which would not have occurred in the
absence of one or more of the following
excluded events. We do not insure for
such loss regardless of: a) the cause of
the excluded event; or b) other causes of
the loss; or c) whether other causes acted concurrently or in any sequence with
the excluded event to produce the loss:
*
*
*
•
•
•
"c. Water Damage, meaning:
"(1) flood, surface water, waves, tidal
water, overflow of a body of water, or
spray from any of these, whether or not
driven by wind."
[1] An insurance policy is a contract
5 26-15-101 et seq., W.S.1977).
"A policy of insurance is a contract between the insurer and the insured and
construed in the same way. Wort kington v. State, Wyo., 598 P.2d 796 (1979);
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Farmer's Insurance Group,
Wyo., 569 P.2d 1260 (1977). When terms
of a contract are shown without any conflict of evidence, interpretation of a contract becomes a question of law for the
court. Engle v. First National Bank of
7S6P24—18

Chugwaterf Wyo., 590 P.2d 826 (1979).
Paraphrased, and as said approvingly
from a quote in Horvath v. SheridanWyoming Coal Co., 58 Wyo. 211, 131
P.2d 315 (1942), the interpretation of a
written contract is a question of law for
the court; but where the terms of a
contract are conflicting or doubtful, it is
for the jury to ascertain the intention of
the parties and determine what the contract was under proper instructions. The
interpretation and construction of a contract are done by the court as a matter
of law. Amoco Production Co. v.
Stauffer Chemical Company of Wyoming, Wyo., 612 P.2d 463 (1980). See
also, Goodman v. Kelly, Wyo., 390 P.2d
244 (1964)." Hursh Agency, Inc. v. Wigwam Homes, Inc., Wyo., 664 P.2d 27, 31
(1983).
The only exception to construing insurance
contracts as other contracts are construed
is the requirement that ambiguous language in an insurance contract is to be
liberally construed in favor of the insured.
"When there are any ambiguities or uncertainties in the meaning of the language used in a policy, they must be
strictly construed against the insurer
who drafted the contract. Wilson v.
Hawkeye Casualty Co., 67 Wyo. 141, 215
P.2d 867, 874-875 (1950). However, if
the language is clear and unambiguous,
there is no room for the court to resort
to a strict construction against the insurer, and the insurance policy must be interpreted according to the ordinary and
the usual meaning of its terms. McKay
v. Equitable Assurance Society of U.S.,
[Wyo., 421 P.2d 166,] 168 [(1966)]; Addison v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, Wyo., 358 P.2d 948, 950 (1961); Coit
v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 28
Cal.2d 1, 168 P.2d 163, 169-170 (1946);
Ostendorf v. Arrow Insurance Company, [288 Minn. 491], 182 N.W.2d [190,]
192 [(1970)]." Worthington v. State,
Wyo., 598 P.2d 796, 806 (1979).
[2] The basic considerations for construing a contract are summarized in Amoco Production Company v. Stauffer
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Chemical Company of Wyoming, Wyo.,
cerning its meaning.
Homestake-Sapin
612 P.2d 463, 465 (1980):
Partners v. United States, 10th Cir. 1967,
"Our basic purpose in construing or in375 F.2d 507."
terpreting a contract is to determine the The language of the contract quoted supra
intention and understanding of the par- is not ambiguous. 1 It is plain and clear. It
ties. Fucks v. Goe, 62 Wyo. 134, 163 does not have a double meaning, nor is it
P.2d 733 (1945); Shellhart v. Azford, indefinite or obscure in its meaning. It is
Wyo., 485 P.2d 1031 (1971); Oregon definite in expression and can be underShort Line Railroad Company v. Idaho stood in only one way. It has but a single
Stockyards Company\ 12 Utah 2d 205, meaning, and that meaning is not un364 P.2d 826 (1961). If the contract is in certain. It provides that there is no coverwriting and the language is clear and age for loss due to "water damage" as
unambiguous, the intention is to be se- "water damage" is defined in the contract,
cured from the words of the contract. i.e., that resulting from "flood, surface waPilcher i\ Hamm, Wyo., 351 P.2d 1041 ter, waves, tidal water, * * * or spray from
(1960); Fucks v. Goe, supra; Holla- any of these, whether or not driven by the
baugh v. Kolbet, Wyo., 604 P.2d 1359 wind." Appellee argues that the loss was
(1980); Wyoming Bank and Trust Com- caused by "rain"—which is not listed under
pany v. Waugh, Wyo., 606 P.2d 725
the contract definition of "water damage"
(1980). And the contract as a whole
—and therefore coverage existed. Appelshould be considered, with each part belant argues that the loss was caused by
ing read in light of all other parts.
"surface water" and therefore is within the
Shepard v. Top Hat Land & Cattle Co.,
contract exclusion. This resulting issue
Wyo., 560 P.2d 730 (1977); Rossi v. Perwas accepted by the trial court as the crux
cifield, Wyo., 527 P.2d 819 (1974); Shellof the case. It said, in the Declaratory
hart v. Axford, supra; Quin Blair EnJudgment, Findings of Fact and Concluterprises, Inc. v. Julien
Construction
sions of Law:
Company, Wyo., 597 P.2d 945 (1979).
"The Court views the coverage issue in
The interpretation and construction is
this
case as follows: if the water which
done by the court as a matter of law.
fell
with
and after the hail and [d]id the
Hollabaugh v. Kolbet, supra; Bulis v.
damage
is
considered 'rain', then there is
Wells, Wyo., 565 P.2d 487 (1977); Shepcoverage.
If such water is considered
ard v. Top Hat Land & Cattle Co., su'flood' or 'surface water', there is no
pra.
coverage * * *."
"If the contract is ambiguous, resort
The trial court also recognized that conmay be had to extrinsic evidence. /. W.
tract
language to be unambiguous—but it
Denio Milling Co. v. Malin, 25 Wyo.
inconsistently
concluded that the words
143, 165 P. 1113 (1917);
Kilbourne-Park
Corporation v. Buckingham, Wyo., 404 "rain," "flood," and "surface water" were
P.2d 244 (1965). An ambiguous contract latently ambiguous. It said, in its second
'is an agreement which is obscure in its Conclusions of Law:
"While the policy language is not inhermeaning, because of indefiniteness of exently
ambiguous, it is ambiguous as appression, or because a double meaning is
plied to the extraordinary facts in this
present.' Bulls r. Wells, supra, 565 P.2d
case because the terms 'rain', 'flood', and
at 490. Ambiguity justifying extraneous
'surface water', are not defined in the
evidence is not generated by the subseinsurance policy. An examination of the
quent disagreement of the parties con1. See definition of ambiguous contract in quotation from Amoco Production Company v. Stauffer Chemical Company of Wyoming, 612 P.2d
465, and in McArtor v. State, Wyo., 699 P.2d 288
(1985); Attletweedt v. State, Wyo., 684 P.2d 812
(1984); Matter of Estate of Reed, Wyo., 672 P.2d
829 (1983); Busch Development, Inc. v. City of

Cheyenne, Wyo., 645 P.2d 65 (1982); State ex
rel Albany County Weed and Pest District v.
Board of County Commissioners of County of
Albany, Wyo., 592 P.2d 1154 (1979); DeHerrera
v. Herrera, Wyo., 565 P.2d 479 (1977); County of
Natrona v. Casper Air Service, Wyo., 536 P.2a
142 (1975).
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cases referred to in the February 2, 1987
enough to attain sensible velocity.' New
letter decision reveal that the Courts
Standard Dictionary." (Emphasis addhave not necessarily agreed upon the
ed.)
'plain' meaning to be given to 'flood', Expert witness Rechard testified at the
'surface water' or 'rain'. Because the trial:
terms are not defined, the Court con- • "Q. Is there a distinction as a hydrolocludes that rain does not become surface
gist, sir, and based upon your expertise
water immediately after it hits the
in hydrology between rain and surface
ground; rather it remains 'rain' (a nonwater?
excluded peril)."
"A. Yes, there is.
We cannot accept this conclusion. A pol"Q. What is that distinction?
icy must be construed according to its plain
"A. Rain is the water falling from the
language, giving to the words their comatmosphere striking the surface of the
mon and ordinary meaning.
earth, and surface water is water on the
"[W]ords used will be given their comsurface of the earth.
mon and ordinary meaning. 13 Apple"Q. What happens after rain falls to
man, Insurance Law and Practice, § 7402
the
ground? Does it retain its character(1943). * * * Absent ambiguity, there is
istic
as rain or does it become something
no room for construction and the policy
elset
will be enforced according to its terms.
"A. It becomes either surface water or
Addison v. Aetna Life Insurance Comif it infiltrates it becomes underground
pany, Wyo., 358 P.2d 948, 950 [(1961)].
water.
Neither will the language be 'tortured' in
order to create an ambiguity. Malanga
"Q. Is that a commonly accepted definiv. Royal Indemnity Company, 4 Ariz.
tion, as far as you know?
App. 150, 418 P.2d 396, 399 [(1966)];
"A. As far as hydrology is concerned,
Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice,
yes.
§ 7384 (1943)." McKay v. Equitable
"Q. That's one that is used—has been
Life Assurance Society of the United
used for how many years? For as long
States, Wyo., 421 P.2d 166, 168 (1966).
as you can remember?
"A. As long as there has been the sciIt is true that "rain," "flood" and "surence of hydrology."
face water" are not further defined in the
policy. But neither does it define "fire," If, by definition, "rain" remains "rain" af"theft," "freezing" or other perils with ter it stops falling, then the water in
common and ordinary meanings. "Rain" is streams and lakes, coming from household
ordinarily and commonly thought of as wa- faucets, etc. is "rain" since it originated,
ter falling from the sky. After it stops partly at least, from water that fell from
falling, one does not say that it is "raining" the sky.
although there may still be wet sidewalks*
In any event, the important determinaand streets, puddles of water resulting" tion to be made in this case is whether or
from the rain, or water running through, not the damage was caused in whole or in
gutters and elsewhere as a result of thej part by "surface water." If the water
rain. It is not common or usual to say in which accumulated on the ground and ensuch instances that it is still raining.
tered the basement window was still
This common and usual meaning is the
same as that legally determined and used
in the science of hydrology. In Al Berman, Inc, v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 216 F.2d 626, 628 (3rd Cir.1954), the
court defined "rain" as:
" The condensed vapor of the atmosphere falling to the earth in drops large

"rain," then there is either no such thing as
"surface water," or "rain" and "surface
water" are synonymous. Obviously, there
is such a thing as "surface water"—at
least in the minds of the parties to the
contract in which they used the term. And
if the two terms are synonymous, then the
exclusion provision of the policy for "sur-
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face water" also applies to "rain," and
there is no coverage.
Justice Blume, speaking for this court,
defined "surface water" in State v. Hiber,
48 Wyo. 172, 44 P.2d 1005, 1008 (1935):
" 'Surface water,' it has been said, is that
which is diffused over the surface of the
ground, derived from falling rains and
melting snows, and continues to be such,
and may be impounded by the owner of
the land, until it reaches some well-defined channel in which it is accustomed
to, and does, flow with other waters; or
until it reaches some permanent lake or
pond, and it then ceases to be surface
water and becomes the water of the water course, or a lake or a pond, as the
case may be. Kinney on Irrigation, [ (2d
Ed.)] § 318; Crawford u Rambo, 44
Ohio St. 279, 7 N.E. 429 [(1886)]; King
v. Chamberlin, 20 Idaho[] 504, 118 P.
1099 [(1911)]."
At least some of the water which entered
appellee's basement had diffused over the
surface of the ground, was derived from
falling rains, and had not reached a well-defined channel, lake or pond. It fit other
plain meanings of surface water as reflected ante. The evidence established the
fact that this kind of water entered the
basement and caused the damage. There
was no evidence to the contrary. Thus, a
contrary finding could not be made. M &
M Welding, Inc. v. Pavlicek^ Wyo., 713
P.2d 236 (1986); Alco of Wyoming v. Baker, Wyo., 651 P.2d 266 (1982); Clausen v.
Bolana\ Wyo., 601 P.2d 541 (1979); Douglas Reservoirs Water Users Association v.
Cross, Wyo., 569 P.2d 1280 (1977).
Appellee, himself, testified:
"And then later on I had a city dump
truck pick me up and leave me off a
block away from my house over there.
And I swam the rest of the way.
"Q. You mean 3warn? That you were
flat with both your legs and your arms
kicking?
"A. Right, right
"Q. How deep was the water at your—
in the street right by your house?
"A. By the house?

"Q. Yes, right by the house?
"A. Oh, I would say maybe like oh, two
and a half, three feet, something like
that. T^vo and a half feet.
"Q. Can you describe it for me by reason of how tall you are or where it came
up to you on your waist?
"A. Oh, up to about the beltline.
"Q. Came up to the beltline?
"A. A little bit, yes.
"Q. That's at the street by your house?
"A. At the street by my house.
"Q. Let's move up to the area around
the house.
"A. Okay.
"Q. How deep was the water level at
the house?
"A. Oh, I would say approximately
maybe like oh, six inches above the, you
know, where it went into the basement,
you know, the side of the basement, that
wall, six inches above. The whole area
in there could have been maybe like 20
inches, something like that, 17.
*
*
*
*
*
*
"Q. Okay. And do I understand correctly that when you went in the house
the water was not only from the basement but all the way through the joists
and ceiling?
"A. Right
"Q. And up onto the first floor?
"A. First floor about half an inch,
maybe three-quarters.
"Q. Now, was that—As you came to
the house that evening, as you swam to
the house that evening, was the water
moving at all?
"A. Yes.
"Q. In which direction was it moving?
"A. I'd say it was coming in from the
north. Coming in from the north.
*
«
*
*
»
•
"Q. Now, Mr. Paulson, I would like to
now ask you whether or not had it not
been for the flood and the surface water
you would have had the loss to your
basement and its contents?
"A. Maybe a minimum amount maybe.
"Q. Just a minimum?
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"A. Minimum."
Mr. Rechard testified:
"Q. So if we wouldn't have had the
flood or surface water there is nominal if
any damage to the basement and its contents, correct?
"A. That is my opinion."
There is testimony that some "rain" may
have fallen directly into the basement
through the broken windows without first
hitting the ground and becoming "surface
water." But there was no contradictory
evidence to the fact that some of the water
which entered the basement and contributed to the damage was "surface water" as
defined m* State v. Hiber, supra, and as
such is commonly considered (see additional definitions ante).
Accordingly, the specific policy exclusions prevent coverage in this instance.
That quoted supra from "SECTION ILOSSES NOT INSURED" of the policy
specifies that there is no coverage for loss
caused by "surface water" or "flood," and
(1) "We do not insure for such loss regardless of: a) the cause of the excluded
event"; e.g., hail breaking a window and
allowing the "surface water" or "flood" to
enter; (2) "We do not insure for such loss
regardless of: * * * b) other causes of the
loss"; e.g., if the loss was also caused by
"rain" falling into the basement through

the broken window, or if it was also caused
by "hail"; and (3) "We do not insure for
such loss regardless of: * * * c) whether
other causes acted concurrently or in any
sequence with the excluded event to produce the loss"; e.g., the loss was a result
of the window being broken, "hail" and
"rain" entering, together with "surface water" or "flood'' entering—either at the
same time or in sequence.2
Although the foregoing may be sufficient for a reversal of this matter, the
second Conclusion of Law, supra, of the
learned trial judge deserves additional comment.
Contrary to his statement therein that
the cases referred to in his letter opinion
"reveal that the Courts have not necessarily agreed upon the 'plain' meaning to be
given to 'flood', 'surface water' or 'rain',"
(emphasis added) a review of such cases
reflects that they are in substantial agreement as to the meaning of these words.
Of the sixteen cases there considered, three
do not address those meanings;3 five define "flood";4 three of those defining flood
also define "surface water," 5 as do an additional seven;6 and one considers the
meaning of "rain."7 Of course, the fact
situation is not the same in all of these
cases.

5. Femdale Development Co., Inc. v. Great Ameri2. If a policy did not contain a sequential exclusion, as did this one, coverage would exist if an •> can Ins. Co., supra; Everett v. Davis, supra;
otherwise excluded peril resulted in the occur-*>
Poole v. Sun Underwriters Ins. Co. of New York,
rence of a covered peril, such as non-covered
supra.
peril of vandalism resulting in breakage of water pipes which caused covered peril of water . 6. Transamerica Insurance Company v. Raff kind,
damage.
Tex.Civ.App., 521 S.W.2d 935 (1975); Aetna Fire
Underwriters Insurance Company v. Crawley,
3. Franklin Packaging Company v. California Un132 Ga.App. 181, 207 S.E.2d 666 (1974); Hatley
ion Insurance Company, 171 NJ.Super. 188, 408
v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 261 Or. 606, 495
A.2d 448 (1979), cert.'denied 84 NJ. 434, 420
P.2d 1196 on reh. from 261 Or. 606, 494 P.2d
A.2d 340 (1980); Fawcett House, Inc. v. Great
Central Insurance Company, 280 Minn. 325, 159
426 (1972); Sherwood Real Estate & Investment
N.W.2d 268 (1968); Unobskey v. Continental Ins.
Company v. Old Colony Insurance Company, La.
Co., 147 Me. 249, 86 A.2d 160 (1952).
App., 234 So.2d 445 (1970); Richman v. Home
Ins. Co. of NY, 172 Pa.Super. 383, 94 A.2d 164
4. Bartleit v. Continental Divide Insurance Com(1953); Urse v. Maryland Casualty Co., 58
pany, Colo.App., 697 P.2d 412 (1984); Femdale
F.Supp. 897 (D.C.N.D.1945); Fenmode v. Aetna
Development Co., Inc. v. Great American InsurCasualty <& Surety Co. of Hartford, Conn., 303
ance Company, 34 Colo.App. 258, 527 P.2d 939
Mich. 188, 6 N.W.2d 479 (1942).
(1974); Maieer v. Reliance Insurance Co., 247
Md. 643, 233 A.2d 797 (1967); Everett v. Davis,
18 Cal.2d 389, 115 P.2d 821 (1941); Poole v. Sun
Underwriters Ins. Co. of New York, 65 S.D. 422,
274 N.W. 658 (1937).

7. Goldfarb v. Maryland Casualty Co., 311 111.
App. 568, 37 N.E.2d 376 (1941).
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The policy exclusion prevented coverage
if the damage resulted from a "flood."
With reference to the five cases considered
by the trial court which defined "flood,"
Bartlett v. Continental Divide Insurance
Company, Colo.App., 697 P.2d 412 (1984);
Femdale Development Co., Inc. v. Great
American Insurance Company, 34 Colo.
App. 258, 527 P.2d 939 (1974); Mateer v.
Reliance Insurance Co., 247 Md. 643, 233
A.2d 797 (1967); Everett v. Davis, 18 Cal.
2d 389, 115 P.2d 821 (1941); Poole v. Sun
Underwriters Ins. Co. of New York, 65
S.D. 422, 274 N.W. 658 (1937), only Mateer
v. Reliance Ins. Co. has language which
could make "flood" a consideration in this
case. It states:
"Today we commonly speak of a cellar or
basement being 'flooded' without regard
to whether the water comes from the
overflow of a stream, from a hard
downpour, or from the bursting of
pipes." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 799.
In each of the other four cases, "flood" is
defined in a similar fashion: Bartlett v.
Continental Divide Insurance Company,
697 P.2d at 413 states:
"Ordinarily, 'flood' means 'a body of water (including moving water) . . . overflowing or inundating land not usually
covered/ 36A CJ.S. Flood * * V
And it notes that no distinction is made
between natural and artificial causes.
Everett v. Davis, 115 P.2d at 823, and
Poole v. Sun Underwriters Ins. Co. of
New York, 274 N.W. at 600, define flood
waters as
"those which escape from a stream or
other body of water and overflow the
adjacent territory."
Femdale Development Co., Inc. v.
Great American Insurance Company,
527 P.2d at 940, adopts the definition from
5 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice
§ 3145 at 462 (1970):
" ' "Flood waters" are those waters
above the highest line of the ordinary
flow of a stream, and generally speaking
they have overflowed a river, stream, or
natural water course and have formed a
continuous body with the water flowing
in the ordinary channel * * V "

These cases do not indicate material disagreement as to the plain meaning of the
word "flood."
The meaning of "surface water" is of
much more importance to this case since,
as noted, if it caused the damage—even in
part—there was no coverage under the policy. A review of the cases defining "surface water" and referred to or quoted from
in the trial judge's opinion letter (see notes
5 and 6, supra) attribute the meaning to
"surface water" substantially as it is defined by this court in State v. Hiher, supra.
Transamerica Insurance Company v.
Raffkind, Tex.Civ.App., 521 S.W.2d 935,
939 (1975), defines "surface water" as
"natural precipitation coming on and
passing over the surface of the ground
until it either evaporates, or is absorbed
by the land, or reaches channels where
water naturally flows."
In Richman v. Home Ins. Co. of N.Y.,
172 Pa.Super. 383, 94 A.2d 164, 166 (1953),
quoting Fenmode v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. of Hartford, Conn,, 303 Mich.
188, 6 N.W.2d 479, 481 (1942), it states:
"[Sjurface waters are commonly understood to be waters on the surface of the
ground, usually created by rain or snow,
which are of a casual or vagrant character, following no definite course and having no substantial or permanent existence."
Urse v. Maryland Casualty Co., oS
F.Supp. 897, 899 (D.C.N.D.1945) accepted
two definitions of surface water, one from
the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia:
" 'Surface water is water of casual, vagrant character, oozing through the sou,
or diffusing and squandering over or under the surface, which, though usually
and naturally flowing in known direction,
has no banks or channel cut in the soil;
coming from rain and snow, and occasional outbursts in time of freshet, descending from mountains and hills, and
inundating the country; and the moisture of wet, spongy, springy, or boggy
land. For obstructing or diverting surface water, though damaging another,
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the party is not liable.' Neal v. Ohio
River R. Co., 47 W.Va. 316, 34 S.E. 914,
P t 2 Syl."
The other definition was from Kinney on
Irrigation and Water Rights, § 318 at 516
(1912):
" ' "Surface" water may be defined 'as
water on the surface of the ground, the
source of which is so temporary or limited as not to be a bit to maintain for any
considerable time a stream or body of
water having a well-defined and substantial existence.' " 58 F.Supp. at 899.
Poole v. Sun Underwriters Ins. Co. of
New York, 274 N.W. at 660 also used this
definition from Kinney, together with that
set forth supra by Richman v. Home Ins.
Co. ofN.Y., 94 A.2d at 164, and Fenmode
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. of Hartford, Conn., 6 N.W. at 479.
Sherwood Real Estate & Investment
Company v. Old Colony Insurance Company, La.App., 234 So.2d 445, 447 (1970)
states:
"In 56 Am.Jur., verbo water, Sec. 65, it is
stated:
" 'The term "surface water" is used in
the law of waters in reference to a distinct form or class of water which is
generally defined as that which is derived from falling rain or melting snow,
or which rises to the surface in springs,
and is defused over the surface of the
ground, while it remains in such defused
state or condition * * V "
Everett v. Davis, 115 P.2d at 823 states:
"Surface waters are those falling upon,
arising from, and naturally spreading
over lands produced by rainfall, melting
snow, or springs. They continued to be
surface waters until, in obedience to the
laws of gravity, they percolate through
the ground or flow vagrantly over the
surface of the land into well defined
watercourses or streams."
Ferndale Development
Co., Inc. v.
Great American
Insurance
Company,
527 P.2d at 940, again adopts the definition
of "surface water" from 5 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, supra at 463, as:
" 'water wrhich is derived from falling
rain or melting snow, or which rises to

the surface in springs, and is diffused
over the surface of the ground, while it
remains in such a diffused state, and
which follows no defined course or channel, which does not gather into or form a
natural body of water, and which is lost
by evaporation, percolation, or natural
drainage.' "
Aetna Fire Undtrwritcrs Insurance Company v. Crawley, 132 Ga.App. 181, 207
S.E.2d 666, 668 (1974) states that "surface
water"
"is used as a part of a series of contingencies all of which have in common the
property that they comprise water flowing on the surface of the ground at the
time they enter the home of the insured."
And finally, in Hatley v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 261 Or. 606, 495 P.2d 1196,
1197 (1972), the court said:
"The term 'surface water,' particularly
when used in conjunction with flood,
waves, and tidal water, was intended to
mean water 'diffused over the surface of
the ground, derived from falling rains or
melting snows.' Price v. Oregon Railroad Co., 47 Or. 350, 358, 83 P. 843, 846
(1906)."
The case of Goldfarb v. Maryland Casualty Co., 311 Ill.App. 568, 37 N.E.2d 376,
377 (1941) referred to in the opinion letter
of the trial court did not define "rain," but
did comment that "[i]t is difficult to say
where the line of demarcation lies between
rain and surface water." In finding that
there was coverage under a policy providing coverage for the peril of rain, the court
said that "[t]here is no evidence that there
was any water lying on the ground, in the
area * * * of the defective door," and that
the plaintiffs' theory "is that the rain coming between the two buildings, and through
the fire escape, fell directly before and
through the defective door of plaintiffs'
premises."
These cases do not indicate a disagreement among the courts as to the meaning
rf
of the word "flood," "surf:
ace water" and
"rain" sufficient to cloud the plain and
ordinary meaning of them. Particularly
with reference to "surface water," it is
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difficult to understand how an item can be
more plainly labeled. It is water on the
surface, other than in streams, lakes and
ponds. The parties, as reasonable people,
must have attached this plain meaning to
the words in the policy. The words "surface water" have the common meaning attributed to them by this court in State v.
Hiber, supra.
Accordingly, and mindful of the following admonishment in Worthington
v.
State, 598 P.2d at 807, we hold that appellee's damages were not covered by his policy with appellant:
"[A] court [is restrained] from liberally
and unreasonably construing an insurance contract to permit a strained or
unnatural interpretation in order to find
coverage for innocent victims who are
subjects of enormous sympathy. Otherwise, the effect would be to bind an
insurer to a risk that was not contemplated and for which it was not paid.
D'Angelo v. Cornell Paperboard Products, Co., 59 Wis.2d 46, 207 N.W.2d 846,
848 (1973)."

opening. It would seem that the parties
mu3t have intended to provide insurance
coverage for something, otherwise why
write into the policy ail of the provisions
concerning loss from windstorm, hail, rain,
snow, sleet, sand or dust.
Coverage B provides as follows:
"We insure for accidental direct physical
loss ' • '.

I would find appellant's insurance policy
ambiguous. In Coverage B, it affords insurance against loss or damage caused by
hail and rain that enter through an opening
caused by the direct force of hail. Then
§ 1 of the policy voids that coverage completely by providing thai a loss is not covered if caused partly by rain entering directly
and partly by rain which has become sur*
face water. It would be a rare occurrence
in which some rain did not, as appellant
claims, become surface water and enter the

"2. * * * when the direct force of wind
or hail damages the building causing an
opening in a roof or wall and the rain,
snow, sleet, sand or dust enters through
this opening."
The policy then provides, under SECTION
1-LOSSES NOT INSURED:
"We do not insure under any coverage
for loss * * * which would not have occurred in the absence of one or more of
the following excluded events. * * * (1)
flood, surface water * * V
"We do not insure for such loss regardless of: * * * (c) whether other causes
acted concurrently or in any sequence
with the excluded * * * loss."
The undisputed evidence in this case was
that hail broke out basement windows and
that hail and rain entered directly through
the window opening causing some damage
to the property. At this point in the occurrence, the damage was clearly covered by
the policy, for it was hail damage that
caused "an opening in a * * * wall" of the
building and the rain and hail entered
through the opening. Appellant even concedes that the broken windows are covered
damage under the insurance policy, although at the time of argument such damage was unpaid.
The insurance coverage seemingly provided by Coverage B of the insurance policy then is claimed excluded by SECTION
i—LOSSES NOT INSURED. The effect
of a literal interpretation of the exclusionary clause in § 1 is that the policy provides
no coverage at all for damage caused by
rain, for appellant contends that as soon as
the rain settles upon some surface, it be-

8, The issue argued by Mr. Paulson in Case No.
87-260 is: "Under the circumstances of this
case, State Farm's denial of coverage was unrea-

sonable or without cause, thus entitling Mr.
Paulson to interest and attorney fees pursuant
to W.S. § 26-15-124."

Case No. 87-259 is reversed. Since such
reversal makes moot the issue in the crossappeal of Herb J. Paulson in Case No.
87-260,8 the trial court's holding in that
case is affirmed.
CARDINE, J., filed a dissenting
opinion.
CARDINE, Justice, dissenting.
I dissent.
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comes surface water. And if any of that
surface water enters through an opening
caused by hail or wind and it, in combination with rain or hail entering directly,
causes damage, it is not covered. For example, assume that hail damage caused an
opening in a roof, rain entered directly
through the opening causing damage, but
some of the rain which fell on the roof
collected, ran down the roof and into the
opening causing additional damage. Under
the literal language of the policy, there
would be no coverage for the loss and
damage that occurred, for the rain that had
collected on the roof would be surface water, and it, in combination with rain entering directly and causing the total damage,
is excluded under § 1. I cannot accept that
as the intent of the parties in writing this
policy.
Appellant argued that rain did not become surface water until it fell to the
ground. I do not find that interpretation in
the policy. At least we must agree that
what is surface water and when it becomes
surface water was ambiguous insofar as
such term was used in this insurance policy. I would hold it was the intent of the
parties to provide some kind of coverage
for damage caused by hail and rain. An
ambiguous contract must be most strongly
construed against the drafter of the instrument, in this case appellant. For this reason I would affirm the decision of the
district judge. And, in any event, I would
hold that the insurance policy at least covered the damage caused by the hail and by
the rain that entered, not as surface water,
but directly through the opening itself.
Appellant contends that the major damage
was caused by surface water. That at
least is a concession that lesser damage
was caused by rain and by hail entering
directly. Without doubt, this damage was
covered under the policy.

£
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STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY
COMPANY, Appellant (Plaintiff),
v.
Gareth H. BOWEN and Dorothy
Bowen. Appellees (Defendants).
No. 87-223.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
June 3, 1988.
Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County; Edward L. Grant, Judge.
John A. Sundahl of Godfrey, Sundahl &
Jorgenson, Cheyenne, for appellant.
George Zunker, Cheyenne, for appellees.
Before BROWN, C.J., THOMAS,
CARDINE and MACY, JJ., and
ROONEY, J , Retired.
ROONEY, Retired Justice.
This is a companion case to State Farm
Fire and Casualty Company v. Paulson,
Wyo., 756 P.2d 764 (1988). The damage to
appellant's residence was caused by the
same storm which damaged the Paulson
residence. The insurance polices involved
were the same. The trial court incorporated the opinion letter in the Paulson case
into its Declaratory- Judgment, Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law in this case.
In a short opinion letter in this case, the
trial court stated:
"The principal difference in the evidence
between Paulson and Bowen was that in
Paulson, falling hail directly broke the
window and in Bowen, large masses of
hail born by water broke the window, but
the outside glass or plexiglass 'bubble'
coverings over the window wrells that Mr.
Bowen had installed were broken by
hail's direct impact."
The Declarator}7 Judgment, Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law in this case
were identical to those in the Paulson case
in all respects pertinent to this appeal.

774 Wyo.
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Accordingly, and for the reasons stated
in the Paulson case, the judgment against
appellant in this case i3 reversed.
CARDINE, J., filed a dissenting
opinion.
CARDINE, Justice, dissenting.
I dissent from the majority opinion for
the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion
filed in State Farm Fire and Casualty
Company v. Paulson, Wyo., 756 P.2d 764
(1988).
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WYOMING SAWMILLS, INC., a Wyoming corporation, Appellant
(Plaintiff/Third-Party Defendant),

Robert B. MORRIS; Raymond McCoy,
Gerald McCoy; and Gary McCoy, d/b/a
J & D Wood Products; Sheridan National Bank, and Edith I. Morris, Appellees (Defendants/Third-Party Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs).
No. 88-3.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
June 10, 1988.

Action was brought to enforce alleged
oral settlement agreement of dispute arising from parties' competing claims to 230,000 board feet of green saw logs. The
District Court, Sheridan County, Jame* N\
Wolfe, J., entered judgment enforcing
agreement, and appeal was taken. The
Supreme Court, Rooney, J., Retired, held
that finding that parties had entered into
binding oral settlement agreement prior to
date set for execution of written settlement
document was sufficiently supported by
testimony of parties.
Affirmed.

1. Contracts <3»15
Unconditional, timely acceptance of offer, properly communicated to offeror, constitutes "meeting of minds" and establishes contract.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

2. Contracts <S=>29
Whether contract has been entered
into depends on intent of parties and is
question of fact, both as to written and oral
contracts.
3. Compromise and Settlement <£=»23(3)
Finding that parties had entered into
binding oral settlement agreement prior to
date set for execution of written document
was sufficiently supported by testimony of
parties that agreement had been reached
as to all material terms; execution of written document was not condition precedent
to settlement.
4. Compromise and Settlement <£=>23(2)
Unexecuted copy of written settlement
document, which merely incorporated
terms to which parties had agreed in fourway telephone conversation, was admissible in action to enforce alleged oral settlement agreement to give meaning to and
support parties' testimony regarding conversation.
5. Appeal and Error <^204(4)
Any error arising out of trial court's
admission of unexecuted copy of written
settlement document was not plain error,
where information contained in document
was already before court by virtue of testimony of parties suing fo enforce oral
agreement.

Darlene L. Reiter of Burgess & Davis,
Sheridan, for appellant
Dan B. Riggs and Haultain E. Corbett of
Lonabaugh & Riggs, Sheridan, for appellees Robert B. Morris, Edith I. Morris, Raymond McCoy, Gerald McCoy, and Gary
McCoy d/b/a J & D Wood Products, and
Sheridan N a t Bank.
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[T 1101] L E E , P l a i n t i f f . A o o e l l a n t v.
NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE,
Defendant, Appellee
Tennessee Court
ai Nashviiie. No.
1988.J\ppeai from
son C o u n t y , ai
remanded.

of Appeals, Middle Section
S7-357-II. Filed Apni 29.
me Chancery Court. DavidNashville. Affirmed and

All-Risk I n s u r a n c e — E x c l u s i o n s of E a r t h
M o v e m e n t a n d W a t e r 3 e i o w Surface of
Ground
Damage to tne wails of a house from a shift in
the foundation caused by a leak in a sewer pipe
inside the house resulting in liquid sewage flowing beneath the foundation was excluded from
coverage under the owner"s ail-risk insurance
policy. The policy exclusions for earth movement and for damage from water beiow the
surface of the ground barred coverage.
James W. Price. Jr.. 1st American Center.
Nashville, Tenn. 57228. for Appellant. Stephen
K. Heard. Michaei J. Quinan, 3rd National
Financial Center, Nasnviiie. Tenn. 37219. for
Appeiiee.

•»• 6S8

id) water beiow the surface of the ground
including mat wnicr. exerts pressure on or
flows, seeps or ieaics througn sidewalks, driveways, foundations, wails, basement or other
floors, or tnrougn doors, windows or any other
openings in such sidewalks, driveways, foundations, wails or floors;
2. The following is added to the EXCLUSIONS section: ;
This poiicy does not insure under Section I
for loss caused directly or indirectly by any of
the following exclusions in this poiicy. Such
loss is excluded regardless of any other cause
or event contributing concurrently or in any
sequence to the loss.
c. Earth movement;
g. Water beiow the surface oi the ground;

OPINION
[All-Risk Insurance]
Plaintiff sued to recover damages to a dwelling under terms of an "ail risk" poiicy issued by
defendant. Tne Trial Judge rendered summary
judgment for tne defendant, and plaintiff
appealed.
[Issue]
The soie issue presented on appeai is whether,
under the undisputed facts, tne ioss was
excluded by poiicy provisions.
[Facts]
Plaintiffs compiaint states that a leak in a
sewer pipe inside tne nouse caused liquid sewage
to flow beneath the foundation, causing the
foundation to shift thereby producing cracks in
the wails of the nouse.
The poiicy upon which suit is brought provides:
The Company snail not be iiabie for loss:
7. due to any and
cracking, buiging or
Sidewalks, swimming
dations, wails, floors,

all settling, shrinking,
expansion of dnveways.
poois, pavements, founroofs or ceilings;

12. caused by, resulting from, contributed to,
or aggravated by any of the following:
(a) earth movement, including but not limited to earthquake, landslide, mudfiow, earth
sinking, earth rising or shifting;

Uiioi

Plaintiffs deoosition states that, in the spring
of 1985. sne saw a cracx from the earth to the
roof wnere the onck had puiied apart aoout an
inch, windows seoaratec from tne nouse an inch
or more, front door separated from tne nouse an
men. roof sunk a coupie of menes: on tne inside
sne saw dayiignt through the wail of the front
foyer, cracks in the batnroom. bedrooms: and
none of this damage was present when sne
inspected tne house 60 days before.
The affidavit of David C. Bourne, licensed
engineer, states:
6. As is reflected in the report, the distress
experienced by the structure was aimost
entirely in the form oi cracxing of the foundations, wails and floors. Said cracking was
caused by settlement of the structure. Several
possible explanations for such settlement are
contained in tne report, one of which being a
reported sewer line leak under the foundation
of the structure. Although the sewer line leak
may have been responsible in part for the
settlement which occurred. I observed no-evidence, and it is my opinion that the sewer line
leak caused no damage other than that resulting from such possible settlement, and erosion
or )oss oi ground.
7. If the sewer line leak was in fact responsible for the settlement of the structure, such
settlement occurred for the following reason:
The ieak caused an accumulation of water
beiow the surface of the ground, which in turn
caused the movement or shifting of the earth
which supports tne foundation of tne structure.
©1988, Commerce Clearing House. Inc.
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The affidavit of Edwin A. McDougie. licensed
engineer, stales:
6. Based uoon tne observations made on
September 19 anc OctoDcr 8. 1985. a report
was issuea :o Nationwiae - undated but sent
with a cover letter aatea October 22, 1985)
signed by botn myself ana Mark Dunning. A
copy oi saia report :s attacr.ea hereto as
Exhibit 2, ana a copy of said cover letter is
attached hereto as Exhibit 3. Said report concluded mat tne aamage v-isibie on :ne structure was the result of settlement in the
structure foundation, apparently aue to consolidation of soii. resulting from water penetration and not associated with biasung at
the airport. In my professional opinion and in
lignt of all information available, said report
was and remains accurate and complete..

8. After a subsequent inspection of the
house by myseif on April 20. 1986. a supplemental letter was issued to Nationwide Insurance Company, signed by myseif and dated
May 9. 1986. A copy of said letter is attached
hereto as Exhibit -v My conclusion, as
reflected in said letter, was and is that the
water coming from the n u m b i n g lea* saturated the soii under the structure ana resulted
in the settlement of the foundation, causing
the aamage snown m our original report.
9. As is reflected in the report and supplemental letter, the damages incurred by the
structure were ;n the form of cracking of the
foundations, wails, and floors. It was and is
my opinion that such cracking was the resuit
of settlement of the structure. Aithougn settlement may nave been caused by the plumbing leak discovered under the house, it is my
oomion that the piumoine .eaic was responsible for aamaee amy to the extent that it
causea the settlement of the structure.
Tne affidavit of Geraid B. Kirksey, licensed
engineer and attorney, states:
4. Prior to preparing this Affidavit, I
reviewed an .Affidavit of Eawm A. McDougie
and an Affidavit of David C. Bourne. Mr.
McDougie and I 'both reach the conclusion
that a piumomg leak in tne sewer system
triggered the movement and subsequent damage to Ms. Lee's house. Mr. Bourne concluded
that "[Bjased on the available information,
the reported sewer line leak appears, in our
opinion, to be the most prooaDie immediate
cause of the distress . . . "

First, in my opinion, the earth movement
exclusion referred to on Pages 5 and 6 of the
Memorandum refers to earth movement
caused by natural pnenomena. including
Insurance Law Reports-Fire and Casualty

earthquakes, landslides, mud flow as in the
aftermath of the St. Heiens voicano, earth
sinking such as sinkhoies, ana eartn rising or
shifting aue to geologic piate movement, volcanic action, or changes in unaerground soii
structure.
Second, the water beiow the surface of the
ground exclusion specifically refers to hydrostatic pressure caused by ground water and is
particularly relevant to basement leaks and
basement wail failures.
The effluent leaking from the sewer pipe
was not water, out was sewage wnich is a
mixture of liquids, including water, and
soiids. Whiie tne water content of the sewage
was ultimately introduced into the ground
water system, the immediate damage caused
by tne sewage was not contemplated by the
ground water exclusion. In addition, there is
no indication that the original house, which is
approximately 25 years old. or the addition,
wmen is approximately 15 years oid. was ever
adversely affected by earth movement or
water beiow the surface of the ground prior to
the 1985 sewage leak.
Finally, most of tne damage to the structure was caused by lateral earth movement,
not settlement. The north end of the two story
portion of the house moved northward
approximately two inches and westward
approximately one inch. Parts of the house,
particularly the onck veneering, were literally :orn into two parts by this movement.
Based on interviews with Ms. Lee and her
tenants, the Logsdons. and based on observation of tne aamagea area. I found no indication that the house had exhibited significant
settlement or movement prior to Apni. 1985.
• emphasis supplied)
It is seen that the only conflict in the opinions
of the experts involves tne following:
Mr. Kirksey undertakes to define the words,
"eartn movement", and "water beiow the surface of the ground" by his "opinion". His affidavit aoes not assert his personal knowledge of the
accepted technical definition of tne woras in use
among engineers: but, even if he did so. such an
opinion is immaterial to the meaning of the
woras used in a contract between an insurance
company ana a property owner neither of wnom
is shown to be cognizant of technical engineering
terms.
[ E a r t h Movement Exclusion]
The terms of a contract of insurance are to be
construed according to their piam. ordinary, and
popular sense, unless the words have acquired a
technical sense by commercial usage. Purdy v.
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Ins. Co.. Tenn. App.
1979, 586 S.W.2d 128. or uniess a contrary

UlOl

1808

4 6-38

1988 Fire and Casualty Cases

intent is snown. Williams v. Bankers Life Co.,
Tenn.App. 1971. 481 S.W.2d 386.
There :s no showing that the quoted words
nave acquired a technical meaning by commercial usage or m a t the parties intended a special
meaning wnen making the contract. Accordingly. :ne ordinary, popular meaning of the
words wiii control.
The woros. "earth movement", mean:
differential movement of the earth's crust;
elevation or subsidence of land. «
Webster s Third New International Dictionary;
Unabridged. <
Taken separately the meaning of the word,
"earth", includes:
fraementai material composing pan. of the
surface of the giooe: soil, ground, usually distmguisned from bed rock.
Ibid.

Thus, the words, "water under the surface of
the ground", mean any water beiow the extreme
upper crust of tne soil wnicn retains its characteristic of liquidity.
[Conclusion!
The uncontradicted evidence shows that the
damage was caused by water under the surface
of the ground. Water flowing in a sewer pipe is
still water, even though it is mixed with waste.
The same water is stiii water wnen it ;eaKS from
the sewer pipe and moves beiow the surface of
the ground. Although it may not be "ground
water" in the sense oi a suDterranean stream, it
is nevertneiess "water under the surface of tne
ground", as described in tne poiicy.
It is uncontroverted from the factual statements of the complaint, deposition and affidavits that plaintiffs damages resulted from:
(a) Earth movement, including . . . mud flow.
earth sinking.. . . rising or smiting;

The word, "movement", means:
The action or process of moving, change of
piace or position or posture.
ibid.

•:

It inus appears that, taken together or separately, tne words, earth movement, mean any
cnanse of piace, position or posture of the soil.
[ W a t e r Beiow Surface of Ground]
Likewise, the words, "water rjeiow the surface
of me ground." have a ciear popuiar meaning.
Water means:
the licuid that descends from the ciouds as
rain, forms streams. iaKes and seas.
Weoster i. supra. No distinction is made in the
definition of water to exclude that wnich contains impurities or pollutants so long as it
retains its predominant characteristic of liquidity. For example, river water is water no matter
how muddy and sea water is water no matter
how saity.
The word, "below", means:
downward from, at a lower levei than, underneath.
Webster's, supra.
The word, "surface", means:
the exterior or outside of an object, the outermost or uppermost ooundary.
WeDster's. supra.
The word, "ground", means: '
the surface on which man stands, moves and
dwells and on which oDiects naturally rest,
the surface of the earth.
Webster's, supra.

II1102

\d) Water beiow tne surface of the ground.
Therefore, tne oss is excluded oy the provisions of the poticy. quoted aoove.
When tne undisDuted facts entitle a party to
a judgment as a matter ox law. thai party is
entitled to a summary judgment. Ferguson v.
Tomerun. Tenn.App. 1983. 656 S.W.2d 378.
The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed.
Costs of this appeai are taxed against appellant.
The cause is remanded for such further proceedings, if any. as may be necessary and proper.
Affirmed and remanded.
HENRY F. TODD
PRESIDING JVDGZ
CONCUR:
SAMUEL L. LEWIS. J U D G E
BEN H. CANTRELL. JUDGE

[11102] C H I C O L A d / b / a / C E N T R A L
LOUISIANA
FISHERIES
v. S U N
I N S U R A N C E C O M P A N Y OF NEW
YORK
United States District Court, Western District of Louisiana. Alexandria Division. Civ. A.
No. 85-1564. September 2, 1987. 677 F.Supp.
463.
Liability I n s u r a n c e — L a c k of Liability on
P a r t of Insured
A carrier of fish, whose policy covered his
"liability" as carrier oi merchandise, was not
entitled to coverage under such poiicy for the
theft from his truck of fish being transported
from the owner to the owner's customers. The
(5198S, Commerce Clearing House, Inc.
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